A Theory of Positional and Spatial Rivalry

Abstract

AbstractWhy do states become involved in conflict with one another? Why do these conflicts persist? Why do they sometimes end? Rivalry analysis assumes that most conflict is restricted to a relatively small group of states that has singled each other out as threatening adversaries in competitions for space and position. Therefore, it is the dynamics of rivalries that we need to understand. Yet there is also a strong strain of emphasis on territorial issues within the study of rivalry dynamics and for good reason. Territorial issues have been found repeatedly to be critical to understanding interstate conflict. But if we pair rivalry origins and termination with only one type of issue, we run the risk of slighting unnecessarily other types of issues. Fortunately, it can be argued that most rivalry dynamics are about spatial and positional questions. What is needed, then, is an argument that encompasses two basic types of issue as opposed to only one. Toward this end an existing theory of conflict escalation is elaborated and extended to encompass new dimensions of conflict behavior. The emphasis is placed in particular on the initiation, maintenance, conflict potential and termination of spatial and positional rivalries as two main types of conflicts. Three new hypotheses, joining 6 earlier ones, are derived, operationalized, and tested successfully. In this fashion, we hope to contribute to a cumulative understanding of rivalry dynamics on which future extensions can be constructed.