Age-based dismissals under the Slovak Labour Code: Compliance with EU and international standards

Traditionally, fundamental human rights have occupied an important place in labor law. The ILO constitution of 1919 focuses, for example, on the right of freedom of association. Subsequent ILO documents stress other fundamental rights such as the right to non-discrimination in the field of labor. The fundamental rights of the worker did begin to get some attention in the EU too, especially in non-binding documents such as the Community Charter of the Rights of the Worker from 1989. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights introduced at the summit in Nice is legally binding to the same extent as the EU Treaty itself. The Charter includes fundamental rights in the field of labor law under the heading ‘solidarity'. In this article two basic questions will be addressed. The first question will address the ‘old' issue of the clash between fundamental (labor) rights and the four economic freedoms of the EU, which are seen by the ECJ as of fundamental nature as well. Since the seminal cases of Viking and Laval, a lot has been written about this theme by both European and labor lawyers. I will not revisit the literature that has been written about these cases, but the more dogmatic issue of a (potential) clash between the four economic freedoms and the fundamental rights is still in need of clarification. The second question is whether the fundamental human rights will get a more important place in the case law of the European Court of Justice now that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is of binding character, or, will there be just a continuation of the already developed relationship between fundamental freedoms and rights or between two different kind of fundamental human rights? I will focus here on case law in the field of labor law. The article will finish with a plea for a proportionality test ‘light' in order to limit the interference of EU law with the essence of fundamental rights.

It is noted that the European vector of development, enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine since 2019, has prompted large-scale transformations of the national legal system aimed at its gradual harmonization with the legal framework of the European Union (acquis communautaire). The article examines European human rights standards and analyses the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a fundamental act of the European Union that enshrines these standards. The legal content of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is analyzed separately, as well as the issue of its implementation in the legal system of Ukraine, which is being integrated into the legal system of the European Union. It emphasizes that human dignity is a fundamental value in European Union law and, given the system of fundamental rights, occupies a decisive place in the hierarchy of fundamental rights of the European Union. It establishes that European standards in the field of human rights should be a benchmark for the development not only of the European Union, its institutions and Member States, but also of other countries that are integrating their national legal orders into the legal system of the European Union. The article analyses certain provisions of the Roadmap on the Rule of Law, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in May 2025. Thus, among the priority steps within the framework of European integration in Ukraine, it is necessary to develop an Action Plan for the implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy, improve the mechanism for the enforcement of European Court of Human Rights judgments, and introduce annual monitoring of the effectiveness of this mechanism, with a view to enhancing the level of human rights protection both during the war and in the post-war recovery period. In conclusion, it is proposed that Ukraine, as a candidate country for European Union membership, should incorporate European standards into its legal system through European integration reforms and implement the principles and norms of EU law, in particular those relating to fundamental rights, in activities of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.

This study puts into historical perspective the balance defined by the European treaties between the economic and social dimensions of the European project. It highlights the two main characteristics of the building of social Europe. First, rather than constituting an objective for its own sake, social Europe has until recently developed as an accompanying measure of the economic integration between the Member States of the European Community, and now the European Union. Second, it has developed through a diversity of legal methods, including in the process a large array of actors. Social Europe today results, first, from certain provisions of the Rome Treaty, from legislative measures, and from the case-law of the European Court of Justice. But it also has developed from the adoption of political declarations which are not legally binding – such as the 1989 Community Charter of fundamental social rights of workers and the 2000 Charter of fundamental rights –, from European social dialogue, and from the “open” coordination between the Member States in the fields of employment and social inclusion. The study identifies the different historical stages in the building of social Europe, and it replaces those stages in a theoretical framework in order to shed light on the logic which connects them with one another.

Social Rights in Refugee Law and Human Rights Law: The Non-discrimination Principle as a Harmonization Tool

Selected Instruments of Collective Labour Law in the Light of the European Social Charter (Revised), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ILO Conventions and the European Pillar of Social Rights

Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.

Abstract. It has been argued that human rights politics is detrimental to social integration. But human rights are not merely abstract principles which, when positivated, secure negative freedom. When they are constitutionalised and turned into fundamental rights they contain a guarantee for equal freedom to all citizens. A charter of fundamental rights is a means to enhance the legal certainty of the citizens, reduce arbitrariness and moral imperialism and to institutionalise the right to justification. However, as the principle of popular sovereignty points to a particular society, and human rights point to an ideal republic, only with a cosmopolitan order can the problem of human rights politics be resolved.

