A Proposal for a National Space Program for Developing Countries

Policy Considerations for Nascent Space Powers

Iran's space programme: Riding high for peace and pride

This study examines the financial feasibility of Türkiye’s 10-year national space program, focusing on public funding allocated to the Turkish Space Agency. Although Türkiye is among the world’s 20 largest economies and has launched a national space agency and space program, academic research examining the financial feasibility and fiscal sustainability of its space ambitions remains scarce. The study compiles central government budget and investment program figures by years and evaluates whether the allocated public funds are sufficient to support Turkish Space Agency’s strategic goals. The data indicate that while the Turkish Space Agency can finance the first stage of the space program, no funds have yet been allocated for the second stage, a more ambitious and costly phase. As of the current investment cycle, there is no concrete evidence that sufficient public resources have been committed to enable its full implementation. Additionally, while Türkiye has made recent strides in developing its space policy, currently available data suggest that its public space expenditures remain modest in comparison to major global actors. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Türkiye will play a significant role in shaping global space dynamics in the short run.

The News of the Week article “Goldin shakes up NASA's life sciences program” (Andrew Lawler, 12 May, p. [938][1]) does not include mention of the many contributions that Arnauld Nicogossian, former chief of NASA's Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications (OLMSA), has made to our nation's space program. Despite flat budgets for OLMSA over the past 6 years, Nicogossian's leadership has increased the office's extramural research community from about 650 to more than 900 researchers from nationally recognized institutions. Working with the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation, Nicogossian has been instrumental in establishing the Life Sciences competitive peer review process, which requires all NASA scientific research to undergo vigorous peer review by independent external panels. Nicogossian should also be credited with spearheading an interdisciplinary research program in biology, physics, and chemistry, which uses biologically inspired technology as the basis for integration. This effort is attracting a new generation of scientists to NASA, as well as several Nobel laureates. Whether serving as the associate administrator for OLMSA or as chief health and medical officer, Arnauld Nicogossian will continue to do an outstanding job providing NASA with world-class leadership and expertise. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.288.5468.938

This article highlights that for centuries although space was the realm of wonder and fascination, of fiction and children’s bedtime stories, of shooting balls of fire and faraway heavenly bodies; still it was less than 50 years ago that things began to change in earnest. Enormous engineering resources were invested in the US space program during the 1960s. By the end of the decade, engineers had gained a sufficient level of knowledge about chemical rockets and storable propellants and turned their attention to other technologies, such as noise control and advanced computer systems. In its tradition of recognizing technological achievement, ASME has bestowed honors and awards on numerous engineers and scientists associated with the nation's space program. ASME’s publications and conferences have been important vehicles for disseminating technical information on aerospace and aeronautics technology. The Society’s Aerospace Division, which predates the lunar program, has been one of the most active sectors of ASME's technical divisions.

This chapter examines the development of China's national space program. Unlike Japan and the western nations, China failed to fully industrialize and remained as an agricultural nation well into the twentieth century. In 1949 the Communist government gained support from the Soviet Union, thereby jumpstarting their own rocket and missile programs. This alliance however started to deteriorate in the 1960s over differences in political direction. The nation bounced back in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping who instituted science reform and established key partnerships with the West. Within thirty years, China's space program has attained a leadership position in Asia due to the hard work of the China National Space Administration, reliable state support, and the advantages provided by available foreign technology and know-how.

The objective of this paper is to examine and provide a holistic assessment of the “Space and Security” Policy in Europe, taking into consideration the European Space Strategies, Programmes and Governance. The first part of this paper focuses on the security aspects of the space strategies in Europe; it aims to analyse the importance of coordination and cooperation between the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union, and their respective Member States. The analysis includes the two main extents of space security – security from space and security in space. The second part focuses on the security dimensions of the European Space Programmes currently in place. Both the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union have developed a variety of space programmes –with most common ones the Galileo and Copernicus. The security aspects of ESA’s, EU’s as well as National Space programmes are considered. The third and last part of the paper is focused on the Space Governance in Europe. This study delves into the role of the European Space Agency (ESA), the various space related EU Institutions and the responsible national Ministries and Agencies. Additionally, the close link between the space strategies and governance is examined. The main purpose of this paper is to come up with conclusions on whether and how the European “Space and Security” Policy contributes to the European Space Integration.

For some time, there has been a strong will to start a national space program in Turkey. However, when technological, financial and human resources of Turkey are considered, Turkish Space Program (TSP) appears to be a challenge for the nation. To commit to achieve such a challenging goal, a solid systematic approach to all aspects of the space program must be devised and thoroughly applied. In this paper, we developed a systems engineering process model to apply throughout the total space program at each level of abstraction from the national level to component level. Furthermore, the evaluation criteria incorporated into national level is given, a set of systems engineering activities needed to manage the total space program is defined and some tools like total work breakdown structure and knowledge-base growth model to define the scope of the national space program is explained. As a conclusion, it is emphasized further that allocation of each element of the space program to relevant national organizations according to their capabilities is crucial for the success of the national space program.

Thomas A. Potemra, supervisor of the Space Physics Group at Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, Maryland, passed away Friday, April 3, 1998, following extended hospitalization after a heart operation. Tom Potemra had been a physicist in APL's Research Center and Space Department since 1965, specializing in the science and history of the Earth's magnetic field. He led a large group of space scientists, published over 200 scientific papers, and directed many spacecraft experiments. He was deeply involved in defining and implementing major scientific missions for the nation's space program.

