Administrative Sanctions in EU Law

Í meginmáli EES-samningsins er ekki að finna nein fyrirmæli um vernd mannréttinda samkvæmt samningnum. Því féll það í hlut EFTA-dómstólsins að móta reglur þar að lútandi innan EFTA-stoðarinnar. Samkvæmt dómaframkvæmd hans er nú ljóst að mannréttindavernd telst til almennra meginreglna EES-samningsins. Við mótun efnis þeirra er tekið mið af ákvæðum Mannréttindasáttmála Evrópu og dóma Mannréttindadómstólsins. Grundvöllur meginreglunnar um mannréttindavernd er einsleitni og staða mannréttindaverndar líkt og EFTA-dómstóllinn hefur mótað hana er sambærileg við það sem gilti innan ESB-réttar áður en Réttindaskrá Sambandsins varð bindandi. Réttarstaðan samkvæmt EES-rétti hefur komið til athugunar hjá Mannréttindadómstól Evrópu í kærum gagnvart Noregi. Í dómum hans er tekið mið af dómaframkvæmd EFTA-dómstólsins og hvernig vernd mannréttinda er tryggð innan EFTA-stoðarinnar. Hann hefur hafnað því að leggja til grundvallar svonefnda Bosphorus forsendu um EES-samninginn líkt og hann gerir um vernd mannréttinda samkvæmt ESB-rétti. Í henni felst að Mannréttindadómstóllinn gengur út frá því að reglur Sambandsréttar séu fullnægjandi nema að leitt sé í ljós að í tilteknu máli sé þeim augljóslega ábótavant. Innan ESB-stoðarinnar ræðst mannréttindavernd innan gildissviðs EES-samningsins af ákvæðum Réttindaskrár Sambandsins. Eftir að hún varð bindandi með gildistöku Sáttmálans um starfshætti Evrópusambandsins hefur mikilvægi hennar aukist verulega og gegnir hún lykilhlutverki við skýringu ESB-réttar. Réttindaskráin er ekki hluti af EES-rétti og því ekki bindandi fyrir EFTA-ríkin. Við nánari athugun á ákvæðum Réttindaskrárinnar er niðurstaðan sú að ekki sé ástæða til að telja að tilvist og áhrif Réttindaskrárinnar hafi í för með sér að ekki verði unnt að viðhalda einsleitni samkvæmt EES-samningnum. The main part of the EEA Agreement does not lay down any rules regarding the protection of human rights. Accordingly, it fell to the EFTA Court to determine the regulation thereof within the EFTA pillar of the Agreement. It follows from the case law of the EFTA Court that the protection of human rights is a general principle of EEA law. The content of the principle is inspired by the provision of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The legal basis of this general principle is homogeneity and the status of human rights protection within the EFTA pillar is comparable to the prevailing situation within EU law prior to the Charter of Fundamental Rights becoming a binding legal instrument. The protection of human rights under the terms of the EEA Agreement has been the subject of examination by the European Court of Human Rights in cases against Norway. These judgments have taken note of the jurisprudence of the EFTA Court and the general principle of protection of human rights established thereunder. The Court of Human Rights has not extended the so-called Bosphorus presumption, applicable in the context of EU law, to the EEA Agreement. According to that presumption, the Court presumes that human rights protection under EU law is sufficient for the purposes of the Convention, unless it is demonstrated to be manifestly deficient in a particular case. Within the EU pillar of the Agreement, the protection of human rights under the Agreement is governed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. After it became binding, following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, its significance has grown considerably, and it now plays a key role in the interpretation of EU law. The Charter is not part of the EEA Agreement and thus not binding for the EFTA States. On a closer examination of the Charter, it may be concluded that there is no reason to assume that the existence and influence of the Charter should lead to homogeneity within the EEA not being maintained.

