A Quality Life in the Shadow of Terrorism

Tables and figures Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee 1. Weapons of mass destruction: a brief overview Susan B. Martin 2. The international law concerning weapons of mass destruction Paul C. Szasz Part I. The Original Debate: 3. Realist perspectives on ethical norms and weapons of mass destruction Scott D. Sagan 4. Realism and weapons of mass destruction: a consequentialist analysis Susan B. Martin 5. Natural law and weapons of mass destruction C. A. J. Coady 6. War and indeterminacy in natural law thinking John Langan S.J. 7. Liberalism: the impossibility of justifying weapons of mass destruction Henry Shue 8. A liberal perspective on deterrence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Michael Walzer 9. Christianity and weapons of mass destruction Nigel Biggar 10. Christian apocalypticism and weapons of mass destruction Martin L. Cook Part II. Expanding the Conversation: 11. Buddhist perspectives on weapons of mass destruction David W. Chappell 12. Buddhism and weapons of mass destruction: an oxymoron? Donald K. Swearer 13. Confucianism and weapons of mass destruction Julia Ching 14. 'Heaven's Mandate' and the concept of war in early Confucianism Philip J. Ivanhoe 15. Hinduism and the ethics of weapons of mass destruction Katherine K. Young 16. Hinduism and weapons of mass destruction: pacifist, prudential and political Kanti Bajpai 17. Islamic ethics and weapons of mass destruction: an argument for nonproliferation Sohail H. Hashmi 18. 'Do not violate the limit': three issues in Islamic thinking on weapons of mass destruction John Kelsay 19. Judaism, war and weapons of mass destruction Reuven Kimelman 20. Between the Bible and the Holocaust: three sources for Jewish perspectives on mass destruction Joseph E. David Part III. Critical Perspectives: 21. A feminist ethical perspective on weapons of mass destruction Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick 22. A pragmatist feminist approach to the ethics of weapons of mass destruction Lucinda Joy Peach 23. Pacifism and weapons of mass destruction Robert L. Holmes 24. Pacifism and weapons of mass destruction: the challenge of peace Duane L. Cady 25. Weapons of mass destruction and the limits of moral understanding: a comparative essay Steven P. Lee Contributors Index.

Freedom, it has demonstrated the extent to which international law remains exposed to a set of serious -and serial -confusions in terms of the justifications used for analysing where a given intervention stands as a matter of the jus ad bellum. These confusions have presented international law with an important methodological challenge and, to address this challenge, the essay returns to the jurisprudence of the Nicaragua case (1986), where it finds that the International Court of Justice outlined discrete principles for the identification and assessment of justifications for the application of force under international law. In its judgment, the Court distinguished between legal and political justifications for action, but it also recognized that states operate in formal and informal spheres of action. The principles form part of a coherent and viable framework for use beyond the four corners of the courtroom, in simulated scrutinizations of legal justifications given for the application of force. That framework is articulated and explained, before it is considered in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom -where it provides us with a sense of how best to organize and evaluate the arguments made in defence of that intervention: the authorized enforcement of Security Council resolutions, the right of pre-emptive self-defence, humanitarian intervention and pro-democratic intervention.

It has been almost two decades since the notion of ‘net assessment’ preoccupied strategic thought during the Cold War. It has not been revisited in a sustained manner since a flurry of articles and...

Objective of the present article is to define optimal tactics and volume of surgical intervention in patients with hysteromyoma during labor process. Evaluation of possibilities and prospects of conservative methods of myomectomy have been determined. 1000 case histories dated 2009 were analyzed. Patients aged from 22 to 43 were under study. During the research it was revealed that hysteromyoma was mostly prevailed in women aged 30 and older (75%). 5% of them were primipara, 44% — bipara. 57% of pregnant patients were delivered by means of cesarean method. Widening of surgical intervention required 29% of 100 observed patients. Conservative myomectomy was conducted for 27 patients (87%), supracervical hysterectomy — for 2 women (6,4%). Natural delivery by vaginal route was marked in 43% of pregnant women with hysteromyoma; it was not a problem for birth and was first diagnosed in the early postnatal period by means of ultrasonic diagnostics. During analysis of the received data attention should be paid to expediency and promising of delivery of patients by means of cesarean method with following conservative myomectomy; it promotes to preserve childbearing function, their quality of life and consequently improves the demographic situation

