A real naval “Grandeur”? France and the European Union’s maritime security

The Nias Islands are an area that is included in the Province of North Sumatra. Nias is an archipelago area surrounded by the Indonesian Ocean. The location of the Nias Islands which are on the border increases the risk of maritime threats that might occur in the Nias Islands. The research problem is how to evaluate communication in maritime security policies in the waters of the Nias Islands. The communication factor in policy implementation includes how to communicate the implementation of maritime security between agencies in maritime security in the territorial waters of the Nias Islands. This study aims to find out how the implementation of policies and efforts in maritime security in the waters of the Nias Islands, by analyzing communication in maritime security in the territorial waters of the Nias Islands. The research uses qualitative methods by collecting data through interviews, field observations and literature studies. The results of this study were processed using the Atlas.ti application. The results of the research show that there is synergy between government agencies in charge of maritime security in the Nias Islands, but there is a need to improve communication between these agencies. This form of communication is not only carried out to carry out maritime security in the territorial waters of the Nias Islands, but also aims to carry out monitoring of marine and fishery resources. Conducting sea patrols is an activity in the form of joint communication or coordination between agencies/institutions as well as a form of implementation of RI Minister of Defense No. 13 of 2014 concerning border area security policies. Communication is the key to creating synergy between ministries/agencies so that maritime security in the waters of the Nias Islands will run effectively and create a safe maritime environment. Evaluation of communication in maritime security policies in the waters of the Nias Islands shows that there are still communication limitations that cause operational constraints.

Food security and maritime security: A new challenge for the European Union's ocean policy

This book set out to provide a comprehensive understanding of EU maritime foreign and security policies, asking to what extent, how, and why the EU is a maritime power in the making. The studies confirm that the EU indeed is becoming a maritime global power. The EU amongst other things now has its own Maritime Security Strategy with a functioning and comprehensive action plan, two major ongoing military naval operations, to a large degree acts with one voice at the international scene, and it has taken important in steps in the development of an Arctic policy. In the maritime domain, the EU is no longer only a soft power but increasingly uses military means to respond to new security threats and challenges, also known as ‘soft threats’ such as piracy and migration. The high number of planned actions agreed in the EUMSS and action plan as well as the maritime focus in the EU’s new Global Strategy suggests that we can expect maritime integration and cooperation, including in the military domain, to continue to grow in the years to come. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the US’ more reluctant tone towards guaranteeing Europe’s defence will only serve to push this development further. After all, EU leaders have already agreed to deepen cooperation on security and defence in the face of these events (European Council 2017). The findings in this book are thus important also for our understanding of the EU as such. Being the only remaining intergovernmental policy area in the EU and the one most strongly linked to member states’ sovereignty, EU foreign and security policies have been referred as a sine qua non in order to achieve full European integration. And EU maritime foreign and security policy indeed takes collective European security policies a substantial step forward. In times where some commentators have questioned the EU’s very survival, the findings in this book in other words lead to the opposite prediction—of more rather than less EU integration in the face of new security threats and challenges. This chapter sums up the book’s main finding and discusses their broader empirical and analytical implications.

As a middle power with its national interests deeply intertwined with the maritime domain, Australia has been demonstrating a more proactive role in safeguarding maritime security. The objective of this article is to analyze Australia’s maritime security policy and offer implications for Vietnam in the context of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region that is witnessing many fluctuations. From 2017 to 2023, Australia has shown a significant update to its maritime security policy, centered on three main pillars: (1) enhancing the naval capabilities; (2) strengthening the maritime cooperation with allies and partners; and (3) actively promoting a rules-based maritime order. The article further delves into the practical implementation of Australia’s maritime security policies, encompassing the increased defense spending, the acquisition of warships and submarines, the participation in joint exercises and enhanced cooperation with the United States, Japan, and India, and the promotion of a rules-based maritime order, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Based on this analysis, the article argues that to protect national interests and contribute to a stable and rules-based maritime region, Vietnam needs to strengthen its maritime security capacity, including continuing to develop the defense power at sea, investing in the maritime domain awareness (MDA), and promoting the maritime cooperation with countries in the region.

