Affective States: Cultural and Affective Polarization in a Multilevel-Multiparty System

Political campaign activities are increasingly digital. A crucial part of digital campaigning is communication efforts on social media platforms. As a forum for political discourse and political communication, parties and candidates on Twitter share public messages and aim to attract media attention and persuade voters. Party or prominent candidate hashtags are a central element of the campaign communication strategy since journalists and citizens search for these hashtags to follow the current debate concerning the hashed party or political candidate. Political elites and partisans use social media strategically, e.g., to link their messages to a broader debate, increase the visibility of messages, criticize other parties, or take over their hashtags (hashjacking). This study investigates the cases of the most recent 2017 and 2021 German federal elections called 'Bundestagswahlen'. The investigation (1) identifies communities of partisans in retweet networks in order to analyze the polarization of the most prominent hashtags of parties, 2) assesses the political behavior by partisan groups that amplify messages by political elites in these party networks, and 3) examines the polarization and strategic behavior of the identified partisan groups in the broader election hashtag debates using #BTW17 and #BTW21 as the prominent hashtags of the 2017 and 2021 elections. While in 2017, the far-right party 'Alternative für Deutschland' (AfD) and its partisans are in an isolated community, in 2021, they are part of the same community as the official party accounts of established conservative and liberal parties. This broader polarization may indicate changes in the political ideology of these actors. While the overall activity of political elites and partisans increased between 2017 and 2021, AfD politicians and partisans are more likely to use other party hashtags, which resulted in the polarization of the observed parts of the German political twitter sphere. While in 2017, the AfD polarized German Twitter, 2021 shows a broader division along the classical left–right divide.

In this paper, we isolate four problems associated with diverse teams: occupational unboundedness, minority gender isolation, generational diversity and cultural differences. Using the surgical team as an example of a diverse team, we present a model based on the Affective Events Theory (AET). In our model, daily hassles and problems encountered by group members result in affective events, which precipitate affective states. The affective states, in turn, have consequences for affect- and judgement-driven behavior, and for attitude formation. We also argue that dispositional affectivity, emotional intelligence, and effective management modify the links between diverse team, problems, affective events, and affective states. In particular, effective management holds the key to the problems in this model, thus allowing for synergy to develop within surgical teams.

The 2017 federal elections in Germany propelled the far-right party “Alternative fur Deutschland” (“Alternative for Germany” – AfD) to become the third largest party in the federal parliament. I argue that this electoral success can be explained by the party’s ability to mobilize a large part of the electorate that had abstained in previous elections. Theoretically, I argue that the AfD was able to asymmetrically mobilize voters because of its unique position in the German party system and because of a perceived centrist move of the CDU/CSU. Drawing on data from the Federal Returning Office, I show that the AfD was able to mobilize the electorate more successfully than other parties and that the party’s electoral success was in large part due to this mobilization success with the change in turnout the second strongest predictor of AfD vote shares. Furthermore, employing individual level data, I show that (a) a plurality of those voters who did not participate in the 2013 elections but participated in the 2017 elections voted for the AfD; and (b) that the centrist move of the CDU is perceived much more pronouncedly among AfD voters than among non-AfD voters.

A design for studies on cognitive bias in the domestic pig

Characteristics and consequences of co-experienced positive affect: understanding the origins of social skills, social bonds, and caring, healthy communities

Extending literature on political polarization and political expression, we study patterns of polarized expression by vocal partisans from opposing camps on social media. Specifically, we argue that polarized partisan expression can be characterized by three divergences: 1) different thematic emphases on the same issue; 2) response to different real-world events on the same issue; and 3) a temporal disconnect at the aggregate level. Highlighting how online expression by different partisan groups is animated by discrete concerns and events and exhibits different temporality, the three divergences in polarized partisan expression not only reflect and explain existing polarization concepts but also speak to the epistemological chasm between partisan groups. Our empirical analysis is based on Twitter discussion about the issue of immigration in the U.S. and applies topic modeling and time series analysis. Results demonstrate that liberal and conservative tweets exhibit different thematic emphases, are often spurred by different event features, and remain largely temporally independent, though both Trump’s tweets and emotionally evocative events can draw simultaneous reaction from both sides. These findings suggest that opposing partisan groups not only hold different views on the same issue, but also weave different events and facts about the issue into partisan expression in response to different exogenous factors. In short, they “talk past each other.” These polarized partisan expression patterns indicate a splintered public sphere, a concerning quality for deliberative democracy.

The authors find reasons to question whether conventional measures of job satisfaction capture the original conception of 'morale'. In particular, evidence suggests that these measures reflect primarily cognitive evaluation rather than affective state or hedonic tone. Recent developments indicate that cognitive and affective systems may be somewhat independent of each other. Questions are raised concerning the appropriate means of measuring affect, as well as whether the antecedents and consequences of affect are expected to differ from those associated with cognitive appraisal.