Acquiring more definitive answers to questions on the origin of life is one of the objectives of our Nation's space program.

Mr. Bridenstine's “To Do” List

When he takes the office of vice‐president next month, Al Gore (D‐Tenn.) will also step into the chairmanship of the National Space Council. He brings to this position knowledge of the nation's space program, gained as chairman of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space.

Reviewed by: The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Securityby Nicholas Michael Sambaluk Alan D. Meyer (bio) The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security. by Nicholas Michael Sambaluk. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pp. 352. $44.95. Most accounts of the "space race" between the Soviet Union and the United States begin with the 1957 launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, which panicked Americans into believing they had lost their technological (and thus military) edge over their cold war adversary. President Dwight Eisenhower's staid response failed to calm their fears; instead, it left many convinced that their avuncular but technologically naive commander in chief did not fully comprehend the strategic importance of outer space. Many authors treat Eisenhower's space policies of the late 1950s similarly, as little more than a reactive and reluctant prologue to the more ambitious and deliberate agenda pursued by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s: human spaceflight leading to the Apollo Moon landings. In The Other Space Race, historian Nicholas Michael Sambaluk argues that Eisenhower in fact created a coherent, long-term space policy that was firmly grounded in national defense. However, the president's low-key leadership style, which served him well throughout his first term, ultimately worked against him as public confidence eroded in the wake of Sputnik. Long before the Sputnik crisis, Eisenhower focused on developing unmanned (and unarmed) reconnaissance satellites to provide intelligence on Soviet military preparedness. To further this strategic goal, the White House announced plans to launch a scientific research satellite during the International Geophysical Year of 1957–58. Eisenhower's real goal for this non-military project was to create a precedent for international "freedom of space," which would make it legal for the United States to overfly the Soviet Union using top-secret spy satellites still under development. Ultimately he achieved both ends: Sputnik's orbit over the United States delivered the crucial "freedom of space" precedent, and by the time John Kennedy took office, photographs from the CIA's Corona spy satellites developed under Eisenhower proved the fiction of the so-called "missile gap" on which Kennedy had successfully campaigned. Ironically, because Eisenhower refused to even hint at Corona's existence, the American public, Congress, and even most top military leaders incorrectly concluded that he had no space policy. Although Eisenhower was mainly interested in reconnaissance satellites, Sputnik forced more visible action. In 1958 he replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics with another civilian agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in part to placate the public, but also to outmaneuver air force leaders who sought control of the nation's space program. And although he saw no practical function in [End Page 597]human spaceflight, Eisenhower subsequently approved NASA's Project Mercury for similar reasons. While he tolerated NASA's non-military agenda, the air force's planned hypersonic space plane, which promised to deliver nuclear warheads from outer space, flew directly in the face of Eisenhower's express policy to avoid weaponizing space (p. 47). Dubbed "Dyna-Soar" (for Dynamic Soarer), the piloted craft would be boosted into orbit atop a rocket, then conduct its mission while gliding back to Earth at speeds approaching 25,000 feet per second (17,000 mph) (p. 72). Sambaluk demonstrates how the postwar air force never doubted that it was the natural choice to lead the nation into manned spaceflight as an extension of its existing airpower doctrine, and shows how the program remained small enough to escape Eisenhower's notice until after Sputnik created considerable public outcry for decisive action to restore U.S. preeminence in space. By then, given Dyna-Soar's widespread popularity in military and political circles, coupled with Eisenhower's perceived weakness on space policy, the president felt that he could not cancel the program even though he clearly wanted to. Ultimately it was Kennedy (who initially favored the project as part of a massive defense spending program) who put the unfortunately named program on the path to extinction (p. 223). Although the title does not mention Dyna-Soar by name, the air force's abortive...

: Space is one of our nation's vital national interests. During the Cold War, space products and services were dedicated predominately for national purposes with relatively little commercial utility, with the exception of communications. Within the past decade, space products and services have transitioned more and more into the commercial sector, realizing global commercial revenues approaching $65 billion in 1998. As this nation explores and exploits the importance of commercial space activities, it must weigh the costs, benefits, and vulnerabilities between enhancing our security and bolstering our prosperity. Striking a balance between these two core national objectives is critical to our nation's future and essential to providing sound leadership to this nation's space program and more importantly, the international space community. This paper discusses current national space strategy, law, and policies - focusing predominately on commercial space, explores the four economically prosperous commercial space activities - communications, remote sensing, navigation, and launch - as well as the implications each of these activities has on our future national security, and concludes with recommendations on how this nation can best posture its space program to gain maximum economic benefit while preserving national security.

R&M is extremely critical to build safe, reliable, and cost effective systems. The challenges of today's unmanned and ma nned space flight programs demand the most efficient use of our technical knowledge base to develop cost effective and affordable systems. An efficient reliability and maintainability program is essential to meet the challenges for the nation's Space Program. This paper discusses the role of Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and its potential impact on operational availability, and affordability. This includes discussion of the R&M elements that need to be addressed and the R&M analyses that need to be performed in order to support an affordable system design. The paper also provides some lessons learned on the impact of R&M on safety and affordability. Lessons learned discussed in this paper clearly demonstrate the importance of reliability and maintainability engineering in designing and operating safe and affordable launch systems.