The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights vs. The Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - A Comparison

The article analyses the process of applying the European Court of Human Rights case law and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 in criminal proceedings in Ukraine. The basic principles arising from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and their impact on national legislation and court practice are investigated. Particular attention is paid to the issues of observance of the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, prohibition of torture and effective investigation of human rights violations. The key cases of the European Court of Human Rights against Ukraine, which have determined the directions of reforms in the field of criminal justice, are analysed. The problems of implementation of the European Court of Human Rights case law in the criminal justice system of Ukraine, in particular, the formal approach to the use of case law, the lack of an effective mechanism for the execution of judgments and insufficient training of law enforcement and law enforcement agencies are investigated. The following prospects for improving the application of the European Court of Human Rights case law in criminal proceedings in Ukraine are identified: 1) the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine to comply with European standards, in particular, with regard to the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, protection against torture and unlawful detention, ill-treatment, etc.; 2) the development of recommendations to improve the training of judges, prosecutors, lawyers and pre-trial investigation bodies; 3) the strengthening of control over the observance of human rights, the reasonableness of the time limits during the pre-trial investigation, and fair and lawful trial; The following prospects for improving the application of the European Court of Human Rights case law in criminal proceedings in Ukraine are identified: 4) the improvement of procedures for verification, evaluation and examination of evidence in order to protect the defence from unlawful actions of the prosecution; 5) the introduction of mechanisms for the effective implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in individual cases; 6) the provision of adequate funding and resources to law enforcement and law enforcement agencies.

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

In the recent period of Ukrainian history, scholars pay attention to the discussion of the relationship between Ukrainian constitutional law and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the place of rulings and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the legal system of Ukraine. The analysis of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and current Ukrainian legislation is made in the article. It is made in order to determine the impact of this act of the Council of Europe on the constitutional law of Ukraine. It is noted that the Convention plays an important role in the process of protection of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine and has an impact on the implementation of the rule of law, which relate to individual’s constitutional status. It is noted that the European Convention significantly increases the level of the effectiveness of constitutional human rights legislation. The role of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in the formation and activity of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has been determined. The thesis that within the ratio of the Convention and Ukrainian law, the supremacy of the latter within the national legal system does not eliminate the need to comply with international obligations is substantiated in the article. The grounds for restricting human and civil rights and freedoms in accordance with the requirements of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the constitutional legislation of Ukraine are considered in the article. In order to ensure national security, the restriction of human and civil rights and freedoms in a state of martial law and emergency is analyzed. By introducing martial law and a state of emergency, it is possible to concentrate temporarily all the levers of control over the individual’s status by coercive means within the framework of official power. The conclusion that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have had a significant impact on the formation and development of human and civil rights and freedoms as basic, value priorities of the constitutional law of Ukraine is substantiated in the article. Key words: constitutional law, sources of law, Council of Europe, Constitution of Ukraine, Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Court of Human Rights.

With the introduction of a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights and the envisaged accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the Treaty of Lisbon significantly affects the legal system for the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. It is argued that those innovations reinforce the integration between different legal suborders at the national, European Union and pan-European level into a common constitutional space. Simultaneously, it creates new challenges for pluralist adjudication on the part of the national constitutional courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. Arguably, the ambiguous scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the uncertain implications of EU membership to the ECHR and the increasing overlap between national and European fundamental rights complicate the protection of human rights in the European legal order.

The article deals with the ways of regarding the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine, which is relevant both in terms of the criminal procedure as a science and for the practice of law enforcement. The purpose of the article is to formulate the concept of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine. The paper justifies the opinion that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is developed and based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, regardless of the country in which they were adopted (i. e. has a polyterritorial jurisdiction over states being the participants of the Convention). The article proves that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is draws upon the decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights regardless of the time of adoption, i. e. it includes the decisions adopted before Ukraine ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The author points out the appropriateness of classifying decisions that have acquired the status of final as «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». It is also mentioned that there is a need to include final decisions in the case (as the matter of fact), which have a decisive nature and contain a legal position in this case, into the scope of the category «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». Moreover, the article substantiates the necessity to include the decisions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in full, i. e. not only the set forth legal positions, into the category of «case law of the European Court of Human Rights». Following the results of the study, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of criminal procedural law of Ukraine is defined as a set of decisions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights, which have entered into force and contain legal policies which either clarify or specify the provisions of the Convention as for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and relate to human and citizen’s rights and freedoms.

