A two-edged sword: The navy as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy, by Nicholas Tracy

Abstract

Nicholas Tracy A two-edged sword: navy as an instrument of Canadian foreign Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012. 496pp., $49.95 (hardcover) ISBN 978-0-7735-4051-4Nicholas Tracy's comprehensive and thoroughly researched book, A Two-edged Sword: Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy, appeals two audiences: readers of naval history, because of its focus on the actions of the Royal Canadian Navy from its autonomy in 1910 until the present day, and readers concerned with the navy's role in Canadian international relations. Of particular interest the international relations community are Tracy's closing chapters that discuss post-Cold themes involving navy constabulary and humanitarian actions, Arctic concerns, and future strategic directions. Certainly, for those interested in Canadian defence policy, Tracy's detailed study would be a great supplement David McDonough's National Security in the Post-9j 11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats {2012).The genesis of the title, A Two-edged Sword, becomes clear in the concluding chapters, which outline the paradox that navy must navigate between independence and integration with Canadian naval allies. Although the navy remains a critical component of national autonomy, the degree of operational freedom from historic allies is questionable. Integration and interoperability with British and American naval counterparts in terms of command and control, communication, and equipment continues be essential, since foreign encourages its forces to remain in a position play a meaningful role in global security affairs (257). Coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Somalia are examples of how such integration comes at the price of saliency and operational influence. This proviso presents (299), Tracy argues, as Canada's partnership with the United States has come replicate the degree of integration that existed within the British Empire (299). Indeed, as Tracy continues, The management of relationship with the United States has been at the heart of naval strategy and this objective has been largely... successful but it is one that constantly challenges the independence of Canadian policy (300). Tracy's argument certainly rings true when one considers that the procurement policies of the Royal Canadian Navy are this day governed in large part by their need for C4ISTAR interoperability and are therefore heavily influenced by British and American suppliers (submarines and helicopters, respectively).1 Indeed, with a small defence budget, for Canada remain internationally relevant, compromises between command and control and practical sovereignty concerns are inevitable (13).2Although Tracy queries the costs of integration with its southern neighbour, he underlines the leveraging effect soft-power relations between the Canadian navy and her allied counterparts play in mitigating gun-boat intervention. 1995 Turbot War between Spain and Canada off the coast of Newfoundland, for example, was settled peacefully by international leverage brought bear by inter-service camaraderie. In this case, These unquantifiable relationships with the US Navy and the historic relationship with the Royal Navy, Tracy explains, were far more important than the easily assessed power of [naval] units (250). …