Administrative Quasi-Judicial Bodies: A Tool for the Independence of Justice from the State?

Abstract

The paper analyzes the legal institution of administrative quasi-judicial bodies in the Anglo-Saxon and continental European legal families. In general, administrative quasi-judicial bodies refer to bodies created by the state (the legislature or, as in the US, the president) for the purpose of regulating certain critical areas of activity (the economy and human rights), as well as for settling disputes out of court, when the state does not consider itself legitimate to intervene directly. For ideological reasons, this institution is more developed in the AngloSaxon countries, in which the mechanisms of deregulation, or the phenomenon of deetatization, are the norm of government. In the countries of the European-continental model, the state played a decisive role for a long time, which is why the spread of this institution began later and was carried out more slowly, mainly after the Second World War, when the state was discredited ideologically in favor of civil society. The relevance of these bodies to the state continues to give rise to many doctrinal disputes, especially in the context of their independence. The independence of quasi-judicial administrative bodies does not mean that they are irresponsible and that the state that creates them has no obligations. Moreover, all legal principles and guarantees of the independence and impartiality of justice are applied in the performance of judicial functions by these bodies. Here there is an ideological impasse: attempts to alienate justice from the state through the establishment of para-state judicial bodies will result either in their politicization or in their return to the public sphere.