Addressing the Unfettered Authority of Sport Governing Bodies through EU Competition Law: The Effect of International Skating Union and European Super League

The unfettered authority of sports governing bodies (SGBs) has given rise to a distinct number of human rights claims, but it has also led to the distortion of the free movement of persons and competition law in the European Union. In the International Skating Union and European Super League Company, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) emphasized that while SBGs have a right to achieve legitimate sporting aims, such as integrity and sporting fairness, this cannot be done at the expense of competition rules. The CJEU highlighted that SGBs are not allowed to prevent their member associations from organizing and operating competitive leagues and events, nor can they inflict sanctions on them for attempting to do so. These judgments will revolutionize the transnational sports law landscape and reshape SGB institutional rules and their relationships with their members.

European Union (EU) competition law aimed at comple(men)ting the Internal Market rules. National competition rules of Member States undoubtedly generate similar effects at the national level. The same is true for third countries' competition rules. Yet, when turning to the impact EU competition law may/can have on the full effect of national competition rules, it is clear that both types of national rules are differently affected. In this chapter, the internal/national dimension of EU competition law specifically refers to the related yet distinct issue of the implications of EU competition law for national authorities and/or courts applying national competition rules to a concrete case. EU competition law applies to behaviour with an adverse effect on competition in the common/internal market or a substantial part thereof and on trade between Member States. Keywords: European Union (EU) competition law; Internal Market rules; Member States

EU Competition Law With Respect to Football Clubs and National Markets

That the penalties imposed under European Union (EU) competition law amount to criminal sanctions within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been settled for some time. Yet whether the entry into force in December 2009 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights (as part of the Lisbon Treaty), and the EU's intended accession to the ECHR, should bring about changes in the operation of EU competition law is a question frequently debated now. Most of that debate has focused on the institutional make-up of competition law enforcement in the EU, notably on whether the European Commission ought to adapt its multiple roles of being simultaneously investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and policymaker, its practices relating to dawn raids, etc. This article takes a different tack and calls attention to the potential impact of fundamental rights on certain procedural or even substantive concepts in EU competition law. For many years now, the Commission has used presumptions to ease its administrative burden in bringing competition law cases. These presumptions have weighed heavily on defendant companies. This article submits that such administrative presumptions need to be curtailed in order to avoid conflicts with the fundamental presumption of innocence and the attendant rights of the defence. We will illustrate this thesis by reference to the presumptions inherent in the parental liability for anticompetitive conduct of subsidiaries and in the infringement attributed to the exchange of future price information between competitors.

The lively debate about the right of gig workers to bargain collectively stems from the idea that European Union (EU) competition law treats this group of workers worse than it treats employees. Namely, it is common to argue that employees, unlike gig workers, are permitted to conclude collective agreements because they are not undertakings and, therefore, not subject to EU competition law. In sharp contrast, by analysing the EU notion of undertaking, this article demonstrates—and this is the first of its theses—that in the labour market, which is the market that should matter in relation to the effects of collective agreements, employees are as much undertakings as any other worker, such as gig workers or other self-employed workers. The article further maintains that the reason employees are currently allowed to bargain collectively, while other workers are not, is to be found not within competition law, but outside it. At present, employees’ collective agreements are exempt from the application of EU competition law because employees enjoy the right to bargain collectively, among other social rights, and because the Court of Justice of the European Union has (rightly) recognized that the protection of these rights must trump the protection of competition. Consequently, this article argues, as its second thesis, that if Articles 151–161 TFEU were interpreted so as to grant social rights to workers other than employees, the collective agreements of gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers would be exempt from EU competition law, as are those of employees. At the same time, however, this paper recognizes that, in the absence of such an interpretative turn, antitrust legislators and policy makers could aid gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers by excluding them and their collective agreements from the scope of application of competition law. This—and here is the third thesis of the article—would not force the interpretation of antitrust notions and rules and would thus not require antitrust authorities and courts to use competition law to pursue goals different from the protection of efficiency and innovation.