This paper analyzes the legal rules and standards concerning the conduct of remote court hearings, held via videoconferencing, in civil litigation. In the context of the legal implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, national legal systems have faced an increased need for accelerated digitalization of the judiciary, bringing to the forefront the question of how to ensure that the use of modern technologies in civil proceedings does not result in the restriction of the parties’ procedural rights. The author examines the domestic normative framework, primarily the provisions of the current Civil Procedure Act, and determines the extent to which it enables or limits remote adjudication. The paper then explores relevant European and international standards: the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the CEPEJ Guidelines on the use of videoconferencing in judicial proceedings, the standards of the European Union (the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU recommendations and regulations), along with a comparative-law overview illustrating the application of these standards in practice. Special attention is given to the inherent tension between the tendency toward judicial digitalization and the need to preserve guarantees of procedural rights and fundamental principles of civil procedure. The paper also provides recommendations for improving the domestic normative framework, based on European standards, in order to enable the effective use of remote justice while fully respecting all rights encompassed by the notion of a fair trial.

The EU’s approach to fake news, as epitomised by the European External Action (EEAS) Service East Stratcom Disinformation Review, violates the rights to freedom of expression and due process of those accused of distributing disinformation. The EU Disinformation Review is a publication of the European External Action Service (the European Union’s diplomatic service) to target fake news and online disinformation. Following our request for access to documents, EEAS conceded that the EU Disinformation Review uses an “ad hoc” methodology for conducting its fact-checks, which makes it an outlier in the international fact-checking community led by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Despite being a well-intentioned initiative to respond to the challenges posed by pro-Kremlin disinformation, the EU should ensure the respect of fundamental rights when engaging in fact-checking. The EU Disinformation Review seeks to control the right to freedom of expression by labelling publishers as “disinforming outlets” and their content as “disinformation,” creating a chilling effect on the work of journalists that is central to democracy. The right to freedom of expression is expressed in Article 11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The labelling of publishers as “disinformation outlets” is contrary to principle of the freedom of press established by the European Court of Human Rights: “[a] general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’ role of providing information on current events, opinion and ideas.” In addition, the methodology used by EEAS in the EU Disinformation Review is “ad hoc,” which constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to good administration in Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, the ad hoc design and operation of the EU Disinformation Review fails to ensure the review acts “impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time.” First, publications are not provided with the right to be heard or proper notice. The EU Disinformation Review’s homepage offers an opportunity to contact the Task Force report a suspected mistake in a fact-check but the page is only available in English, in violation of the principle of multilingualism, and no notice if given to outlets accused of being “disinforming outlets” before or after fact-checks of their content are published. Second, the EEAS does not fulfil its duty to motivate. EEAS is given a broad margin of discretion to identify disinformation, but fails to do so according to a consistent methodology. Therefore, EEAS cannot justify, on the basis of objective criteria, its choice of which content to review and how to determine its truth or falsehood. To comply with EU law and ensure the respect of fundamental rights, the EEAS should develop and make public (1) a methodology for selecting partnerships and reviewing fact-checks in line with international standards and (2) a notice and response mechanism for journalists, publishers and citizens whose content is being reviewed. If EEAS is unable to comply with the above, the EU Disinformation Review should be shut down.

Правовое пространство Европейского Союза в целом относится к степени распространения правовых норм этой организации. Политико-правовое значение Хартии основных прав Союза в ее правовом пространстве вытекает из юридической силы и состояния реализации положений указанного документа. Поэтому роль Хартии Европейского Союза об основных правах в сфере регулирования и надзора за деятельностью структур, действующих на ее основе, определяется новым политико-правовым значением Хартии (имеющим обязательную юридическую силу) в правовом пространстве ЕС. Однако несмотря на то, что со временем в этой области были проведены фундаментальные исследования, а в результате анализа литературы и научных статей на тему участия Казахстана в международном сотрудничестве с государствами Европейского Союза по защите прав человека и основных свобод, стало известно, что данная тема недостаточно изучена в отечественной юридической науке. Это, безусловно, важные факторы, определяющие актуальность данной темы. Основная цель статьи – доказать место и значение Хартии Европейского Союза об основных правах в системе защиты прав человека и основных свобод. В статье выделяются некоторые актуальные политико-правовые вопросы, связанные с Хартией Европейского Союза об основных правах, состоянием ее реализации и перспективы. Также в статье рассмотрены реальные и возможные аспекты вопроса о получении Республикой Казахстан соответствующих международно-правовых обязательств в качестве партнера Европейского Союза по вышеупомянутой Хартии. Выводы, представленные в статье, могут быть использованы при практической реализации Хартии основных прав Европейского Союза. Также это может учитываться при выполнении международных обязательств Республики Казахстан. Ключевые слова: Хартия, соглашение, международная организация, государства-члены, государства-партнеры, европейское право.