Maritime security policy is beginning to change, and one may note that some statements on maritime security occasionally include reference to fisheries – typically illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Some authors are sensitive to this change. Thus, some aspects of fisheries regulation, or rather IUU fishing, are occasionally connected to wider debates about maritime security. This literature is increasingly concerned with the operational links that make fishing activities vulnerable to or synergistic with crime. Other areas, such as the degree to which fisheries disputes and their resolution contribute to insecurity and good order respectively, remain underexplored. This chapter aims to deepen the dialogue about how fisheries fit within the broader framework of maritime security. We seek to move the debate forward by extending discussions about fisheries regulation into maritime security, showing how poor or ineffective regulation and management of fisheries activities can have a wider destabilizing effect on maritime security. In particular, we argue that cumulative, multiple stresses at lower/different levels can render maritime security generally more vulnerable. This is a novel perspective because it combines two discreet areas of concern: maritime security discourse and fisheries law.

A major focus of the U.S. maritime security effort is strengthening international norms and legal regimes. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41, Maritime Security Policy, was the highest U.S. outline of American interests in maritime security. The policy established guidelines to enhance U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the oceans, which were broadly defined to include littoral seas and inland waterways. Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee (MSIPC) is a functional policy coordinating committee that implements and refines NSPD-41, executing American strategy relating to maritime security. The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) was released in September 2005 and, even after the release of Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, remains the capstone U.S. document for maritime security under the National Security Strategy. The NSMS sets forth the relationship between the worldwide maritime domain and broader themes of U.S. national security.Keywords:American maritime security policy; cooperative strategy; global supply chain security; homeland security; national security strategy

In efforts to assert maritime sovereignty and security, the strategy of managing maritime resources, particularly mangrove ecosystems, plays a crucial role. This research aims to examine the impact of national mangrove belt thickening on the expansion of a country's sovereign territory, linking maritime security aspects with sustainable maritime resource management. Through a literature study methodology, this research collects and analyzes secondary data from various scientific publications, government reports, and other relevant documents to understand the relationship between mangrove rehabilitation and territorial expansion. The findings of this analysis indicate that mangrove belt thickening has significant potential in expanding the land area of an island through natural accretion mechanisms. Consequently, this process not only strengthens the country's position in claiming maritime sovereignty but also contributes to efforts to adapt to climate change and mitigate the risk of rising sea levels. Furthermore, mangrove rehabilitation is recognized as a strategic step that supports the sustainability of fisheries resources and preserves stable coastal ecosystems. The results of this research provide important insights for policymakers, coastal area managers, and research communities in the field of maritime security. The policy recommendations generated offer guidelines for planning and executing mangrove rehabilitation programs on a national scale. This emphasizes the need for an integrated approach between maritime resource management and maritime security policies, suggesting the application of ecosystem concepts in policy development. Thus, this research not only enriches the literature in the field of maritime security with empirical evidence regarding the benefits of mangrove belt thickening but also underscores its strategic contribution to expanding a country's territorial jurisdiction.

This chapter adds to our understanding of the mechanisms informing EU maritime foreign and security cooperation and EU foreign and security integration more broadly by exploring the impact of external, geopolitical factors. It does so by examining the impact of the Ukraine crisis on member states’ discussions and agreements on the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the EU Arctic policy. The chapter makes the claim that EU policies can only be understood against an increased Russian aggression and in particular its involvement and behaviour in Ukraine. Rather than undermining the CFSP, this geopolitical crisis led to enhanced integration and cooperation in a different but interrelated and increasingly important policy field—maritime security—developed in parallel but not independently of the Ukraine crisis.

