A Strategy for Reformulating the Dialectical and Functional Theories of Conflict

Abstract

This paper attempts to examine the assumptions and major propositions of Ralf Dahrendorf's and Lewis Coser's theories of conflict. Particular attention is drawn to the divergence in their respective schemes and how such divergence actually makes the schemes highly complementary. By formalizing the propositions of Dahrendorf and Coser, then examining how the theoretical statements of each inventory correct for omissions in the other, a strategy for synthesizing the propositions on the causes and form of is suggested. Such synthesis is presumed to improve upon previous attempts at theoretical reconciliation, since it is couched in propositional rather than assumptive terms. The growing disenchantment with structuralfunctional has been marked by the rise of alternative theoretical perspectives over the last two decades. One of the most conspicuous of these alternatives has been conflict theory which has presumably rediscovered for the discipline such phenomena as power, force, coercion, constraint, and change in social systems. Despite the excessive polemics which have often accompanied this rediscovery '(Dahrendorf, 1958b; Horowitz, 1962; Lockwood, 1956; Rex, 1961) there have been a number of impressive attempts at developing systems of theoretical statements on certain processes (e.g., Blalock, 1967; Coser, 1967a; Dahrendorf, 1957; Mack and Snyder, 1957; Williams, 1947). One of the drawbacks of this accumulated body of theoretical statements is that attempts at synthesizing, reconciling, and integrating them into a more adequate system of propositions have not been often undertaken. The result is that sets of propositions exist side by side in the literature yet in virtual isolation from one another. In this paper, I seek to begin redressing this oversight by examining the propositional inventories of two prominent schemes, the of Lewis Coser (1956; 1957; 1962; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1968; 1969a; 1969b) and the dialectical perspective of Ralf Dahrendorf (1958a; 1958b; 1957; 1961; 1967). The and dialectical schemes of these thinkers are singled out for examination because they are often presumed to be contradictory; and thus, if some tentative guidelines for synthesis can be suggested for these perspectives, then other schemes should be more readily reconciled-thereby allowing for the development of a more unified of processes. In this effort, I will draw attention to how Coser's and Dahrendorf's assumptions have been translated into highly suggestive propositions. Emphasis is placed upon the respective propositions of these two theorists, because it is in this form that: (a) the causal relations between concepts can be accurately discerned, (b) the points of compatibility and incompatibility between schemes can be readily visualized, and (c) the promise of operationalization and empirical investigation are greatest. Thus, I have chosen to focus on propositions because it is only when assumptions are translated into statements of covariance among explicitly stated variables that theoretical schemes become sufficiently clear to allow for tentative attempts at synthesis. Such a synthesis is, of course, only an uncertain first step in what will be a long process of converting theoretical schemes into propositional inventories, and then, critically examining them to see what they have to offer sociological theory. DIVERGENT ASSUMPTIONS In his efforts to direct sociological out of a functional utopia, Dahrendorf has reformulated in even more extreme form some of Marx's key assumptions: (1) social life is typified by opposed interests cohering around differ* This paper offers a revised version of propositions presented in an earlier work (Turner, 1974a) to suggest potential lines of synthesis for building a general of processes, a difficult task which was not undertaken in my earlier work.