Absolute Authority

Abstract

In this article, I set side by side two conceptions of absolute authority. Behind both stands a neutral concept of absolute authority whose definition is common ground between them. An absolute authority is one whose commands its subjects have an obligation to obey independently of all conditions save those necessary to its being an authority. The conceptions of absolute authority I discuss describe a legal relation between a political authority and a political subject meant to satisfy that definition, but they do so in opposite ways. Roughly (for now), one conceives absolute authority as being empty of legal duty to the subject; the other conceives absolute authority as being replete with legal duty to the subject.1 I will call the first conception ‘absolutism’ and the second ‘constitutionalism’. Authority empty of legal duty is commonly described as despotic, while authority replete with duty is commonly called constitutional. However, absolutism gives its own meaning to these terms. Absolutism teaches that absolute political authority is authority absolved of legal duty such that nothing it does can be called unjust. This is tantamount to saying that political authority is in its nature despotic, if we accept the standard meaning of that term. Because, however, proponents of absolutism equate political authority with despotic authority, they have to narrow the meaning of despotism in order to make that concept do analytical work, while simultaneously lowering the standard of constitutionalism to a level they regard as attainable. Since the counterpart of constitutionalism is civic freedom, this means compromising that ideal as well.