Abstract
The environmental pollution of industrial enterprises has severely restricted the development of economy and society. In the face of serious industrial environmental pollution, this paper constructs a three-player game model including enterprises, government and the public, and conducts a balanced analysis on the interests of the three parties in enterprise environmental pollution control. The results show that the regulation effect of pollutant discharge punishment on industrial enterprises is better than that of pollution control subsidies, and the system with high fines and high subsidies will reduce the enthusiasm of enterprises to comply with regulations.
Highlights
Many scholars have carried out studies on environmental pollution and treatment from different perspectives
The government environmental regulation and the public demand constraint jointly affect the environmental behaviors of industrial enterprises
Since most industrial enterprises have no strong awareness of environmental protection at present, the government tries to improve the current situation of industrial environmental pollution control through various means
Summary
Industrial pollution is one of the most difficult problems in the world. With the continuous advancement of industrialization, industrial enterprises uncontrollably cause pollution and damage to the environment in processing and utilizing scarce resources. Based on the hypothesis of “rational man”, Fairchild used game theory and mathematical modeling to analyze the interaction between enterprises and the government in the process of environmental pollution regulation [2]. In addition to government environmental regulation, informal regulation of industrial enterprises’ environmental behavior, such as public demand constraint lays an increasingly important role. Dungumaro et al discussed the positive role of public participation in ecological environmental protection through game analysis [6]. The government environmental regulation and the public demand constraint jointly affect the environmental behaviors of industrial enterprises. In this way, this paper will build a three-player game model of the government, enterprises and the public in the enterprise environmental pollution control
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