The European Green Deal aims to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 and maps a new and inclusive growth strategy to boost the economy, improve people’s health and quality of life, care for nature, etc. EU Farm to Fork Strategy for fair, healthy and environmentally- friendly food system, among others, asks for „moving to a more plant-based diet“. Plant-based diet is a diet consisting mostly or entirely of plant-based foods. Plant-based diet does not exclude meat or dietary products totally, but the emphasis should be on plants. Vegetarianism is the practice of abstaining from the meat consumption. Vegetarians consume eggs dairy products and honey. Veganism is the practice of abstaining from the use of animal product in diet and an associated philosophy that rejects the commodity status of animals. Article 9 of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union almost use the same text enshrining Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. To ensure the observance and engagements in the Convention and the Protocols, Council of Europe set up European Court of Human Rights. All European Union Member States are parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. European Court of Human Rights had many cases dealing with above-mentioned article 9. This paper will focus on Court’s cases dealing with veganism, vegetarianism and plant-based diet. It will investigate obligations, which arise from European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to public administration institutions, namely hospitals, prisons, army, school and university canteens, etc. The paper will explore the practice of several European countries and Croatia. The results will show if veganism, vegetarianism and EU promoted plant-based diet are equally protected under European Convention or there are differences, and what differences if there are any.

The article is devoted to the study of the European Court of Human Rights practice implementation into the national legal system by domestic legal science, in particular, administrative law. It is noted that the issue of the European Court of Human Rights decisions implementing into the national legal system arose before Ukraine in 1997 when the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was ratified. It is noted that a significant role in the process of national law improving belongs to the European Court of Human Rights, which is the body monitoring compliance with the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the Member States. Emphasis is placed on the fact that to date there has been no comprehensive study of the European Court of Human Rights practice in the administrative law sources system, which would be based on Western legal culture in Ukraine. It is noted that the European Court of Human Rights decisions nature is a “challenge” for the domestic legal system, that did not recognize case law as a source of law and, moreover, the interpretation of the category “human rights” by Strasbourg court is qualitatively different from its understanding by domestic legal doctrine, still being largely based on the perception of rights as opportunities guaranteed by law. Until now, the principle of legality was the fundamental law principle, and the justification of the decision taken in the administrative process was reduced to a reference to the prescription of the normative legal act. Legal provisions set out in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are based on other legal postulates. The analysis of scientific sources, the object of study of which is the European Court of Human Rights practice as a source of administrative law, is being tcarried ou. It is suggested that the existing scientific research of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of administrative law be classified into two groups: scientific papers, the subject of which is the European Court of Human Rights practice; scientific papers, the subject of which is the impact of the European Court of Human Rights practice on the national legal system, the immanence of features of forms of lawforms to this practice, etc. It is concluded that the analysis of scientific developments of the European Court of Human Rights practice as a source of administrative law by domestic legal science allows us to conclude about the relevance of the chosen topic, its lack of research and the need for elucidation.

The respect of fundamental rights is one of the cornerstones of the European Union. It is a precondition of membership and it is listed among the core values of the Union. Still, as the recent controversies between the European Commission and some Member States revealed, EU law contains no effective mechanism to compel Member States to respect fundamental rights and freedoms in general. This paper presents and examines the EU architecture of fundamental rights protection. First, it demonstrates that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the “EU bill of rights”) applies predominantly to EU institutions (that is, “federal” institutions); it applies to Member States only when they act as the EU’s “agents” (when they implement EU law). Although this approach may appear to be illogical, it does have its clear and legitimate reasons and it is far from unprecedented. In fact, it very much resembles the first century of the United States constitutional architecture. It is to be noted that though the EU does have the means to call Member States to account in case they violate fundamental rights, this action is a “nuclear bomb” and is hardly apt for handling human rights problems; not to mention that the application of this is almost politically unattainable. Second, it demonstrates how, in certain cases at least, the Commission “cooked from what it had” in that it used unconnected (that is, non-human-rights-related) provisions of EU law to shelter fundamental rights (e.g., the free movement principles of the internal market to protect minority rights or the prohibition of discrimination based on age to protect the independence of the judiciary). The use of the “supportive by-effects” of these economic rights is novel but not fully unprecedented. In fact, it resembles how the U.S. Congress used its commerce power to protect civil rights. Third, it argues that although the present architecture is certainly not the best of all possible worlds and the full federalization of human rights is a tempting option, the bifurcation of the “federal bill of rights” (the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) has a solid basis and federalization is compelling only regarding those fundamental values and rights the violation of which qualifies as a “ground of divorce.” Accordingly, while the current system obviously calls for a reform, in terms of approach, this constitutional architecture has its merits in the context of what the multicolored European federation needs. On the one hand, the core of human rights protection cannot be subject to territorial variations and the violation of the nucleus of these rights cannot be justified with reference to constitutional identity. On the other hand, outside this sphere, to use the terminology of the European Court of Human Rights, European federalism demands respect for the Member States’ margin of appreciation.

