Abortion

Abstract

This identifies the major views on abortion and argue that the interest view is superior to them all. The conservative view ascribes moral status on a seemingly arbitrary feature, namely, species membership. The person view, which ascribes moral status on the basis of psychological characteristics that do have moral significance, such as rationality and moral agency, does not have this flaw. However, individuals with severe developmental disabilities apparently lack moral status on the person view, a problem that the interest view does not have. is more plausible than either. The chapter is brought up to date with a critical analysis of the works of Don Marquis, Jeff McMahan, and David DeGrazia. I then examine the challenge presented by the nonidentity problem for the interest view. Judith Thomson’s important analysis of the nature and scope of the right to life is explored, and then U.S. law on abortion, from the right to privacy to the undue burdens analysis. The chapter ends with the latest attempt to restrict abortion, the Partial-Birth Abortion Act. Although the interest view acknowledges that sentient fetuses can have moral standing, I argue that they cannot be given equal moral status, due to their location inside the bodies of women.