SUMMARY * On December 7, 1993, Secretary of Les Aspin announced that the United States was adding a military dimension to its fight to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new program, called the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI), provides funding to prepare for combating foes with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile weapons on future battlefields, improves monitoring for localing rival NBC/missile programs, improves theater defenses, and develops weapons capable of penetrating and destroying underground facilities. U.S. efforts will include a diplomatic offensive to persuade U.S. allies to take similar counter-proliferation steps. * The central thrust of the CPI is to prepare U.S. and allied forces for dealing with future enemies on the battlefield who are armed with weapons of mass destruction. * An important secondary thrust of the CPI is to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the tools to disarm an adversary unilaterally if necessary, before the adversary can initiate the use of WMD in situations where we are on a collision course with such an enemy and no alternative course seems feasible. * Numerous preemptive counter-proliferation strikes have taken place since 1940. Allied air forces and special operations forces destroyed German nuclear facilities and heavy water supplies that were an integral part of the Nazi A-bomb research effort. U.S. bombers also destroyed the most important Japanese nuclear research laboratory in Tokyo at the end of WWII. Other raids include: Iran versus Iraq in 1980, Israel versus Iraq in 1981, Iraq versus Iran with seven raids from 1984 to 1988, and the U.S.-led coalition versus Iraq in 1991. * When deciding whether or not to use military action to remove a WMD capacity from a rival state, it is important that decision-makers address a number of key questions, and ensure that answers to each are positive, before making PCP decisions: --Is the enemy undeterrable, violent, and a risk-taker? --Is the enemy on the WMD threshold or beyond it? --Are vital U.S. interests threatened? --Are key enemy targets precisely located and vulnerable? --Is surprise achievable? --Does the United States have a first strike capability? --Is the United States homeland safe from enemy WMD? --Would the United States and its allies be safe from retaliation from the WMD of third parties? --Have all non-military options been exhausted before considering preemption? --Does the United States have clear objectives achievable by appropriate means? --Is the United States commiting enough resources and is it taking all necessary steps to insure victory? * Finally, a note of caution, PCP strikes against states armed with WMD had better work completely or they could spell disaster for the initiator. POLICY SHIFT: THE DEFENSE COUNTER-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE Secretary of Les Aspin announced a significant policy shift on December 7, 1993, that the United States would add a military dimension to its fight against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a speech before members of the National Academy of Science in Washington, D.C., Aspin explained the rationale and initial program of what he termed a U.S. Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative. (1) This new policy is a response to the number of radical regimes that appear on the verge of acquiring WMD (2). Particularly unsettling was finding out just how close Saddam Hussein's Iraq was to acquiring a clandestine atomic bomb at the time of the Gulf War. A more recent concern, also sparking the new policy direction, is the nuclear threat posed by Kim Jong II's regime in North Korea. Aspin stated that the United States is now developing improved and specialized military capabilities, doctrine, training, and contingency plans to pursue its counter-proliferation policies. …

Many authors note the difficulties in qualifying weapons of mass destruction as an object of a criminal offense. The article is devoted to the problems of understanding the essence of the concept of "weapons of mass destruction" in modern criminal law and directly addresses the issues related to the disclosure of the concept of the subject in the investigation of this type of crime. The article analyzes the concept of "weapons of mass destruction" as one of the elements of the criminalistic characteristics of its smuggling, which serves as the basis for putting forward versions and seeing tactical prospects for investigating this type of crime. The article considers the role of the customs authorities of Russia as a paramilitary and law enforcement structure by its status, which provides national security of the state.

The Iraqi regime has used weapons of mass destruction. They not only had weapons of mass destruction, they used weapons of mass destruction. They used weapons of mass destruction in other countries, they have used weapons of mass destruction on their own people. That's why I say Iraq is a threat, a real threat. - George W. Bush, Address at Ford Hood, Texas, Jan 3, 2003

