Abstract
In this note, we study a version of a war of attrition when all participants have to experience the longest delay before the consumption takes place. We show that all strategies are iteratively dominated and there is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this game has a well-defined best response against a completely mixed strategy. We further argue that a number of real-life games fit our description. We also provide a real-life evidence that when such games are embedded into a larger game, the threat that players would be forced to play it affects equilibrium outcome.
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