Abstract
This article explores the role of the Treasury in the formulation and implementation of Britain's European policy in the period between the Messina conference and the failure of the first membership bid. It points to a strong contrast between the 1955–59 period, during which the Treasury, aided and abetted by the Board of Trade, was the dominant force in British European policy, and the early 1960s when the Cabinet and Foreign Offices successfully challenged for the position as lead department in this policy area. The final section of the article seeks to explain the disappearance of Treasury pre-eminence, suggesting that factors ranging from the personality of the Chancellor to the subject and context of negotiations with Western European interlocutors help explain why the Treasury appeared a waning force in the making of Britain's policy towards the EEC.
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