Accumulation with or without dispossession? A ‘both/and’ approach to China in Africa with reference to Angola

China's Cultural Rise:Visions and Challenges Zhao Litao (bio) and Tan Soon Heng (bio) China's economic rise has made salient the issue of its cultural rise/development. Domestically, a fast-changing China has generated a genuine demand for new cultural values and products that are attractive and relevant. Sustained economic growth has expanded the "urban middle class", whose consumption behaviour is vastly different from peasants and manual workers. Internationally, despite the fact that China has for years been emphasising the peaceful nature of its rise, its growing significance in the world economy has given rise to varying degrees of fear and scepticism in different parts of the world. To lower the distrust and sense of insecurity, there is a strong need for China to better use culture as a source of attraction, and to promote a more favourable perception of China through cultural exchanges. Against this backdrop, Chinese academics and intellectuals in recent years have begun to raise the issue of cultural rise/development. Of course, culture became an issue more than a century ago when interaction with the west changed the Chinese perception of China's position in the world, and it was in fact traditional Chinese culture which was blamed for China's decline. The [End Page 97] current interest in the issue of culture, most notably since 2006, occurs in the context of a rising and modernising China, a radically different situation from that before the 1980s. After nearly three decades of single-minded pursuit of economic growth, the Chinese Government has also begun to pay heed to its cultural development. In September 2006, the General Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued a national programme on cultural development for the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006–10). This is the first such programme since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in 1949. Unlike its economic rise, the shape of China's cultural rise is not yet clear. Despite increasing discussion about the subject, it remains unclear what kind of culture will eventually emerge and whether it will be attractive enough to overcome the fear of a rising China. But the concept of cultural rise has been proposed, and discourse on the topic has begun to gain attention. It could have profound implications for China's domestic development and global image. The Cultural Dimension of China's Rise The breakneck speed and mammoth scale of China's economic rise has taken the world by storm. Great uncertainties and apprehension about China's increasing prominence in the international arena have aroused varying degrees of fear and scepticism throughout the world. Powerful countries and conglomerates are worried that China may cause a major shift in global power currently dominated by the US and the EU. The situation is made worse when western mass media attempt to portray and perpetuate China's image as a "rising challenge" to the west. Since the 1990s, the media has also repeatedly used the term "China threat", evincing China's rise as a destabilising force ideologically, economically and militarily.1 To counter the "China threat" theory, the concept of "China's peaceful rise" has been proposed, envisaging a rising China that exerts its influence on the international scene in a non-threatening and non-confrontational manner. Though often hailed as rhetoric, it sends an important message to the rest of the world that China would like to emerge as a great power without following [End Page 98] the more violent, imperialist paths taken by Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the US in the past. The concept of "peaceful rise" has been debated and refined in the last two years. There are currently three main prongs: China will strive for peace in its foreign affairs, promote harmony in domestic development, and seek reconciliation on the Taiwan issue.2 Since 2005, Chinese president Hu Jintao has extended the idea of building a "harmonious society" to the international community. At the 2005 Asian-African Summit, he proposed for the first time to build a "harmonious world". Whether "peaceful rise" or "a harmonious world", the question of how China uses its growing...

China's rise has become inevitable, but there is no agreement about whether China will rise peacefully or pose a threat to the United States. The author asserts that both theories of 'China threat' and 'peaceful rise' failed to address China's central domestic problem. Thus, both theories are not convincing. This book attempts to develop a third view of China's rise from a domestic perspective and contends that China's potential threat to the existing global order is not derived from her rapid economic growth and military expansion, but from her potential domestic chaos. A strong democratic China will contribute to the global peace, but the collapse of China will gravely threaten Western societies. The current Chinese political system directly contributes to this social instability and could possibly cause China's social crash. China's democratization is the key to ensure China's peaceful rise in a global context. However, the Party is still in power and any attempt to dissolve the one-party system in presentday China has poor prospects. China must take a two-step, gradual reform approach to complete the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. In the two-step theory, the first phase for promoting China's democratization includes exercising freedom of media, increasing the consciousness of citizen participation, and enacting religious rights. Through all these democratic exercises, China will gradually be able to achieve a fully democratic society. This two-step theory is crucial for the United States if it is to enact effective foreign policy toward China and for China to develop a democratic harmonious society.

