Abstract
ABSTRACT In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in how the object looks. I here respond on behalf of the representationalist. Against the argument of Block, I give a “companions-in-guilt” argument that the dilemma Block claims to find for the representationalist will, in fact, arise for anyone who accepts that attention can alter appearance in the described manner. I conclude that the facts about attention’s effects on appearance give no specific reason to reject representationalism alone. Meanwhile, I argue that Block fails to adequately motivate a key claim, the ‘phenomenal precision principle’ upon which he relies. I conclude that the representationalist has nothing to fear from.
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