A long coastline and extensive maritime claims mean that Australia benefits from and has responsibility for an enormous maritime jurisdiction. Within this offshore area Australia faces significant, varied, and complex maritime security and ocean policy challenges. In response, Australia has taken a number of innovative steps toward enhancing its maritime security. This article will review Australia's past practice together with some of the more recent developments in this context, particularly efforts to enhance offshore maritime surveillance and enforcement, such as the creation of the Taskforce on Offshore Maritime Security and Border Protection Command, establishment of the Australian Maritime Identification System, and implementation of augmented security patrols.

Maritime security is of vital importance to Australia and New Zealand as both countries depend on maritime transport for their economic survival. Since the events of September 11th 2001, significant questions have been raised as to whether Australia and New Zealand are adequately prepared for the consequences of a major disruption to global shipping following a terrorist attack on a leading regional port such as Hong Kong or Singapore. Considerable efforts have also been undertaken to improve responses to an array of maritime security threats, such as transnational crime, environmental pollution, and piracy and armed robbery.
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\nThis volume identifies those issues that particularly affect Australia and New Zealand's maritime security, evaluating the issues from legal and political perspectives, and proposes methods for improving maritime security in the two countries. While the focus is primarily on Australia and New Zealand, the scope extends to regional considerations, addressing matters related to Pacific Island states, Southeast Asia and the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic region. The book also addresses strategic partnerships examining the influence of the United States, and analyses issues within the broad framework of international law and politics.
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\nMaritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand will be of great interest to scholars of international law, international relations and maritime affairs, maritime industry professionals, private and government lawyers, as well as diplomats, consuls and government officials.

Abstract: Maritime trade routes within the Indo-Pacific region, a central artery for global trade and geostrategic interests, are witnessing increased maritime security challenges, including inter-state disputes, arms proliferation, terrorist acts, smuggling, piracy, and climate change. Nations in the region have significantly adjusted their maritime security policies in recent years. This article aims to analyze the similarities and differences in the maritime security policies of India and Australia, two key nations that shape the region’s security structure. Marked by a changing geopolitical landscape, India and Australia are enhancing their capabilities, modernizing their naval forces, strengthening maritime cooperation with allies and partners, and promoting a rules-based maritime order. However, the article also demonstrates that the different geostrategic visions, relationships with major powers, and varying capacities of India and Australia lead to differences in their maritime security policies. The article provides prospects on how India and Australia can contribute to the maritime security of the Indo-Pacific region.

Geopolitics is essential in understanding global dynamics, economic and resource considerations, cultural interlinkages, global governance for common humanitarian causes, foreign policy, diplomacy and security. Today, geopolitics as a concept transcends temporality and ventures into technological innovations, interdependence, demographic shifts, transnational threats, and involvement of non-state actors. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical construct is accompanied by the nations’ quest to establish themselves in prominent positions in the region. India, too, is not alien to this quest. India’s geopolitical move from its neighbourhood to the Indo-Pacific hence becomes a critical point of analysis in the nation’s aspiration to become the regional leader. The evolution of geopolitics from a nation-state-centric paradigm of the 20th century to a multi-pivotal approach in the 21st century reflects the current highly interdependent global order. Nation-states shape their foreign policies based on internal and external factors, with the Indo-Pacific region assuming increasing significance, particularly concerning maritime interests, both developmental and strategic. Historically, India has played a prominent role in the Indian Ocean region, contributing significantly to global trade and cultural diffusion. Over time, the land borders assumed priority over the maritime space. However, the shared yet contesting interests in the region with various nation-states competing for their claims, the attention returned to the seas. These competing claims and claimants in the region highlight the vitality of India to have a stringent and proactive foreign and maritime security policy – for the region and in the region. This research delves into the evolving discourse of geopolitics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific construct, and its intersection with maritime security. By analysing India's strategic viewpoint, particularly its maritime strategy, through scholarly and official sources, this paper aims to elucidate the critical linkages between geopolitics and maritime security. Ultimately, it seeks to underscore India's role as a key agenda-setter in the region. Keywords Geopolitics, Indo­Pacific, Maritime Security, Security Dilemma