The proposal to forge a ‘new type of great power relations’ is one of the most important diplomatic innovations this Chinese administration has made. Although popular in official discourse, Chinese scholars diverge greatly on how to define the new concept. Debates focus on who the great powers are and what the new relations feature. All are rooted in the vagueness of this concept in official discourse. As the official interpretation of the concept is changing, the debate is also narrowing to that of the goals of the new relations. However, the revision of this concept makes it less practical due to its disconnectedness with the reality of China–US relations. The revised expression also diminishes the uniqueness of the new relations proposal, which implies that it may no longer be a feasible guide to China–US relations or an effective framework for academic studies on the power transition between existing and established powers. Having surpassed Germany and Japan in succession to become the world’s second biggest economy, China imposes greater influence than ever on regional and global affairs, not just in economy, but also in politics and security. There has consequently been more discussion on China’s rise both in Western and Chinese studies. Debates on China’s rise have extended from relatively simple narratives on the ‘China threat’ in the 1990s to more neutral and specific ones, such as whether there could be a peaceful rise of China, whether China could adapt to the existing international regimes and norms, and, most specifically, how China as a rising power would manage disputes and conflicts with other major powers. The answers 1 Regarding discussions on the influence of China’s rise, see Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2010), pp. 5–36; Feng Huiyun, ‘Is China a Revisionist Power?’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2009), pp. 313–34; Charles Glaser, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead to War’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67479/ VC The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2015, 349–370 doi: 10.1093/cjip/pov012

‘China threat’ as a western foreign policy orientation and ‘Peaceful rise’ which later became ‘Peaceful development’ concept of Hu Jintao administration is debated since last two decades. Visualising rising China, her policies and its implications on the liberal world order have become debatable on the agenda of global intellectual community. The paper addresses the same theme and questions; whether China’s rise would be peaceful or not? Further, this research looks at the possible scenarios of comprehending rising China’s impact on international politics. The paper tries to explain the possible scenarios from different theoretical perspectives and the implications of each scenario. The paper concludes that the rising China’s impacts are long-lasting whether peaceful or threatening power depends on the members of the international community, especially the existing great power; the US, how latter accommodates the interests of a rising state and manages misperception, and maintain the balance of status in the global politics. Though minor conflicts can occur in several regions of overlapping interests, any major conflict would be avoided at the behest of both the major stakeholders.

Since mid-1990, it has been discussed that China’s economic rise would affect political space. There are some worries that the “rejuvenation” of China as economic, politic, geo-strategic power could challenge to the current international system. Hence this rising has been called “China threat theory” and it could cause a conflict in international system. According to realist school, China’s peaceful rise is almost impossible, so China will threat to the current international system and clash with hegemonic power. They also provide some empirical evidence from history. On the other hand, Liberals expresses that trade provides valuable benefits to any particular states. So, China as a dependent state should avoid from war or conflict, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. This paper attempts to examine ‘China’s peaceful rise’ based on interdependence and trade expectations theory within the context of international political economy. To analyze whether China threat or not to the world, we have to know the relationship between economic and politics. Trade expectations theory could explain the rise of China with establishes bridge between incompetence of realist and liberal theories. According to trade expectations theory, the rise of China will be peaceful because of China’s expectations as economically are positive. For this reason, China as a rational actor chooses win-win without risk instead of win-lose or lose-lose. If China’s expectations turn into negative in future, its policies could change from cooperation to conflict.

China proposed its “peaceful rise” strategy in 2003 as a signal to the world of its peaceful intentions during its rising process. The strategy is not only a discursive response to the “China threat” theory of the 1990s but also a rational policy choice based on both domestic economic needs and international conditions. In practice, China’s “peaceful rise” strategy highlights four priorities in its foreign policy: major powers, neighboring states, developing countries, and international institutions. Although this strategy is rooted in Deng Xiaoping’s “keeping-a-low-profile” policy principle, it has also experienced necessary adjustments along with China’s increasing power capabilities, as evidenced by China’s assertive turn in diplomacy after 2008. China’s “peaceful rise” strategy will face two challenges in the future. Domestically, the country’s economic growth model and political and social uncertainties might change the direction of its foreign policy. Internationally, the outside world can shape China’s rise as much as China can shape the world.

