Abstract
This paper involves an attempt at reconsidering public choice theory, with reference to its pertinence for public administration. The impetus for such reconsideration has been supplied by the claims of public choice theorists that their theory, as the economics of politics, is superior to its alternatives in political science and sociology. The Weberian theory of bureaucratic administration or bureaucracy has been a special target of public choice theorists on the grounds that it misconstrues bureaucrats as idealists in economic terms. The public choice solution is treating bureaucrats and other political subjects as rational utility optimizers, including profit‐maximizers and rent‐seekers. Public choice theorists claim that such a treatment has revolutionalized the theory of bureaucratic administration. The reconsideration does not provide prima facie support for these claims of public choice theorists.
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