The United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003 with the declared intention of removing Saddam Hussein's regime. Although it was determined after the war that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), removing a regime believed to be in possession of WMD raises the possibility that the post-9/11 US security policy is more willing than previously believed to tolerate the risk of precipitating a WMD exchange. In future crises, policymakers may conclude the risk of WMD use during a preemptive attack or disarming strike is lower than the risk of a terrorist attack utilizing such weapons. This article will examine the potential for intra-conflict deterrence when a state confronts an enemy that possesses WMD--most likely chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW). It will contend that, despite creating an increased risk of a WMD attack, the invading state can take steps to reduce the likelihood of being met by a WMD response. It begins by exploring the relevant literature on deterrence and intra-war negotiation in an effort to develop a framework for deterrence while at the same time restraining conflict below a desired threshold. The case study of the 1991 Persian Gulf War is then analyzed in an attempt to draw lessons on whether, and if possible how, intra-conflict deterrence might work and implications for developing a theoretical understanding of likely deterrence scenarios. Finally, the article will consider lessons applicable to future conflict capable o flowering the likelihood of the use of such weapons. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)-reiterating what was first enunciated in the 2002 NSS--declares that the United States is willing to preempt threats and accept risk in disarming the possessors of WMD: The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. (1) This declared policy has been followed by several efforts designed to aid the United States in responding to such threats. The George W. Bush Administration has affected a shift in nuclear policy by creating the New Triad of nuclear and nonnuclear strike forces, active and passive defenses, and revitalized defense infrastructure capabilities. It also developed several new diplomatic initiatives--the Proliferation Security Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, negotiated disarmament of Libya, and a flexible approach to India's nuclear program--all designed to counter the actions of authoritarian states possessing WMD. Yet, despite these initiatives, the most attention has centered on the declared policies of preemption, regime change, and forceful disarmament. Deterring first-use of WMD is one of the most challenging issues facing nations interested in confronting states that possess such a capability. There are a number of states that now possess, or claim to possess, an assortment of WMD--nuclear, CW, and BW. With the possible exception of North Korea, the United States has an inferred policy of taking action against such states prior to the completion of nuclear weapon programs. A number of these states also happen to be located in areas of conflict involving the US military. Building a theoretical understanding of the strategies most likely to deter first-use would be of obvious benefit to America's foreign policy objectives and global stability. There are few examples of the United States taking military action against states possessing WMD. The 2003 war in Iraq presents an opportunity to examine US strategy related to possible WMD use by a regime that is aware it is being targeted. …

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­

The Bush Administration has placed significant emphasis on countering the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats that some states pose. Its famous “Axis of Evil” speech specifically identified North Korea as being a WMD concern. Yet many in the ROK discount the North Korean threat, including its WMD. This article addresses five questions: What WMD does North Korea possess? We do not know for sure, but both the ROK and U.S. governments believe that North Korea has robust chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. How might North Korea seek to employ its WMD? North Koreans could use WMD to support an invasion of the ROK, to deter and/or coerce ROK and U.S. action, in limited attacks against the ROK or others, as part of a North Korean civil war, as part of an insurgency against Korean unification, and to obtain funds from other states or terrorist groups. How serious a threat is posed by North Korean WMD? Do the various kinds of WMD give North Korea reliable tools? Even small quantities of ...

: The failure to find substantial evidence of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in Iraq has exposed serious weaknesses in the U.S. understanding of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat posed by its adversaries as well as in its ability to deal effectively with these threats. A rancorous and highly politicized debate, primarily about the intelligence assessments of Iraqi WMD capabilities before Operation Iraqi Freedom, has dominated national discussion for months. Unfortunately, the current preoccupation with intelligence might mask other issues and shortcomings in the American ability to eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of its enemies. Events in Iraq did not unfold as many might have expected. The expected smoking gun never materialized; large stocks of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were not strewn throughout the countryside. And, most importantly, neither U.S. forces nor innocent civilians had to face WMD use. Even so, weapons of mass destruction were very much a condition of this most recent war in Iraq, simply not in the shape and form that many predicted. The Armed Forces had to plan and prepare for conflict as if WMD use was not only possible but also likely. In addition, coalition forces had to prepare to disarm a country of its WMD programs, a mission neither anticipated nor planned for since World War II. This mission has come to be called WMD elimination.