The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights

Ukraine has recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights by acceding to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The implementation of Western concepts of the rule of law, human dignity and human rights stipulates study of the European Court of Human Rights practice, which, in accordance with national law, is the source of Ukrainian law. It is emphasized that the enshrinement of the rule of law principle in a number of laws was accompanied by a normative provision on the necessity to understand the content of this principle through the European Court of Human Rights practice.
 The purpose of the study is to elucidate the general provisions characterizing the impact of the European Court of Human Rightsice practice on the national system of Ukraine.
 It is substantiated that the European Court of Human Rights ensures the relevance of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provisions, compliance of its rules with modernity, ensuring the general spirit of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which is designed to uphold and ensure the values of a democratic society.
 It is noted that in interpreting the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Court of Human Rights is a kind of subject of legal doctrines making in the field of human rights affecting the legal systems of the states parties to this Convention.
 Some decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in cases against Ukraine, which played a significant role in changing the national legal system, are analyzed, in particular,the decisions in the cases Koretsky and Others v. Ukraine, Natalia Mykhaylenko v. Ukraine, and Volokhy v. Ukraine.
 The following legal provisions as the separation of law and the law are mentioned, giving priority to law over the law in case of contradiction between them; understanding the content of the rule of law, the importance of legal certainty and reasoning of the decision to restrict human rights, legal equality of people, and giving real access to a fair trial to a person, etc.
 It is concluded that when considering the applicants' complaints about Ukraine's non-fulfillment of its obligations in the field of human rights, the European Court of Human Rights forms legal provisions that become an integral part of the domestic legal system, in some cases they (the decisions) are the factor in changing legislation, and influence the legal doctrine transformation.

The Court of Justice of the European Union faces a wide variety of human rights decisions. In common with national courts, it has to ensure that the actions of the European Union administration and legislature comply with human rights. These human rights are found in the general principles of Community law, including, inter alia, those of the European Convention of Human Rights, in addition to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. When doing so, the CJEU may find that it is judging not only the actions of the institutions of the European Union, but also actions of the administration and legislature of the Member States as they implement provisions of EU law, or act as agents of the EU administering EU law. In addition, the CJEU will adjudicate on actions of the Member States when they are acting within the sphere of European Union law. This can occur when Member States derogate from other provisions of EU law on the grounds of protecting human rights, or where Member States fail to implement European Union law provisions that either directly or indirectly protect human rights. This diverse nature of the human rights jurisdiction of the CJEU poses unique problems for human rights adjudication in the EU. The Court is at one and the same time protecting human rights from abuse by its own measures and policing the activities of its Member States. Moreover, the lines between these roles are blurred. For the CJEU to provide a human-rights compatible interpretation of the provisions of a Directive, for example, not only restricts the actions of the EU legislature, but also limits the actions of Member States. In addition, when the CJEU takes on the role of policing the actions of Member States, it does so within the context of the ECHR, given that all Member States, and potentially soon the EU itself, are signatories to the ECHR and the provisions of the ECHR are sources of general principles of Community law as well as being mirrored in the first Chapter of the Charter. Yet for the CJEU to perform the same function as the European Court of Human Rights would lead to replication of roles, as well as cause problems for the CJEU’s assertion of the supremacy of directly effective EU law over national law which would appear to run contrary to the margin of appreciation granted by the ECtHR to its signatory States. This chapter aims to provide the groundwork for developing a theory of human rights adjudication for the CJEU, looking specifically at the complexities that arise when deciding cases that require control over actions of Member States. It builds on consensus found in the literature calling for the need for the CJEU to be sensitive to competing requirements of consensus and divergence in the protection of human rights, drawing on the constitutional pluralism underpinning the EU. It will first explain the need for both uniformity and diversity in human rights protections in the EU. It will then explain how these needs can best be met through a dialogue theory of human rights adjudication, with Article 267 facilitating the provision of varying degrees of authority to determine rights-issues to either the CJEU or the national courts. The final section discusses the factors that should influence whether a rights-issue is more suited for resolution by the CJEU or national authorities, building on Weiler’s theory and explaining its precise application through a series of examples drawn from recent case law.