The choice of focusing on “Sri Lanka’s Maritime Security Strategy in the 21st Century” stems from the changing geopolitical landscape of the world as well as the strategic importance of maritime security for island nations. Being a significant maritime actor in the IO, Sri Lanka has a variety of complex challenges that make its maritime security plan especially important. With emerging powers vying for control of vital maritime lanes, the world order has become more multipolar in the 21st century. Sri Lanka must review and modify its maritime security policy in light of the changing global landscape and the emergence of both traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the region.

This article examines four major naval battles (1656, 1657, 1807, and 1915) that took place in the Dardanelles during the Ottoman Empire period. The study analyzes the historical context, causes, course, and consequences of these battles, emphasizing the strategic importance of the Dardanelles. Furthermore, in light of the lessons drawn from these historical events, the article offers recommendations for modern Turkey's maritime security policies. By highlighting the importance of strait defense, naval power, technological superiority, and international cooperation, the article aims to contribute to Turkey's future maritime security strategies. Keywords: Dardanelles, Ottoman naval battles, maritime strategy, strait defense, Turkey's maritime security

This note reviews US maritime security measures, outlines work carried out by international organisations and then frames maritime security within the wider context of maritime trade. Finally, it suggests the development of a Global Agreement linking security and other maritime trade-related issues. The initiative for such an agreement should be undertaken by the EU only if current International Maritime Organisation (IMO) efforts fail to produce a maritime security framework with binding requirements and after the wider impact of US security measures has been properly assessed (Flynn, 2002). The September 11 events have revealed the soft underbelly of globalisation. The liberalisation of markets and the resulting facilitation of trade and travel allow terrorists to do their worst. Existing border-management architectures provide no guarantees that terrorists can be prevented from reaching their targets. Furthermore, market pressures are now forcing transport companies to embrace higher standards and adopt technologies and processes that can make border control less relevant. Preoccupation with the urgency of domestic security issues has encouraged the US to develop security standards and urge the rest of the world to adopt their approach or to engage in direct negotiations with them. The US approach is two-fold: it is based on the early detection and interception of terrorists (by moving control away from borders to points-of-origin) who seek to exploit or target the international transport networks coupled with cooperation on data gathering and information sharing. These two aspects have shaped US initiatives and legislations such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (US Customs 2002), the ‘Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001’ and the ‘Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Act of 2002’. These two legislative Acts and the CSI initiative aim at enhancing security, while at the same time furthering US strategic interests in security-related trade issues and strengthening the US maritime industry's position in order to make it more competitive (Lloyd's List, February 2002). There is a need to study the wider implications of US maritime security initiatives and assess US intentions within the context of international maritime trade. US-driven maritime security initiatives and the current fragmentation of efforts of international organisations such as IMO, World Customs Organisation, International Labour Organisation, and International Standards Organisation, if are not checked by the international maritime community (through a global agreement), may ultimately enable the US to impose its requirements on the rest of the world and affect the operations of international shipping. There is no doubt that current efforts to secure new maritime security consensus through the IMO is a step in the right direction. The amended Chapter XI of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) although fundamental to a global security do not cover containers. However, given the multiplicity of actors involved, existing arrangements may not guarantee the required coordination in particular with the WCO. Furthermore, it is not certain that input from the various organisations with varying degrees of expertise will dovetail with IMO work already underway. In order to deal with the consequences and pitfalls of the US initiatives and cope with the fragmentation of international efforts, the development of a Global Agreement should be considered to weld all the stakeholders in a legally binding international framework. A Global Agreement may prove to be a much more cost-effective way of enhancing maritime security globally and restraining US ‘hegemonic’ ambitions and unilateralism in maritime trade.