Since emerging from its century of humiliation, China has repositioned itself as a rising power. China’s great power potential, combined with its latent expansionism and assertive foreign policy behaviour, however, has intensified regional and global security concerns. Among the issues that support the ‘China threat’ theory, that of the South China Sea disputes has become one of the most widely debated security concerns in the region. This study is designed to examine the power game between China and its neighbours which revolves around these disputes. It also looks into the role that the United States plays in managing these regional tensions and the US leadership’s prospects as regards facilitating China’s peaceful rise and transforming this potentially dangerous geopolitical flashpoint into an opportunity to build a more cooperative regional order.

The ‘rise of China’ discourse involves two critical issues: whether China is rising or has risen? If the answer is yes, will China be a status quo power or a revisionist power? The sustained rapid economic growth in the last three decades seemed to have confirmed the rising trend of China as a potential global power. There is definitely little suspicion about a rising China nowadays and attention is predominantly focused on whether China will be rising peacefully. I doubted the oversimplified assertion on the ‘China rising’ issue. The remarkable economic growth did provide the foundations of China’s rise, but the growth itself was problematic. I would argue from international political economy perspective that the way in which China was integrated into the global economic system enabled its economic ‘success’ in growth terms but blocked its industrialization which was the real foundation of the rise of any great power in modern world history. China’s rhetoric on ‘peaceful rise’ precisely revealed its deepening dependence on the international system dominated by the US, whereby its intentions to sustain current neo-liberalist economic development model for the purpose of legitimation of the authoritarian regime. The paradox is, though China has neither the intention nor the capability to challenge the order of existing international system and does hope to seek a peaceful rise within the international framework, the maintaining of an unprofitable economic growth model, or one of a ‘technologyless industrialization’, will inevitably exacerbate the constraints of market and resource bottlenecks and thus make China’s economic growth hard to sustain. This would heighten tensions and even increase the likelihood of conflicts between China and the developed world which would in turn be destabilizing to the international system within which the US intends to transform China into a responsible stakeholder that will play by the rules. Thus, the so-called ‘peaceful rise’ is nothing but a wishful illusion.

In this study we first briefly introduced political psychology of international relations, and moved to the notion of threat perceptions in political psychology which extends from national threats to group threats. Thirdly, we focused on the so-called ‘China threat’ which is mostly considered as a theory, a perception, a discourse or a thesis, but also as an issue, a theme, a hypothesis, a notion, a charge, a narrative, a debate, an image, a coverage, a topic, a school of thought, a public discourse, a story, a perspective, a proposition, a specter, a view, a syndrome, a school, a fear, a sentiment, an idea, a terminology, a rhetoric, a possibility, a mentality, and an atmosphere, in the order of frequency. We also see other scholars preferring to use ‘the so-called China threat’ as they don’t believe it. The notion of ‘China threat’ is mostly associated with China’s military build-up which is visible in South China / East Vietnam Sea territorial disputes. China is at odd with most of its neighbors due to its revisionist moves. Emotions play a role in all parties to the conflict including the Asian neighbors and U.S.. Chinese government, reminiscent of the past humiliations, wants to be respected; but China’s military moves are viewed with fear, mistrust and suspicion among other parties. National threat perceptions are updated accordingly. As a response to China’s rise, conservatives and Republicans support containment policies, while the liberal and Democrat response is engagement. This division is also related to the attitudes towards Chinese people and Chinese government. China has its own logic in its moves, but to what extent it is rational is to be disputed. The study concludes with further discussions about China’s rise, considering the possibility of peaceful rise or confrontation.

