Abstract
A Public–Private Partnership (PPP) procurement mode is poised to play a leading role in delivering global infrastructure. However, there is no fundamental microeconomic framework to determine whether a project or part/s of a project is a suitable PPP. This paper presents the development of a new theoretical framework that overarches and harnesses the application and integration of prominent microeconomic theories, namely, transaction cost and resource-based theories, property rights theory and principal-agent theory, to explain how an efficient bundle of property rights, associated with externalised project activities, is configured or crafted. This novel framework is developed to contribute significantly to advancing the rigour and transparency of PPP selection, as well as advancing theory of the firm. In turn, this change in current PPP thinking would appreciably increase the prospect of PPPs efficiently addressing the substantial appetite for this mode of procurement.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Archives des Maladies Professionnelles et de l'Environnement
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
