Abstract
In this paper, the author assumes that a junior worker learns on the job from senior workers. The worker's earnings are equal to his value of marginal product minus the tuition to his senior workers plus the teaching reward from his junior workers. The slope of the experience-earnings profile decreases with the employment growth rate. The earnings of an inexperienced worker of an unusually large cohort tend to be higher than the normal level. Finally, the author shows that his model generates an age-earnings profile which is increasing, concave in age, and declining near to retirement. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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