Although economic growth has historically been an engine of prosperity in the United States, recent trends have generated uncertainty regarding the prospects for sustaining such growth. Economists disagree about the relative importance of many factors affecting future growth, including rapid technological advances, immigration, the growth of the financial sector, problems with the educational system, increasing income inequality, an aging population, and large fiscal imbalances that have not been addressed by the political system. This collection of chapters, authored by many of today's leading economists, addresses the prospects for economic growth in the United States over the next few decades. During a time of great economic uncertainty, this book engages with both sides in the debate over economic growth, focusing on policy options that increase the prospects for vigorous economic growth in the future.

JEL Classification Codes: E42, E52, F00, G38. 1. Introduction The aim of this study is to determine the characteristics of financial and industrial policies implemented in context of Western sanctions, as well as existing demographic, infrastructural, and institutional limitations, on the development of Russian economy. Continued dependence on global oil and gas prices, low diversification of Russian economy, and other factors limit its potential growth. Historical experience of Russia and other countries of the Eurasian Economic Union suggest that overcoming these constraints requires significant time and effort. Therefore it is necessary to develop effective anti-crisis financial and industrial policies that would stimulate growth of Russian economy, which is the principal driving force behind the formation and integration of the Eurasian Economic Space. Economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and the USA have limited the access of Russian companies and commercial banks to capital and technologies required to implement their investment projects, and thus have creating obstacles to the sustained growth of Russian economy. The uncertainty of prospects for Russia's economic growth and the harmful effects of prolonged recession require the identification of specific factors limiting the development of integration processes in the globalizing economy. In order to improve Russia's economic situation, the investment scenario of economic development must be implemented, wherein price increases for certain products might lead to a relative reduction in prices in the economy as a whole. 2. Theoretical, Informational, Empirical, and Methodological Grounds of the Research This study rests on the theoretical framework formed by conceptual approaches to the market economy theory, institutional design, financial economics, modern concepts of the economic growth theory and the new industrialization, and other factors that determine the direction of contemporary industrial policy, which forms in the context of economic sanctions based on an integrated system of risk management and import substitution programs (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014; Averina et al., 2016; Boldeanu and Tache, 2016; Carstina et al., 2015; Tcvetkov et al., 2015; Theriou, 2015; Budik and Schlossberger, 2015; Thalassinos et al., 2015). In order for Russian economy to grow, it needs hard currency and technological resources required for the development and implementation of investment projects. Sanctions imposed on Russia restrict its ability to raise funds in global financial markets in order to implement its energy projects, and thus they increase the risk of prolonged economic recession. Economic and technological sanctions imposed on Russia by the Western countries have limited the access of Russian companies and commercial banks to the global capital market, and thus their ability to borrow funds and attract investments. Prolongation and extension of these sanctions by the European Union and the USA would certainly limit Russia's economic growth and decreases its financial stability. Despite certain volatility in the global financial market caused by the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) following the referendum held on June 23, 2016, the current state of the world economy has not deteriorated. The pace of economic growth in major developed economies has remained stable, and in developing countries, including the Eurasian Economic Union, it has not decreased significantly (Rupeika-Apoga and Nedovis, 2015; Liapis and Thalassinos, 2013; Medvedeva et cd., 2015; Allegret et cd., 2016; Sharma, 2014; Salimova and Makolov, 2016; Sibirskayaeta]., 2016). Authors of this study evaluate and verify the factors affecting Russia's economic growth, which in 2016 demonstrated better dynamics than in 2014. Naturally, the prospects for economic growth could be positively influenced by increasing oil prices; however the forecasts suggest $50 per barrel at best. …

With its rapid economic growth and deepening integration into the global system, Chinese leaders see the first 20 years of the 21st century as an ‘important period of strategic opportunity’ for China. China under Hu Jintao’s leadership has chosen a new path of peaceful rise. To facilitate such a peaceful rise, Chinese Communist Party has gradually adopted a soft power strategy. We see building soft power as a means as well as the end of China’s peaceful rise. We argue China has a genuine desire for peace in her rise and China’s peaceful rise may not be impossible. Based on existing literature, we expand the sources of soft power to six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation. We also identify three channels for wielding soft power: formal, economic, and cultural diplomacies. Putting all the basics together, we have proposed an integrative model of soft power. Accordingly, we analyze the sources and limits of China’s soft power and suggest how to improve it in these six areas.