Terrorism involves the use or threat of violence and aims to instill fear not only in the immediate victims but also in the general public. The extent to which it relies on fear distinguishes terrorism from conventional warfare. Terrorism has become a matter of international concern. Terrorists make use of ‘Weapons of mass destruction’. A weapon of mass destruction is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological or other device designed to harm large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) constitute a class of weapons with the potential to have massive destructive effects, killing millions of civilians, endangering the natural environment and changing the lives of future generations with catastrophic consequences. These include: Chemical weapons can cause death or serious injury to persons by poisonous chemicals. Biological weapons spread disease organisms or poisons to harm or kill people, animals or plants. Radiological weapons which release radioactivity to maim and kill humans, animals and plants. Nuclear devices can be used to disperse all the three. The general awareness, covering all aspects about these weapons of mass destruction in one compilation, is needed by law enforcement agencies, criminal justice organizations, forensic science professionals, medical fraternity and the general public.

JAVMA, Vol 230, No. 12, June 15, 2007 W of mass destruction may be defined as chemical, biological, radiologic, nuclear, explosive, or incendiary devices intended to cause widespread injury or death. Injuries and illnesses resulting from weapons of mass destruction may be overt, subclinical, or delayed. Because veterinarians may find themselves responding to emergency incidents, they should be aware of the agents that may cause mass casualties. Importantly, if such agents have been used intentionally, then the incident is a crime scene, and responders should be aware of the need to secure the scene and preserve evidence. If the incident was intended to intimidate or coerce for social or political reasons, then it is classified as an act of terrorism, and federal regulations and authorities have jurisdiction. Specifically, animal enterprise terrorism has been defined as a crime that causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise or economic damages exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise. There is little published information on the effects of most weapons of mass destruction in animals, although some information has been published on possible dangers for search-and-rescue dogs working in postdisaster environments. Nevertheless, veterinarians may obtain some useful comparative information from published reports of the effects of weapons of mass destruction on humans and their treatment. Because of the potential for veterinarians to be involved in the response to an incident involving weapons of mass destruction, they should have at least some awarenesslevel information of the various agents that might be used. Similarly, although law enforcement personnel are responsible for securing crime scenes, gathering and preserving evidence, and maintaining a documented chain of custody for such evidence, veterinarians should have at least some rudimentary knowledge of the principles and practices of evidence preservation because they may be involved in rendering aid at the site of a disaster or treating victims at the site or elsewhere.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is internationally recognized to categorize nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Despite their joint categorization, each weapon is distinct from the other and use and possession are treated differently. Previous studies have focused on technological aspects of these weapons, failing to examine and explain the distinct nature and underlying significance of this term. Adopting a constructivist approach, and utilizing sociological research, this work addresses this gap by restoring the underlying strategic and ethical significance of the concept of WMD. The article stresses stigmatization of WMD by the international community. The evolving condemnation of chemical and biological weapons forged the stigma and led to the condemnation of nuclear weapons. WMD have been framed as a threat to humanity due to their ability to create widespread, long-term, irreversible destruction. WMD have also been associated with elevated status and power. These two aspects cannot be separated from each other. The article shows that the actors involved in stigmatization have varied. Initially, the stigma emerged top-down, via government officials. In time, grass roots movements and the general public have also condemned these weapons. Secondly, stigmatizing was driven by perceptions of social, economic, and political power, which elevated the status of these weapons. Stigmatization then developed as a reaction to the threatened possession and use of WMD by antagonistic actors. The ethical and political processes cannot be distinguished from each other; each has formed to frame the image of the long-term danger of WMD. Understanding this process of stigmatization is of particular importance at a time in which the threat from these weapons has increased. This work therefore provides greater insight and understanding into ways to address this challenging subject.

The threat towards international security that terrorists, failed or failing states, and rogue regimes pose when in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a very significant one. Having accurate and timely intelligence is a must in today's security environment, especially when estimating WMD capabilities. Breakdowns in information management relating to WMD intelligence can be responsible for failures in deterring a WMD attack or may create a false alarm regarding a nation's capabilities, with equally serious consequences. This paper seeks to propose a framework for understanding the informational failures associated with estimating a state's WMD capabilities using an information management model. Estimating a state's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons capabilities is complicated due to several factors. At every point of the intelligence process that will later transcend to policy and action, there are challenges that affect how information is managed. This article will cover these different challenges by organizing them into four information management categories: Sources Management, Analytics Management, Interpretation Management, and Actions Management. An appreciation of the informational challenges associated with WMD detection may lead to improved practices of information management thereby resulting in accurate assessments regarding WMD capabilities and policy agendas.