A Survey of Recent Critical Histories of Neoliberalism

This book creates (on the one hand) and explores (on the other hand) philosophies of African development suitable for Black sub-Saharan African countries. As an academic discipline focused on thought informed by indigenous moral values among Black peoples in the sub-Saharan region, African political philosophy involves philosophizing normatively about government by traditional Black African people with the aim of advancing a better African society. African political philosophy does not mean that its themes, views, concepts, and approaches are exclusively African. It also does not mean that only thinkers in Africa could hold these concepts, nor does it mean that all African thinkers hold the same views. “African” is used geographically in African political philosophy to demarcate certain perspectives that are unique to sub-Saharan African thought and practice that tend not to be the case elsewhere. An African political and economic philosophy should address the origin and method of political power, the guarantee of human and civil liberties, and how economic goods are generated and distributed in African societies. Africapitalism, as a new economic philosophy, obviates the inadequacies in Afrisocialism and offers an option for an African economic philosophy. Edited by Ephraim-Stephen Essien and Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere, the contributors to African Political and Economic Philosophy with Africapitalism: Concepts for African Leadership ask the question: can a neo-Afrisocialism offer anything good for the Africa?

This book creates (on the one hand) and explores (on the other hand) philosophies of African development suitable for Black sub-Saharan African countries. As an academic discipline focused on thought informed by indigenous moral values among Black peoples in the sub-Saharan region, African political philosophy involves philosophizing normatively about government by traditional Black African people with the aim of advancing a better African society. African political philosophy does not mean that its themes, views, concepts, and approaches are exclusively African. It also does not mean that only thinkers in Africa could hold these concepts, nor does it mean that all African thinkers hold the same views. “African” is used geographically in African political philosophy to demarcate certain perspectives that are unique to sub-Saharan African thought and practice that tend not to be the case elsewhere. An African political and economic philosophy should address the origin and method of political power, the guarantee of human and civil liberties, and how economic goods are generated and distributed in African societies. Africapitalism, as a new economic philosophy, obviates the inadequacies in Afrisocialism and offers an option for an African economic philosophy. Edited by Ephraim-Stephen Essien and Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere, the contributors toAfrican Political and Economic Philosophy with Africapitalism: Concepts for African Leadershipask the question: can a neo-Afrisocialism offer anything good for the Africa?

This chapter presents an expository picture of some of the main essays that carried out the work of interpreting modern Brazil. To expose the ideologies rooted in this genre used by Brazilian intellectuals in the twentieth century, the text points to the different Brazils imagined by scholars such as Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Caio Prado Junior, Antonio Candido, Raymundo Faoro, Dante Moreira Leite, Celso Furtado and Carlos Guilherme Mota, who dedicated to the discussion and critical reflection on the formation of the Brazilian people concerned with the construction of their identity in Brazil as a Portugal’s colony, during the empire and as a republic in the process of social and capitalista development. Along the way, cultural, political, and economic ideologies were shaped, which masked some of our fundamental contradictions.

This article explores answers to three questions: Why is prostitution as controversial today as it was 4,000 years ago? Why are feminists embroiled in the prostitution controversy? And, what are the effects of this controversy on the working prostitute? The author suggests that the answers rest historically in a fundamental contradiction in Western culture that arises from the institutionalization of a sexual double standard in patriarchal societies, wherein prostitution owes its existence to an interplay of social and economic arrangements that involve promiscuity, chastity, and inequality. The article looks beyond theoretical issues and examines social policy and its impact on the women who work as prostitutes.

Much has been written of the perceived ‘clash’ between Islamic and western civilisations and of the need for reconciliation. If western nations truly seek rapprochement with the Islamic world, then they must be open to the possibility that in some ways their marvellously productive economic systems have contributed to a loss of community and a decline in social morality, and must acknowledge Muslim fears of the global economy. A purely material or human rights explanation for why non-democratic and predominantly Muslim countries should adopt democratic capitalism will fail. What is needed initially is some foundation upon which to build dialogue. Orthodox social thought could serve as a lynchpin connecting the communal economic ethic of Islamic societies with the individualist ethic of democratic capitalism. Russian Orthodox theologian and social theorist Sergei Bulgakov left a rich repository of economic thought that philosophically bridges a gap between the rationality of western market economies and the transcendent awareness of Islamic social structures. Bulgakov's philosophy of economy embraces ideas of human freedom even as it recognises the need for ‘guidance’ and the essential nature of economic relationships to the preservation of community. By engaging Bulgakov's economic ideas, westerners can better understand the apprehensions of intellectuals in traditional cultures concerning globalisation and the reticence of many Muslims to embrace it.

