Abstract
We show that the presence of dual holders following the mergers between institutional shareholders and creditors of industry firms leads to a decrease in the firms' excessive corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The negative effect of dual holders on CSR activities is stronger for firms with more severe conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors or managerial agency problems. Further analysis indicates that decreased CSR activities are associated with greater firm value. Our findings provide evidence that dual holders mitigate agency-motivated CSR activities.
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