Abstract
The paper examines the effects of distortions in agricultural incentives in the industrial, developing, and European socialist countries. It is concluded that lowering agricultural protection in the industrial and the European socialist countries while reducing industrial protection in the developing countries would contribute to economic welfare overall by improving resource allocation in world agriculture as well as in world industry. These conclusions point to the desirability of multilateral trade negotiations that would permit simultaneous changes in policies.
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