The new frontiers in the philosophy of intellectual property lie squarely in territories belonging to moral and political philosophy, as well as legal philosophy and philosophy of economics – or so this collection suggests. Those who wish to understand the nature and justification of intellectual property may now find themselves immersed in philosophical debates on the structure and relative merits of consequentialist and deontological moral theories, or disputes about the nature and value of privacy, or the relationship between national and global justice. Conversely, the theoretical and practical problems posed by intellectual property are increasingly relevant to bioethics and philosophy and public policy, as well as to more established areas of moral and political philosophy. Perhaps this is just to say that the philosophy of intellectual property is coming into its own as a distinct field of intellectual endeavour, providing a place where legal theorists and philosophers can have the sorts of discussions – neither reducible to questions about what the law is, nor wholly divorced from contemporary legal problems – which typify debates about freedom of expression, discrimination and human rights. These are all areas in which legal and philosophical ideas influence each other at the level of method as well as of substance. My hope is that this collection of essays will appeal to those who, whatever their professional specialty or training, share an interest in the philosophy of intellectual property, and that it will build upon and advance existing interdisciplinary dialogue and research in this complex, fascinating, and important area.

This chapter explores conceptions of neo-liberalism in the context of the development of tourism research. Although its intellectual origins are somewhat earlier, neo-liberalism as an economic philosophy is mostly seen as growing in global dominance from the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the starting point for this discussion is the extensive and ongoing debate about neo-liberalism's general influence on higher education in particular. This is justified in terms of the corresponding growth of tourism in higher education since the 1970s. Putting it another way, in the English-speaking world (and, some would argue, beyond), the apparent growth of neo-liberalism in higher education is coincidental with the rise of tourism as a subject in that milieu. Accordingly, we might not unreasonably expect the development of tourism as a relatively new area of enquiry to more strongly reflect the supposed tropes of the neo-liberal project than is the case with more established subjects. Following from this, the chapter seeks to explore the extent to which the neo-liberal project has influenced tourism research, finally reflecting on the implications of such an analysis.

The article analyses Pericles’ last speech in Thucydides’ History (2.60–64) as a case revealing the limits of rational political decision-making in a crisis situation. Although Pericles seeks to convince the Athenians to continue the war by using rational arguments, there is a fundamental contradiction in his rhetoric: his belief in the unlimited power of Athens at sea. This motif, which did not influence the mood of the citizens at the time, later became the ideological basis for an expansionist policy that led to the collapse of the polis. The article argues that Thucydides deliberately creates an ambiguous portrait of Pericles: his speech simultaneously expresses efforts to preserve the state and shapes the ideology that undermines it. The analysis is based on Thucydides’ decision-making scheme (1.75.3, 1.76.2), which reveals how Pericles’ rhetoric clashes with the emotional response of society. The speech takes on a tragic dimension, and the figure of Pericles highlights the limits of human and community political thinking.

Duncan K. Foley Rationality and Ideology in Economics ROBERT H EILBRO NER HAS HAD A LONG-STANDING IN TEREST IN THE issues of rationality and ideology in shaping economic theory (see, particularly, Heilbroner, 1988, chaps. 1 and 8, and Heilbroner, 1999, chap. 11). Heilbroner argues that the conception of rationality under­ lying economic theory is specific to the emergence of capitalism as a mode of production and that economics as a science cannot avoid confronting issues (especially the distribution of material wealth and power) that are inherently political and ideological. This essay explores these issues in the spirit of Heilbroner’s concerns. RATIONALITY AND ECONOMICS “Rationality” has played a central role in establishing the hegemony of contemporary mainstream economics. As the specific claims of robust neoclassicism fade into the history of economic thought, an orientation toward explaining economic phenomena as “rational” has become the touchstone by which mainstream economists recognize each other. This is not so much a question of adherence to any particular conception of ratio­ nality, but of taking the rationality of individual behavior as the unques­ tioned starting point of economic analysis. As we shall see, mainstream economics has room for various concepts of rationality (“full rationality,” “bounded rationality,” “substantive rationality,” “procedural rationality,” to list a few) and for vigorous debates over their relative merits. The concept of rationality connects economics firmly to the Hobbesian-Lockean tradition o f political philosophy, which purports social research Vol 71 : No 2 : Summer 200 4 329 to explain the political and economic organization o f modern soci­ ety as the necessary outcome o f the interaction o f naturally consti­ tuted rational individuals confronting each other as com petitors for scarce resources. To avoid the terrible consequences of anarchic struggle, these rational individual actors are supposed, according to this “ju st so” story, to agree to the institutions o f property and political authority that constitute the framework o f modern society. A hallm ark o f these institutions is that they are in principle demo­ cratic and egalitarian (everyone has an equal right to vote or to hold property) but lead inexorably to sharp inequalities in economic well­ being. An economic science whose philosophical starting point was not rational individual action would create an em barrassing discord with this political tradition. The whole point o f the Hobbes-Locke “discourse” (to use the jargon o f postm odernism ) is to rationalize real inequalities o f power and economic well-being as unavoidable consequences o f the interaction o f naturally constituted rational individuals confronting each other as equals. Economic science has a place in this grand project only insofar as it can relate itself to the same philosophical foundations. This ideological imperative imposes a series ofunresolvable contra­ dictions on rational-choice economics. Much of the energy of the most imaginative and energetic scholars who have been drawn to economics has been devoted to proposals for the (inevitably unsatisfactory) resolu­ tion ofthese contradictions. I would like to review this story and suggest where the fundamental source of these contradictions lies. The diffi­ culty is that in seeking to explain how naturally constituted rational individuals might invent the institutional structures of modem society (largely capitalist structures of what Marx called “bourgeois” society, though that characterization has lost some of its sting with the passage of time), mainstream economics tells at best half the story. The other half, without which the whole project tends to become lost in a mass of unresolvable methodological problems, is to explain how m odem society constitutes human beings as individuals who see themselves in conflict with others over scarce resources. 330 social research VARIETIES OF RATIONALITY One of the tricky aspects of the discussion of rationality is that the word “rational” is used in many different ways. Economists use “rationality” in a rather peculiar and technical sense. In ordinary language, to be “rational” means to act consistently and instrumentally to achieve some well-defined end. “Irrational” behavior is behavior that appears to be inherently self-defeating or pointless. Thus, it is rational to pile up stones to make a wall, if you want to build a wall, but irrational to pile stones up in one place...

