A Review of Frank McKenzie's The Melting Point by Adib Farhadi

The United States Military is currently organized along the lines of regional combatant commands (COCOMs). Each COCOM is responsible for all U.S. military activity in their designated area of responsibility (AOR). They also deal with diplomatic issues of a wide variety with the countries within their respective AORs. Among these COCOMs, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), whose AOR encompasses all of Central and South America (less Mexico) and the Caribbean, is one of the smallest in terms of size and budget, but has the longest history of activity among the COCOMs as it is the successor to the first joint command, the United States Caribbean Defense Command (CDC 1941-1947). Existing from 1941 to 1947, the CDC was tasked with protecting the Panama Canal, the Canal Zone, and all its access points as well as defending the region from Axis aggression and setting up a series of U.S. bases throughout the Caribbean from which to project U.S. military power after World War II. Throughout its short history, however, the CDC was plagued with the same types of resource scarcity that its successor commands would later experience. Early successes, as well as the progress of the war saw to it that the original mission of the Command was quickly rendered moot. Ironically, it was partially the success of the U.S. war effort that kept the CDC from ever reaching its full potential. Nevertheless, the CDC evolved into something different than had originally been envisioned. In the end, it became the model that other COCOMs would follow after November 1947 when the system of regional combatant commands was formally established. Although some research has been conducted into the history of these commands, this dissertation is the first academic attempt to chronicle the history of the United States Caribbean Defense Command. Research into this topic involved combing through the Archives of the United States Southern Command in its offices in Miami, Florida (SOUTHCOM Archives), as well as the CDC archives in Record Group 548 in the U.S. National Archives II in Suitland, Maryland. Secondary sources as well as references regarding treaties and international agreements were also consulted as necessary.

: During Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Phase I), the Combatant Commander's logistical management organizational structure proved to be inadequate both in its organizational structure and subject matter expert manning level to execute an efficient logistical support effort. With the waning of Cold War era symmetrical warfare and the emergence of adversaries who attempt to exploit the United States military strength by employing asymmetrical warfare, the Department of Defense (DOD) must develop logistics organization that is dynamic, mobile, adaptable and able to keep pace with the needs of deployable forces employed by Combatant Commanders. order to improve joint logistics efforts, the in theater logistics structural organization must be transformed and linked to the strategic level organization to provide the best possible support to Combatant Commanders. Increased logistical support will permit Combatant Commanders an increased freedom of action enabling them to achieve operational objective(s) within their area of responsibility (AOR). Following the establishment of U.S. Transportation Command as the single distribution process owner (DPO) and the establishment of the U.S. Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC), the logistics organization was capable of bridging the gap between strategic and theater logistics to establish a more efficient organization. Due to the overwhelming success of the newly established U.S. Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC), in 2004, it should be used as a model to develop tailored Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers (JDDOCs) for the four remaining Combatant Commands.

United States professional military advisors play a critical role across the spectrum of conflict within the various services’ strategies in support of the overall National Defense Strategy. In an era of great power competition, the role of advisory forces within the shadow of large-scale conflict, provide a crucial edge for the US military services fulfilling their strategic role. Within each of the services’ unique strategies - the Army’s multidomain operations, the Marine Corps expeditionary advanced base operations nested within the Navy’s broader littoral operations in a contested environment, and the Air Force’s forward projecting agile basing concept - advisors from across the force support developing doctrines with conducting interoperability, providing access, and building relationships with allies and partners across key regions in great power competition. Even so, within each of these services, there is room for maximizing the utility of the advisory forces’ support to the service strategies.

The adoption of the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) marked Washington’s official pivot to “great power competition” as the conceptual framework for U.S. foreign policy. The shift to great power competition as the foundation for U.S. foreign policy represents an acknowledgment that the “forever wars” in the Middle East had become an expensive, strategically dubious distraction from the more pressing challenge posed by a revanchist Russia and a rising China. The template for much of the “new” thinking about great power competition is the Cold War – the last time the U.S. faced a peer competitor – whose shadow hangs over much thinking about U.S. policy toward Beijing and Moscow. In many ways, though, the Cold War was an outlier in the history of U.S. foreign policy, a product of very specific circumstances that are unlikely to be replicated in the 21st century. A danger exists in seeing the Cold War as a typical example of great power competition, or in using it as a template for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. Great power competition is usually a chronic condition, which is to say, more or less incurable. In order for a country like the United States to enter a new era of great power competition with China and Russia, it will need to convince the American public that the stakes are high and the dangers are great enough to justify the costs. Without the ideological or existential stakes of the Cold War, public support for an assertive strategy of containing Chinese and Russian influence will likely be hard to maintain. Rather, the U.S. is likely to continue the reversion toward its pre-Cold War pattern of seeking to insulate itself from the dangers of the world, and increasingly pass the burden of resisting the expansion of Chinese and Russian influence to others.