The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has strengthened the position of the European Ombudsman, since the Charter contains an article specifically dedicated to the Ombudsman. At the same time, the Ombudsman, through her/his practice, contributes to the implementation in the everyday life of the provisions of the Charter and their further development. The consolidation and development of the provisions of the Charter by the European Ombudsman have proceeded especially rapidly since the Charter of Fundamental Rights received the status of a binding act. Due to the fact that the right to “good administration” contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights has become one of the basic human rights in the EU since the Charter became legally binding, the competence of the European Ombudsman has acquired a new substantive and factual (functional) content, expanding her/his ability to positively influence the EU administration in the field of governance and respect for fundamental rights. This article examines, based on legal acts, statistical and other factual data, the interrelated issues (such as institutional and human dimensions of European integration) of ensuring the effectiveness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights through the activities of the European Ombudsman.

Specifics of human rights institution development and formation in the European Union are researched. The problem of the human rights protection and corresponding standards of such rights were analyzed in the scientific works of such scholars as Tabushka S., Nanette N., Allan R., Entin K., Ispolinov А., Belova G., Gaja G. These scientists researched different aspects of evolution and elaboration of human rights protection in the primary and secondary legislation of the European Union, namely role of the Court of European Union in this process, amendment of the founding treaties of the European Union bearing in mind necessity of the human rights protection clauses. At the same time it is worth mentioning that within Ukrainian scholars the problem of European Union human rights standards has not been sufficiently researched, notwithstanding fact that after signing Agreement on Associated Partnership between Ukraine and European Union that very the problem of approximation of Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of human rights towards European Union standards became of paramount importance. That is why the goal of this article to research and suggest some particular suggestions for amendment of the Constitution of Ukraine in the realm of fundamental human rights and freedeoms. Norms of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union are analyzed through the prism of Charter understanding as the main legal instrument of human rights protection in this international organization, as well as perspectives of legal protection enhancing of human rights in this international formation are researched. A special emphasis is being made in relation to the possible accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe. Efforts are being made for analyzing draft legal instruments on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights – Agreement on Accession. Key words : Human Rights, European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights.

1. Introduction 1.1. The new legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: The much anticipated entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought about a number of changes and additions to the existing body of Union law. A significant addition can be found in Article 6 TEU which reads: Article 6 1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions. 2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties. 3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law. These recent developments may be viewed in light of criticism that has been raised against the EU for an inconsistent and incoherent approach to fundamental rights protection. In particular, criticism has been voiced over how the EU’s strong insistence on fundamental rights protection in its external relations did not appear to be matched by an equally strong “internal” focus on such fundamental rights protection. Some commentators also took the view that the EU at its then current state (at the turn of the millennium) was inappropriate as a human rights organisation in its own right. In this light, it is clear that with the new Article 6 TEU the protection of fundamental rights in the EU context has been taken to a new level. While the EU perhaps cannot be said to have become a proper “human rights organisation”, clearly steps have been taken in the Lisbon Treaty to highlight the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights protection. An immediate example would be the obligation for the EU to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR/the Convention). Moreover, Article 6 TEU also brings about changes for the Member States. By turning the Charter of Fundamental Rights into a legally binding instrument, Article 6 TEU also obliges the Member States to respect the provisions of the Charter. The new legal status of the Charter raises several questions. First of all, however, it should be noted that the Member States’ obligation to respect fundamental rights is not a new creation. In fact, this obligation has been enforced by the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) on numerous occasions in the past. With the new legal status of the Charter, has the obligation to respect and even protect fundamental rights also been elevated to a new and higher status in Union law? If so, what does that entail?

The Consequences of the “Constitutionalization” of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Although the EU prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination under non-discrimination law theoretically applies to algorithmic recruitment, doubts exist about whether the prohibition can tackle algorithmic recruitment discrimination in practical terms. This article examines two significant obstacles to dealing with direct discrimination identified in prior research: ambiguity in determining whether proxy discrimination constitutes direct discrimination, and the incapacity of job applicants to meet the burden of proof. First, the analysis of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law suggests that the inextricable link doctrine could apply to proxies used by algorithmic recruitment systems, assuming that the proxies are comprehensible and detectable. In cases in which the proxies remain unintelligible or invisible, it might still be possible to show that the protected ground determined the decision to impose less favourable treatment. Thus, proxy discrimination in algorithmic systems could constitute direct discrimination. Moreover, the direct discrimination prohibition could deal with more proxy discrimination cases if the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) is acknowledged when an EU Regulation directly applies to algorithmic recruitment. Second, the research discloses that the burden of proof could be interpreted in a way which allows applicants to establish prima facie cases of algorithmic recruitment discrimination even if they lack access to detailed information about the workings of the algorithmic recruitment system. The challenges of direct discrimination in algorithmic recruitment might not be insuperable, and the prohibition of direct discrimination should not be sidestepped when analysing the discriminatory tendencies of algorithmic recruitment.