Abstract
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are an integral part of market capitalization, and the pricing of such offerings have been theorized considerably. New methods of IPOs often bring new insights to existing theories. This paper studies a new form of IPO with French tenders, and proposes an information theory to explain the strike price and the listing price premia. An outcome of the model is that it shows how informed investors' excess returns in traditional IPOs may be dissipated under competitive French tendering.
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