Reviewed by: China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy ed. by William A. Callahan and Elena Barabantseva, and: Past and Present in China’s Foreign Policy: From “Tribute System” to “Peaceful Rise.” ed. by John E. Wills Jr. Rosita Dellios (bio) William A. Callahan and Elena Barabantseva, editors. China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. xiv + 280 pp. Hardcover $55.00, isbn 978-1-4214-0383-0. John E. Wills Jr., editor. Past and Present in China’s Foreign Policy: From “Tribute System” to “Peaceful Rise.” Portland, ME: Merwin Asia, 2010. 133 pp. Paperback $35.00, isbn 978-0-9836599-8-3. The world’s preoccupation with the rise of China appears to have gone through at least three phases in the past thirty years. First was the thrill of China the economy, with its 1.3 billion potential consumers. This period was in the heyday of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. Second, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s rise, was the spectacle of China as America’s significant other. This was accompanied by the so-called China threat theory to which China responded with its peaceful rise slogan in 2003 and the even less provocative peaceful development in 2004. [End Page 219] A more proactive turn of events occurred the following year when President Hu Jintao gave a speech at the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations in which he urged the building of a harmonious world. Like U.S. president Barack Obama’s Prague speech calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, President Hu’s harmonious world dream may not have mattered a great deal in the greater scheme of global politics—at least not until the global financial crisis, the dollar and euro debt crises, and the ongoing global economic slowdown. China emerged far more resilient than either the United States or the European Union. This observation ushered in the third phase of external interest in China’s rise: its contribution to world order. With China routinely predicted to overtake the United States as the largest economy within a decade, the time has come to consider in greater depth how Beijing will exercise its power on the global stage. This is the question raised by China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy, published in 2011: “What will China do with this new global power? How would China run the world?” (Callahan and Barabantseva, p. 3). The question, though timely, is not a new one. Writing in the 1960s, world historian Arnold Toynbee could well have been discussing China’s role today when he said: “If a ‘Middle Empire’ was now needed as a nucleus for political unification on a global scale, China was the country that was designed by history for playing this part of world-unifier once again, this time on a literally world-wide stage.”1 For the 2010 publication, Past and Present in China’s Foreign Policy: From “Tribute System” to “Peaceful Rise,” history may not be such a useful guide because China’s current position is “without historical parallel” (Wills, p. 125). Harry Harding explains in the last chapter that two of China’s previous identities—that of the powerful Middle Kingdom with a tribute system followed by its decline as a weak state in the European treaty system—simply “no longer fit” present circumstances (Wills, p. 125). This slender volume of 133 pages is not prepared to be so bold as to speak of China running the world, as does the more detailed 280-page China Orders the World; but what it does suggest, the role of “responsible stakeholder in a globalized and increasingly institutionalized international order” (Wills, p. 125), may be only a transitional stage away from the message in China Orders the World. The latter shows the logic of an institutionalized world as being compatible with China’s own long-held philosophical concern for public order under conditions of unity. Exciting as this phase of interest in China’s rise may be, the findings in both books add nothing substantially new to the literature. This is because they are both...