blic interest. – Article. The article highlights the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in protecting private and public interest in taxation. It is established that the law enforcement activity in taxation is a precondition for the realization of private and public interest, and this form of realization of the norms of tax law is characterized by the dualism of tasks and goals: satisfaction of needs and interests of persons whose rights and obligations are realized, as well as satisfaction of needs and interests of the society as a whole. The key decisions in the practice of tax disputes of recent years have been analyzed, which testifies to the dynamics of the ratio of private and public interest in taxation and search for the optimal variant of legal support of their implementation. The positions of the European Court of Human Rights relate to: the presumption of lawfulness of the taxpayer's actions in the presence of contradictory regulatory acts; provisions on the integrity of the taxpayer (the taxpayer should not be liable for violations committed by its counterparties); the need to take into account the mandatory presence of guilt in the case of fines, if they are exclusively punitive and deterrent in nature, comply with criminal prosecution in the sense of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the principles of proportionality and proportionality; the need to take into account the fact that the taxpayer is not liable for violations committed by its counterparties. It has been determined that in making decisions the European Court of Human Rights is guided by the principle of a fair balance between the private and public (general, public) interest, taking into account that the sphere of taxation is the prerogative of the state's domestic policy. Deprivation of property, interference in the use of property, control over the use of property by the state must be justified by the corresponding public purpose in carrying out control measures and must meet a fair balance between the requirements of the public interest and the requirements of protection of fundamental human rights. It is summarized that the domestic judicial practice in general develops in accordance with the principles of the European Court of Human Rights, which is an international body for the protection of rights and legitimate interests of subjects of legal relations, including in the field of taxation, operates in accordance with the principles defined by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, taking them as a basis to resolve tax disputes in essence, creating legal precedents that are binding on both the states and taxpayers of these states. However, it is in no way allowed to use the positions of the t European Court of Human Rights, which do not correspond to the actual circumstances of the case.

The article focuses on the fact that abuse of law is not only an urgent problem of modern legal science, but also one of the most complex and important issues to be addressed. This phenomenon is becoming aggressive and global, negatively affecting the processes of democratisation and consolidation of statehood. The prevalence of cases of abuse of law can slow down the development of society, violating the acquired norms and values. It is important to understand that achieving stability in social relations and their further development is impossible without taking into account the specifics of this legal phenomenon. Abuse of law not only violates the basic principles of law, but also poses a significant threat to the development of the rule of law and the determination of its future course. The particularities of the use of the term “abuse” in international law are determined. It is noted that the European Court of Human Rights considers that this concept should be understood in its ordinary meaning, namely, as the fact of exercise of a right by a subject of law outside its intended purpose in a manner which causes prejudicial damage. The author identifies the approaches to understanding the abuse of law which are used by the European Court of Human Rights in its work. It is noted that in addition to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the provisions defining the basis for preventing abuse of law at the international (supranational) level are also contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The author examines a number of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in which cases of abuse of law occurred. The author defines the role of the state in cases of abuse of law. The main features inherent in the abuse of law are outlined. Attention is paid to the fact that in addition to the positive components of preventing abuse of law, this activity also has negative consequences. The importance of preventing abuse of law is emphasised, subject to the obligatory observance of the principles of fairness, transparency and consideration of individual rights and freedoms of subjects. Ensuring a balance between the protection of rights and prevention of their abuse is an important task for the effective work of the European Court of Human Rights.