Accountability through Intraparty Competition

Abstract

Many scholarly commentators, led by Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, have trumpeted the view that only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens. This preoccupation with interpartisan competition has had a strong influence on the debate about how legislators and judges should assess challenges to American political systems. But competition is only a means to an end; namely, it is only useful if it enhances the responsiveness of political leaders to the will of the electorate. It is the accountability-enhancing features of competition that make it a particularly useful and universal organizing principle for the law of democracy. This Paper's central thesis is that vigorous competition within the party structure can be an adequate - and sometimes superior - means for creating more representative, responsive, and responsible political leadership. In each of the three potential loci for intraparty competition - primary elections, legislative caucuses, and party organizations - I propose doctrinal and regulatory reforms that could be implemented to break down the barriers to competition that currently exist.