Abstract
Memory errors are still a serious threat affecting millions of devices worldwide. Recently, bounty programs have reached a new record, paying up to USD 2.5 million for one single vulnerability in Android and up to USD 2 million for Apple’s operating system. In almost all cases, it is common to exploit memory errors in one or more stages to fully compromise those devices. In this paper, we review and discuss the importance of memory error vulnerabilities, and more specifically stack buffer overflows to provide a full view of how memory errors are exploited. We identify the root causes that make those attacks possible on modern x86-64 architecture in the presence of modern protection techniques. We have analyzed how unsafe library functions are prone to buffer overflows, revealing that although there are secure versions of those functions, they are not actually preventing buffer overflows from happening. Using secure functions does not result in software free from vulnerabilities and it requires developers to be security-aware. To overcome this problem, we discuss the three main security protection techniques present in all modern operating system; the non-eXecutable bit (NX), the Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) and the Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). After discussing their effectiveness, we conclude that although they provide a strong level of protection against classical exploitation techniques, modern attacks can bypass them.
Highlights
Every computing device, from the servers that comprise the infrastructure of the internet to electronic cars, to the internet-of-things devices that are increasingly making their way into people’s homes, has digital memory.vulnerabilities exploiting memory errors are still a major threat
In a quantitative study conducted [1], it was found that memory buffer errors account for 14% of all vulnerabilities reported to MITRE’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Vulnerability Database (NIST NVD) from 1988 to 2012
Protector (SSP), which adds a canary/cookie/guard value in stack frames to mitigate against the overwriting of the frame return address; the Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR), which randomises the virtual memory addresses layout of a process memory to thwart attacks that relies on known memory locations; and the Non-eXecutable (NX), which enables readable memory to be non-writable, meaning that any malicious code injected for example into the stack as part of an attack payload will not be executed by the CPU
Summary
From the servers that comprise the infrastructure of the internet to electronic cars, to the internet-of-things devices that are increasingly making their way into people’s homes, has digital memory. Protector (SSP), which adds a canary/cookie/guard value in stack frames to mitigate against the overwriting of the frame return address; the Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR), which randomises the virtual memory addresses layout of a process memory to thwart attacks that relies on known memory locations; and the Non-eXecutable (NX), which enables readable memory to be non-writable, meaning that any malicious code injected for example into the stack as part of an attack payload will not be executed by the CPU Those protection techniques mitigates the exploitation, they do not eliminate the vulnerabilities itself but make the exploitation harder.
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