In an effort to increase student readiness for college and career, many States have adopted new academic standards encouraged by education reform advocates. These standards are commonly referred to as the Common Core Standards. Schools from States that have adopted the Common Core Standards have been compelled to significantly restructure their existing curriculum and adjust how they teach that curriculum. These requirements can be particularly onerous for rural schools. Neoliberalism is the underlying political philosophy undergirding these changes in the current school reform movement and is similar to the political philosophy that drove the changes in agricultural policies in the mid 20th century. Neoliberal political and economic philosophy as it correlates to education policy is buttressed by three values: (1) education fosters economic growth; (2) education policy modeled on efficiency and business practices; (3) high stakes testing to measure what a student has learned. These values have created an educational policy structure that attempts to quantify student learning, teacher effectiveness and school district value. By understanding the similarities between agricultural policies in the mid 20th century and current education policies, rural schools and communities will be able to change the narrative surrounding the education of their children.

This paper traces how various dominant social, economic, and political philosophies are played out in debate over and changes in the general studies curriculum at the University of Costa Rica. This investigation reveals a close link between dominant ideologies and the general studies curriculm. Specifically, the general studies program implemented in the 1970s which emphasized teaching about national problems and social responsibility, is currently being challenged by neoliberal policies and perceived competition from private universities. Latin American universities have traditionally served as battlegrounds of competing social, political, and economic philosophies. The debate over general studies serves as a unique opportunity to observe how competing social roles of higher education are played out in the university setting. The author concludes that the debate over general studies is really about the role and status of the University of Costa Rica in an environment thatvalues privatization; individual, as opposed to societal, benefit from higher education; and professions such as management.

Ayn Rand’s philosophy has once again found an important part on the American political stage. With the rise of the Tea Party movement, her political and economic philosophy has infused the American public discourse with a new Libertarian vitality. Ironically, many of her new followers identify themselves as committed Christians, a prospect that Rand herself would have rejected. This book critically reviews Rand’s secular-atheist philosophy of religion, which includes her theory of altruism, collectivism, and statism, and asks the questions: How did Ayn Rand become conservative Christians’ favorite atheist?; Can Christianity, or any other prophetic religion, be reconciled with her philosophy of greed, selfishness, and capitalism?; Can one be both a Christian and a dedicated follower of Ayn Rand?; Can one appropriate her political and economic philosophy while rejecting her radical atheism and anti-religious stance?