Introduction After its rise, will China display restrained or self-interest maximizing behaviour toward its neighbours? This question is at heart of propaganda line that was espoused by Chinese leadership from 2003 until mid-2004: theory of China's (helping jueqi). The government, anxious that smaller states on its periphery will react negatively to growing Chinese economic and military power, built a new line out of old themes, stressing that China's rise will not turn it into an aggressive hegemon who uses its power strictly to maximize its own interests. Instead, all nations will benefit in win-win situation created by Middle Kingdom's new power. While actual term appears to have been shelved, basic themes it encompasses have not: China continues to portray itself as a status quo power whose increasing stature will not negatively affect those around it. Nor does apparent disappearance of term itself diminish importance of analytical question: namely, how will China act towards its neighbours as it gains more power? This article asks: how can we know whether Chinese protestations of its are more than just empty words? How can we know whether China will help its neighbours, or is actually a wolf in sheep's clothing, luring its neighbours into complacency or working them into relationships in which China is principal beneficiary (playing possum, in words of one China expert)? This article suggests a framework for evaluating Chinese behaviour. Clearly, there is a need to look not only at Chinese words, but also at their actions. But which actions? This essay argues that some issue areas will prove more illuminating about future Chinese behaviour than others. After laying out framework, it focuses on one under-studied issue in China's multilateral relationship with ASEAN countries: agreements (or lack thereof) to manage Mekong's water resources. China's relationship with Southeast Asia is chosen principally because some analysts have asserted that China's new multilateral diplomacy and charm offensive (see Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Beeson 2003; Stubbs 2002) are succeeding in drawing Southeast Asia into a proto-Chinese sphere of influence. Therefore, purpose of this article is to lay out a framework for assessing Chinese actions as well as to call attention to an important issue often below radar of Western experts on Asian security. The Theory of Peaceful Rise From 2003-2004, Chinese government officials, academics, and press promoted a new propaganda term: China's rise. The theory was formulated explicitly to reassure countries, particularly smaller ones on its periphery, that China's increasing economic and military power will not pose a threat to them. Zheng Bijian, dean of influential Central Party School, agreed with an interviewer's assessment that the concept of a 'peaceful rise' initiated by China has forcefully addresses [sic] 'the China threat theory' and 'China collapse theory' and also allows China's neighbouring countries and various countries in world to feel more relief. (1) While term itself is apparently no longer in vogue, basic ideas it encompasses continue to reflect image China wants to project to its neighbours. Indeed, theory itself was not particularly new, but rather a slightly extended version of Deng Xiaoping's and line, The theory has three key points. The first point amounts to not much more than a restatement of standard and line. Zheng Bijian writes that China is both striving for a peaceful international environment in which to develop ... and also to safeguard world peace through China's development. (2) The key problems China faces are domestic, and answer to these problems is development of economy. …

East Asia (EA) is conventionally defined to comprise China and Japan, the four newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEANs) economies. The EA region is well known for its dynamic economic growth through the past 50 years. The first wave of EA's high growth was led by Japan, and it soon spread to the four NIEs and some ASEAN economies. This marks the first rise of EA or EA-I. Japanese economists used to explain such a phenomenon as the ‘flying geese pattern’. The second wave of EA's high growth was led by China, and it is currently spreading into the whole of the EA region. The second rise of EA or EA-II is economically much more formidable than EA-I because of China's vast economic scale compounded by its high rates economic growth. The China-led EA-II today accounts for 24.4% of global GDP (higher than the US share of 21.5%), as compared to 15.2% of the Japan-led EA-I. Increasingly, China's economy operates not just as an engine of growth for the EA region but also a catalyst for regional economic integration. After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, global economic gravity has clearly shifted to EA. However, individual EA economies are still beset by problems of structural imbalance. Above all, the future of EA-II critically depends on the continuing economic rise of China, i.e. the ability of China's economy to sustain its dynamic economic growth without falling into the ‘middle-income trap’. EA economic growth has been taking place in the kind of regional order that is, from time to time, undermined by bilateral discord and regional conflict. China as the region's largest economy will no doubt continue to lead the region's economic growth and shape the pattern of economic relations among the EA economies. Increasingly trade and investment in the region are gravitating towards China. However, for a long time, China will not be able to shape the region's geo-political landscape. China's message of ‘peaceful rise’ has not been unequivocally accepted in the region. China's overall relations with other EA economies will continue to be ‘hot in economics and cold in politics’. The growing political and strategic role of the USA has further complicated China's relations with other EA economies in the region. For years to come, China's geo-political leverage in the region will remain limited as opposed to its expanding geo-economic influence. The existing regional order in EA will, therefore, continue to be marred by uncertainty and instability. It is still a long way from the East Asian Community, which is to be based on not just sustainable economic growth and increasing integration, but also harmonious political and security relations.