Introduction: Great power competition in Africa is a multifaceted phenomenon with significant implications for regional stability, economic development, security, and governance. This study explores the drivers, strategies, and impacts of major global powers in Africa, aiming to deepen our understanding of the complexities of great power rivalry on the continent. Methodology: Employing a qualitative research approach, this study conducts a comprehensive review of existing literature, scholarly research, and expert insights to analyze great power competition in Africa. Data collection involves gathering and synthesizing information from diverse sources, followed by qualitative analysis techniques to interpret key findings and insights. Results/Findings: The study identifies several key findings, including the strategies employed by major global powers, the challenges posed by great power competition, and the role of regional organizations in managing external influence in Africa. Future Directions: Building on these findings, future research directions could explore the long-term implications of great power competition on sustainable development, governance, and regional cooperation in Africa.

: Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) was promulgated based on our Unified Command Plan (UCP) that designated five Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs) supported with traditional Component Command capabilities. The UCP change incorporating Africa Command (AFRICOM) created a GCC that departs from the traditional model, yet it encompasses an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that is perhaps the most economically challenged and one of the most diplomatically and militarily volatile. Since NEO in AFRICOM s AOR is not a question of if, but of when and where, preparation now by the GCC will improve planning during the crisis mode when Joint Force Commanders face the significant challenges of these complex and critical operations.

Abstract: Traditionally, geopolitical scholars focus on how great powers compete for influence over small states and how small states navigate such competition. This special issue endeavors to transcend the "great power–small state" framework and to reorient both states and quasi-states as critical actors of contemporary great power competition, using the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia as the research sites. It advances a comparative typology that encompasses the dynamics of great power competition across different ideal types of states and quasi-states, including small states, associated states, contested states, and territorial autonomies. By doing so, this special issue opens up a new agenda of investigating the interaction of states and quasi-states in international relations scholarship.

: Today, aerial refueling is essential to quickly open or prepare air bases of operations and generate missions. It is also necessary to quickly deploy, efficiently sustain and maintain, and quickly redeploy forces. In short, without a robust, multi-service, aerial refueling capability, the combatant commanders (CC) will not be able to efficiently project power throughout their areas of responsibility (AOR). Therefore, the CCs should place aerial refueling capability and the recapitalization of the multiple tanker fleets at the top of their integrated priority lists and should also take sufficient personal interest in shaping their AORs to ensure that aerial refueling infrastructure requirements are developed and negotiated prior to the outbreak of hostilities. CCs should also push the services to develop and adopt technologies that increase the flexibility of the tanker fleet including multipoint refueling, defensive systems, and austere field capability.

The Great Power Rivalry is a strategic reality with implications at both the international and regional levels. The concept of 'Great Power Competition' (GPC), first formally identified in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, aimed to explain great power behaviors in the post-US hegemony period. While existing literature is rich in historical and global impact studies, research focusing on the conceptual and theoretical aspects of rivalry within the context of security strategies remains scarce. This chapter addresses this gap by offering a comprehensive theoretical and analytical framework for GPC. The central problem investigated is: “How does great power rivalry affect the struggles of small and middle powers, especially in the context of security strategies and doctrines?” The Iran-Israel struggle (2017 to 2023) is presented as a key illustrative case study for future analysis, demonstrating the necessity of the proposed theoretical approach.

What challenges and risks do Chinese and Russian bases pose to the United States’ military strategy? How do the military postures of great powers interact and with what consequences for regional and global security? This book examines the emerging dynamics of geostrategic competition for overseas military bases and base access. The comparative framework adopted in this volume examines how the geopolitical interests of the United States, China, and Russia and their respective underlying force posture interact in different regions including the Indo-Pacific, Europe, sub-Sahara Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and the Arctic Circle. By exploring the security, political economic, and domestic political dynamics of specific regions, the contributors to this volume reveal varied motivations for overseas military bases and base access among great powers. With analysis on the particular dynamics of overseas bases in major regional theaters, the book offers a valuable window into the nature and scope of the broader “great power competition” underway in the twenty-first century.

What challenges and risks do Chinese and Russian bases pose to the United States’ military strategy? How do the military postures of great powers interact and with what consequences for regional and global security? This book examines the emerging dynamics of geostrategic competition for overseas military bases and base access. The comparative framework adopted in this volume examines how the geopolitical interests of the United States, China, and Russia and their respective underlying force posture interact in different regions including the Indo-Pacific, Europe, sub-Sahara Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and the Arctic Circle. By exploring the security, political economic, and domestic political dynamics of specific regions, the contributors to this volume reveal varied motivations for overseas military bases and base access among great powers. With analysis on the particular dynamics of overseas bases in major regional theaters, the book offers a valuable window into the nature and scope of the broader “great power competition” underway in the twenty-first century.

