Abstract
Rural institutional innovation in China encompassed changes in land tenure arrangements and commodity pricing practices, and their effects hinged on how they were carried out. Properly implemented, the incentive structure could improve, forest production would increase, and thus producers and consumers would benefit. Otherwise, if the reform programs were inappropriately implemented, as reflected in market control and price distortions as well as policy uncertainty, then the incentive structure might improve only slightly. Chances for production increase could be diminished, making it hard for producers and consumers to benefit. In addition to quantifying these impacts using contrasting cases, this article also suggests some policy implications in a broader context.
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