USUS AND USURA: POVERTY AND USURY IN THE FRANCISCANS' RESPONSES TO JOHN XXII'S QUIA VIR REPROBUS l INTRODUCTION: CONSUMPTIBILITY, USURY AND POVERTY In his fundamental treatment of economic issues in Ordinatio IV, dist. 15, John Duns Scotus discusses also the problem of usury. What he has to say is probably not so relevant for the originality of his conclusions as much as for one ratio against lending money at usury which he dismisses. One doctor, he says, maintains that usury is unjust because the use of money consists in its consumption, and giving it to another as a loan means consuming it.2 Such an argument is well known to historians of medieval economic thought and is often called the Thomistic argument, although its "paternity " is not ascertained beyond any doubt.3 In his most recent and brilliant monograph, Economics in the Medieval Schools, Odd Langholm names it "the argument from the consumptibility of money", because it rests on the assumption that the use of money 'The present paper rests on some results of a more comprehensive research on Francis of Ascoli originally made possible by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. I should like to express my gratitude not only to the Foundation, but also to Prof. C. Dolcini, to Prof. O. Capitani, and to Prof. Dr. J. Miethke for their valuable advice. For her improvements to my English I am particularly indebted to Annalisa Lambertini. Footnotes are limited to the essentials; further information can be found in the secondary sources cited. Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. IS, q. 2, n. 17 (ed.Vivés 18, 292-94), now edited in Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, Latin Edition and English Translation by Allan B. Wolter (Santa Barbara CA: Old Mission Santa Barbara, 1989), 58-60. 3See now Odd Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350 (Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1992), 166-167, 196-197, 241-244; cf. the almost "classic" analysis by John T. Noonan Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 53-57. Noonan, however, should be read together with Ovidio Capitani's review article "Sulla questione dell'usura nel Medioevo," Bulkttino dell'Istituto storico italiano per U Medio Evo 70 (1958), 539-566, now in L'etica económica médiévale, ed. O. Capitani (Bologna: Patron, 1974), 23-46. 185 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 186ROBERTO LAMBERTINI (like that of other fungibles) coincides with the consumption of its substance. For this reason, money can not have any separate use value.4 According to Scotus, however, an objection can be raised against this ratio. The surprising fact is not that Duns Scotus disagreed with Aquinas on one point (according to Fr. Allan Wolter, he might actually be addressing directly Richard of Mediavilla, who sided with the Doctor communis on this issue5), but the reason for his rejection of the consumptibility argument. He does not in fact criticize it on rational grounds, but refers to the papal Bull Exiit qui seminat issued in 1279 by Nicholas III to defend the Minorites against the criticism raised from outside the Order with regard to the way Franciscans interpreted and claimed to follow the idea of evangelical poverty.6 According to Scotus, this papal declaration, included by Boniface VIII in Liber Sextus of the Decretals, states that "quarundarum rerum usus perpetuo separatur a dominio."7 The connection underlying Scotus' rather succinct counter-argument can be explained by recalling an aspect of the controversy which flared up in Paris, opposing secular clerics and mendicant friars.8 At about the same time at which Aquinas began to insert the consumptibility argument into his case against usury, the impossibility of distinguishing use and ownership in goods whose use involved their consumption was exploited by secular masters like Gerard 4Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, 166, 241ff. sAllan B. Wolter, Introduction to Duns Scotus' Political and Economic Philosophy, 11; cf. Richardus de Mediavilla, Quaestiones super quartum Sententiarum, IV, d. 15, a. 5, q. 5 (Brixiae, 1591; reprint Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1967), 223; there is, however, no literal agreement between...

Taking as its point of departure the problematic distinction between illness as ‘deviance’ and health as ‘conformity’, this article ventures an alternative notion of health which oscillates precariously between bodily discipline and corporeal transgression; modalities which both reflect and reproduce fundamental tensions and contradictions in Western culture. Underlying this is a notion of the ‘recalcitrant’ body; one which, as an (un) containable entity in any one domain or discourse, demands both cultural ‘limits’ and points of corporeal ‘transgression’. Drawing upon recent sociological and anthropological work within this area, these issues are illustrated through: (i) the ritual performance of health as ‘dilemmatic’; (ii) the cultural shift towards more holistic, emotionally expressive, forms of health and embodiment; and (iii) the so-called ‘resacralization’ of social life and resurgence of emotions and ‘effervescent bodies’ at the turn of the century: developments which, it is suggested, hold out both positive and negative possibilities.

The purpose of this article is to reconstruct the philosophical origins of neoliberalism, especially through two great classics of nineteenth and twentieth century thought: Friedrich Nietzsche and Friedrich Hayek. The comparative analysis of some cornerstones of these two thinkers, which in other aspects are very different, aims to demonstrate how contemporary neoliberalism is the result of a long journey in the field of ideas. Yet, both the origins of neoliberalism can be traced to the distant past, as the effects of this economic ideology produce effects in the present time. Present time that is characterized by a pandemic emergency that reveals many points of contact with the foundations of the neoliberal ideology. In short, never as today rethinking Nietzsche and Hayek means understanding the limits and contradictions of a society afflicted by more than one virus. Neoliberalism; Spontaneous order; Innocence of becoming; Nietzsche; Hayek; political philosophy; Covid-19.