Abstract
In this note, we analyze a simple auction mechanism for locating noxious facilities such as hazardous waste dumps, prisons, and trash disposal plants. Specifically, we first delineate the details of our auction mechanism. Next, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this auction. Finally, we argue that the auction under study is an efficient allocation mechanism.
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