: The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) provides a unique organizational structure that capitalizes on force multiplier effect realized from an entity staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies with one common commander and mission. Though ideally suited for detection, monitoring and interdiction of illicit transnational threats, a JIATFs efficiency and unity of effort can be hampered by certain legacy impediments placed upon them. One such impediment is identified in National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). The current NICCP states the areas of responsibility (AORs) for JIATF will mirror those of their respective Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) as defined by Unified Command Plan (UCP); JIATF West AOR will mirror that of USPACOM, and AOR of JIATF East will mirror that of USSOUTHCOM. These two regional COCOMs share a common boundary in eastern Pacific located at 92 degrees West longitude. This common boundary or seam has created an area where highly integrated planning, communication, and coordination are required to conduct most basic of operational objectives. This study serves three purpose. First, through real world operations in JIATF East and JIATF West, it will demonstrate corrosive effect of current NICCP JIATF AOR boundary on unity of effort in counterdrug operations. Second, it will illustrate why NICCP JIATF AOR boundary must change to enhance mission efficiency and ensure unity of effort. Finally, it will present two courses of action for mitigating current erosion in unity of effort in counterdrug operations.

Afghanistan, owing to its unique geostrategic position at the heart of Asia, has historically served as a focal point of great power competition. Located at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, the country represents a pivotal arena in global security and strategic dynamics. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent U.S. military intervention, Afghanistan became a major geostrategic battleground among the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation. This rivalry extends beyond the military domain to include political, economic, and security dimensions. The primary aim of this study is to analyze the interventions of these three global powers in Afghanistan and assess their impact on the country’s political stability and security structure. Based on John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism theory and employing a geostrategic analytical framework, the research demonstrates that the competitive behavior of the major powers driven by the pursuit of influence and relative power has contributed to the weakening of state institutions, the perpetuation of instability, and the deepening of Afghanistan’s political dependency. The study applies a descriptive–analytical methodology, utilizing qualitative content analysis of academic sources, policy reports, and credible international documents. The findings reveal that, despite differing in approach U.S. direct military intervention, China’s economic diplomacy, and Russia’s multilateral balancing policies all three have ultimately led to the erosion of Afghanistan’s internal capacities and the failure of sustainable state-building. The U.S. withdrawal in 2021 marked not merely the end of a military mission but the beginning of a redefined geostrategic balance in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. The study concludes that as long as great power competition in Afghanistan persists within the logic of offensive realism, achieving lasting political stability will remain unlikely. Accordingly, multilateral cooperation frameworks and regional confidence-building mechanisms are essential for mitigating the negative impacts of global power rivalries and fostering national sovereignty and durable stability in Afghanistan. Keywords: Afghanistan, Geostrategy, National interests, USA, Russia, China

The erosion of unipolarity in conjunction with the rise of new as well as great powers who are “near peer competitors” in an increasingly multipolar world has contributed to the changing conceptualization of war. This development coupled with an increasingly uncertain international milieu, has brought significant changes in strategic thinking as new modes of warfare, new technologies and new adversaries in different places have come to the fore. These places of strategic consequence include the Gulf of Guinea which has the potential to become an important theatre for great power rivalry as a major hydrocarbon hub, an important trading route and also a source of economic diversification. The Gulf of Guinea has likewise seen increased securitisation as great powers increase their defence engagements across the globe. Moreover, the intensification of great power competition is likely to make each theatre more consequential as a competitive edge may be gained from greater engagement. The research has endeavoured to analyse the geopolitical background of the great power competition in the Gulf of Guinea; to assess the current nuances and dimensions of great power competition in the Gulf of Guinea; to examine the potential challenges and prospects that accompany great power competition and their implications for countries in the region; and to consider the long-drawnout ramifications and implications of great power competition in the Gulf of Guinea.

: The National Military Strategy clearly articulates the diverse global threats that face the United States, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not implemented a process to deal with these adversaries effectively. Current threats involving transnational and nonstate actors operate across the areas of responsibility (AOR) of multiple combatant commands. In order to deal with these threats, there must be a single DOD entity empowered to globally integrate and prioritize targeting. Combatant commanders are assigned a wide range of missions, such as conducting Global Strike, waging the war on terror, supporting counternarcotics operations, and countering weapons proliferation. In some of these mission areas, the combatant commander's geographic boundaries are insufficient to delineate where one commander's responsibilities end and another's begin. Therefore, it is imperative that DOD adapts to cover the seams created where global networks form that can threaten U.S. interests. Current doctrine is insufficient to address these complex networks, which link adversary states, terrorists, narcotics dealers, international criminal organizations, financiers, weapons proliferators, and individual nonstate actors.