Abstract
It is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a result it can be met luckily. I shall argue that this kind of luck is inconsistent with knowledge. In order to prevent this pernicious form of luck I introduce a “defeaters-responsiveness” condition, according to which subjects ought to be disposed to adequately address defeaters if they were to arise (even if they in fact do not arise).
Highlights
Epistemic irresponsibility and luck tend to sit awkwardly with knowledge.1 It would not be far-fetched to say that in looking for knowledge we aim to eliminate or at least attenuate the epistemically negative impact that irresponsibility and luck can bring to our cognitive lives
In order to show the insufficiency of the standard No Defeaters Condition (NDC), I begin by exploring in detail a threat for knowledge that arises from a kind of epistemic luck that has received little attention in current epistemological discussion
Given that knowledge is incompatible with having non-neutralized defeaters, it might be thought that the most straightforward way to deal with this threat would be to posit a No Defeaters Condition (NDC) for knowledge
Summary
Epistemic irresponsibility and luck tend to sit awkwardly with knowledge. It would not be far-fetched to say that in looking for knowledge we (partly) aim to eliminate or at least attenuate the epistemically negative impact that irresponsibility and luck can bring to our cognitive lives. In order to show the insufficiency of the standard No Defeaters Condition (NDC), I begin by exploring in detail a threat for knowledge that arises from a kind of epistemic luck that has received little attention in current epistemological discussion. This kind of epistemic luck is connected to a form of epistemic irresponsibility that arises when subjects are unprepared to adequately address potential epistemic defeaters for their beliefs. Having a clear understanding of this kind of irresponsibility (and how to prevent it) matters beyond providing us with an improved formulation of a necessary condition for knowledge (in the form of an improved formulation of a condition for epistemically responsible belief). On the proposal put forward, subjects must be disposed to act appropriately in the face of defeaters, even in cases where no defeaters are present. §5 briefly explores some consequences of my proposal in epistemology and philosophy of action
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