Since its publication in 1996, Affective Events Theory (AET) has come to be regarded as the seminal explanation for structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work. AET does not, however, elucidate why, how, and when objects and events in the workplace trigger moods and emotions which in turn influence cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Consequently, AET does not yet provide us with a theoretical basis upon which to predict the way in which contextual, cognitive, motivational, or individual factors might moderate the impact of workplace events on affective states and subsequent behavior. In this chapter, we outline the central tenets of AET, and review a model of the processes underlying AET, with a view to understanding individual differences in the manifestation and consequences of affect in the workplace.

ABSTRACTThe anti-fascist movement is generally viewed as a reaction to the extreme right by concerned left-wing activists. Therefore we would not expect the Antifa to feature in countries where extreme right activism is not a feature of the politics. However, Ireland has no significant extreme right but it still has an anti-fascist movement that plays an influential role within radical left circles. By treating Ireland as an outlier in relation to the existing reactive explanation for anti-fascist mobilisation this paper takes a deviant case analysis approach to generate novel hypotheses behind the reasons for the anti-fascist movement. First, anti-fascism acts as a site of left convergence, an area of unity that transcends the usual ideological divisions that can impede other types of political collaboration in a fragmented radical left activist base. Second, in the absence of effective extreme right forces, anti-fascism acts as a form of prophylactic action. In effect, the aim of this activism is to deny political space to extreme right micro groups before they become a popular force or a more serious political threat. Finally, a close cultural lineage between elements within the left and a past revolutionary tradition will increase the appeal of anti-fascist activism among left-wing activists.

Most research focuses on actual affect, or the affective states that people actually feel. In this article, I demonstrate the importance and utility of studying ideal affect, or the affective states that people ideally want to feel. First, I define ideal affect and describe the cultural causes and behavioral consequences of ideal affect. To illustrate these points, I compare American and East Asian cultures, which differ in their valuation of high-arousal positive affective states (e.g., excitement, enthusiasm) and low-arousal positive affective states (e.g., calm, peace-fulness). I then introduce affect valuation theory, which integrates ideal affect with current models of affect and emotion and, in doing so, provides a new framework for understanding how cultural and temperamental factors may shape affect and behavior.

The 2017 federal elections in propelled the far-right party Alternative fur Deutschland (Alternative for Germany – AfD) to become the third largest party in the federal parliament. I argue that this strong result of a party that is at odds with much of the post war German political consensus can be explained by a) the move of the Christian-Democratic CDU/CSU to the political center and the resulting increase in similarity between center-left and center-right political forces; b) a de-politicization of politics, especially in the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis and during the reign of the grand coalition. Drawing on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the Party Manifesto Project, I show that the AfD inhabits an otherwise unpopulated region of the policy space where it puts particular emphasis on anti-EU positions. In the next step, drawing on data from the Federal Returning Office, I show that the AfD was able to mobilize the electorate more successfully than other parties and that the party's electoral success was in large part due to this mobilization success with the change in turnout the second strongest predictor of AfD vote shares.

Growing attitudinal and affective differences across party lines and increasing social polarization are often attributed to the strengthening of partisanship as a social identity. Scholars have paid less attention to personal preferences as a contributor to these phenomena. Our focus is on how citizens’ policy beliefs—their operational ideologies—are associated with their views of partisan groups. We examine our perspective with two studies. In the first, we find that the attribution of ideologically extreme political views to an individual's peer significantly reduces interest in interpersonal interaction but find limited evidence that partisan group membership alone induces social polarization. In the second, we show that citizens’ policy views are strongly associated with their perceptions of their own partisan group as well as their counterpartisans. Together, our results have important implications for understanding the consequences of increased polarization and partisan antipathy in contemporary politics.

If anti-immigration parties perform well in national elections, the media also in other countries will cover their success. This initiates a process of cross-national influence, which we argue polarizes public opinion abroad. This article examines the case of migration attitudes and how they are shaped by national election outcomes in other countries. We analyze data from the European Social Survey (ESS), and individual-level data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) in the context of the 2017 federal election in Germany. The combined findings from these analyses support our argument: citizens' polarization in one country is influenced by foreign anti-immigration parties’ electoral success. Our research holds direct implications for the understanding of public attitudes toward migration, how public opinion is formed, political polarization, and cross-country political diffusion processes.

Previous research has shown that expectancy violations can have both affective and cognitive consequences. In particular, recent victimological research argues that people’s perceptions and judgments of victims are negatively influenced when their expectations of the victim’s emotional behavior are violated. That is, expectancy violation may lead to secondary victimization: victims may be judged to be less credible, suffer higher levels of victim derogation, and receive less sympathy as a result of expectancy violation. In this study, we elaborate upon these affective consequences and examine possible cognitive consequences of expectancy violation in victimological research. We found preliminary evidence for secondary victimization in both affective and cognitive domains: when evaluated by student observers, victims of ‘mildly’ severe crimes who delivered an emotional victim impact statement not only ran the risk of being evaluated as less credible than victims of more severe crimes who delivered the exact same victim impact statement, but their victim impact statement was also remembered less accurately.

Disrupting motivational sequences in chicks: Are there affective consequences?