Against Phenomenal Intentionality as Intrinsic Reductive Intentionality

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 3 argues against the phenomenal intentionality approach. This approach is presented as an instance of a more general strategy that takes intentionality to be determined by some intrinsic mental property, and the chapter argues against this strategy as well. After presenting the theories of phenomenal intentionality on which the chapter focuses as those suggesting non-circular responses to the question of intentionality, the main arguments in their favor are criticized. Special attention is given to the argument from introspection. It is argued, first, that due to the transcending nature of intentionality introspection cannot inform us of it, and second, that pure first-person judgments about intentionality are vacuous. For either reason, arguments from introspection for both the phenomenal intentionality thesis and the thesis that phenomenality resolves content indeterminacy fail. Arguments are then presented against both conceptual reductions of intentionality to phenomenality (and, more generally, to intrinsic mental properties) and synthetic-empirical ones.