Chapter 1 - Introduction to Competition Law 1.1 The economic background to competition law 1.2 The function of competition law 1.3 The market 1.4 Competition law and the economic theory of regulation 1.5 Various systems of competition law Literature Chapter 2 - The basic structure of competition law 2.1 Some key concepts in the application of competition law 2.2 The combined system of UK and European competition law 2.3 The scope of application of competition law Chapter 3 - The prohibition of anti-competitive agreements 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The prohibition of cartels 3.3 Voidness 3.4 Block exemptions 3.5 Other exceptions from the prohibition of cartels 3.6 Some important types of anti-competitive agreements Chapter 4 - The prohibition of the abuse of positions of economic power 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The prohibition of the abuse of a position of economic power 4.3 Postscript: the Commission's Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Abuses under Article 82 EC Chapter 5 - Control of concentrations 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The key elements of the EC Merger Regulation 5.3 Merger control in the UK system: the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission Chapter 6 - The Application and Enforcement of Competition Law 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The application of competition law by the courts 6.3 Competition procedure and enforcement under UK law 6.4 Enforcement of EC competition law 6.5 Leniency policy 6.6 Judicial protection in EC competition law 6.7 Division of competence and co-operation between the Commission and the UK authorities (OFT and CC) Chapter 7 - Competition Law and the State 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The rules for public undertakings and undertakings with exclusive or special rights 7.3 The norm of Articles 3(1)(g), 10, 81 and 82 EC 7.4 How to assess conduct in mixed situations? 7.5 EC state aids law: a general introduction Chapter 8 - The international dimensions of competition law 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The geographic scope of application of EC and UK competition law 8.3 International agreements 8.4 Relevant concepts Chapter 9 - Epilogue 9.1. Introduction 9.2. Themes in competition law 9.3. Objectives of EC Competition law and policy 9.4. Does competition law do the job? 9.5. Antitrust procedure 9.6. Fundamental rights 9.7. Block exemptions 9.8. Fostering general Community policies? 9.9. Remedies 9.10. Liberalisation of the closed 9.11. Public service obligations 9.12. Extraterritorial application of EC competition law and international co-operation in the competition law field 9.13. Merger Control 9.14. Article 82 EC 9.15. Articles 3(1)(g) and 10 EC 9.16. Article 86 EC 9.17. Role of national courts 9.18. Harmonisation 9.19. Centralisation & Decentralisation of EC competition law 9.20. Regulation 1/2003/EC 9.21. Competition between Legal Orders 9.22. Targeted sectors and/or issues 9.23. Accession 9.24. Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the institutional actors, design and history of the competition law systems in the European Union and the UK. It begins with a discussion of the legal framework, focusing on the main competition law provisions in the EU and UK. The role of EU competition law provisions within the EU treaties is considered, along with provisions applying to all undertakings such as antitrust and merger control, application of Articles 101-102 TFEU to state conduct, the INNO doctrine, and UK laws such as Competition Act 1998. The chapter also looks at the main actors in the EU competition law process, including the European Commission and national competition authorities, and the main actors in the UK competition law process such as the Competition and Markets Authority. Finally, the history of competition law as well as the interaction between EU competition law and UK competition law are analysed.

We assess the relationship between professional sport and European Union competition law using the example of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR), a set of rules enacted by FIFA, the world football governing body, to regulate the activities of football agents. The FFAR have been challenged under competition law before national courts and in arbitration proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The European Court of Justice has been asked to rule on the matter. The FFAR are the result of an anti-competitive decision by an association of undertakings. In particular, there is no exception for such agreements under the so-called Meca-Medina test. This analysis is supported by the European Court of Justice’s 2023 rulings in sports cases, in particular the European Superleague.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

Dedicated to the European Superleague case, this chapter draws on insights gained from the author’s doctoral thesis on the compatibility of a possible future Superleague in football with EU competition law. In his thesis, the author does not only question the compatibility of the response chosen by established sports associations to avert initiatives such as the European Superleague (ESL) project, but also explores the question whether the ESL would not itself be problematic under EU competition law, leading to proposals for a more compatible league structure. In this chapter, the focus is on the latter and thus on the role of investors and financial markets as drivers of change, combining legal and conceptual with economic and empirical findings and arguments.

Consten and Grundig and Vertical Agreements

Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe -- Legal and Jurisdictional Issues

Retraction of: Addressing the Unfettered Authority of Sport Governing Bodies through EU Competition Law: The Effect of <i>International Skating Union</i> and <i>European Super League</i>