Advancing ecosystem services auctions: Insights from an international Delphi panel

Abstract

Auction theory has made major contributions to overcoming allocation problems involving asymmetric information and common-pool resources, leading to multiple Nobel Prizes and serving as a foundation for multi-billion-dollar markets. Despite evidence that related mechanisms could enhance the performance of payments for ecosystem services (PES), adoption has been sporadic and inconsistent. One possibility is that the relevant peer reviewed literature has low visibility or consensus design elements are not sufficiently accessible to interested experts. To overcome this barrier, we adopt a straightforward approach: we asked the PES auction subfield to describe itself. In collaboration with an expert panel (n = 32) whose affiliations span more than two dozen universities and research bodies across three continents—including top-ranked economists, ecosystem services theorists, and practitioners with experience designing and implementing PES programs with and without auctions—we synthesize a birds-eye view of ecosystem services auctions for an interdisciplinary audience. Through an iterative, mixed-method Delphi consultation, we identify broad consensus about fundamental elements of theory and practice, including what functions auctions tend to perform well, common challenges, and key factors influencing their performance. By selecting topics that panelists appeared to disagree about for further discussion, we also highlight open questions and potential research frontiers. We conclude with a reflection on using the Delphi method to foster exchange between time-constrained experts.