A populist incitement? Populism, attack rhetoric, and support for political violence

The main objective of the study was to assess how youth unemployment stimulates youth participation in political violence in Eyecourt and develop a comprehensive understanding of other unemployment interrelated factors and their interrelationships in driving political violence among youths in the area. Using a qualitative research methodology, the study utilized Eyecourt Township as a case study. Thirty participants, both perpetrators and victims of political violence, were selected using snowball sampling. Data collection tools included in-depth interviews and focus group discussions and were analyzed using thematic analysis. The study found that youth unemployment significantly drives political violence. Other related factors such as limited economic opportunities; lack of civic education fosters intolerance and violent behavior towards political opponents; political terrain in Zimbabwe, stimulates youth involvement in political violence; and rapid urbanization exacerbates the situation by creating large pools of idle youths susceptible to recruitment for militias and contestations for land. The study concludes that these are key factors explaining youth participation in political violence. It recommends targeted interventions such as conflict early warning systems, special youth economic zones, vocational training, and the establishment of special courts to handle political violence cases. These measures aim to create economic opportunities, reduce youth frustration and aggression, fostering stability and peace in Harare and across Zimbabwe.

What is the effect of political violence on electoral support for anti-system parties? We argue that the effect of violence is asymmetric and predominantly benefits nationalist, radical-right parties. Posing as defenders of the nation, nationalist parties benefit from violence by their political opponents and violence targeted against perceived threats to the nation. Two potential mechanisms underlie this asymmetric effect. First, nationalist violence becomes an acceptable means of defense in the eyes of status quo-oriented voters if they attribute blame to out-groups who used violence first. Second, nationalist violence itself increases the salience of a threat to the nation, and voters concerned with preserving the status quo see radical right parties as its most effective defender. To test this argument, we collect novel actor-based and geospatial data of political violence in interwar Italy. Using a difference-in-differences estimator, we model the effect of violence on vote shares of anti-system parties at the municipality level in the 1919 and 1921 elections. Our results indicate increasing electoral support for the nationalist Fascist party in municipalities that experienced violence committed by either the far right or left after the 1919 election. In contrast, the radical left Socialist party loses electoral support if violence occurs. These results are robust to different specifications, modeling choices, and measurement approaches. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings for violence in liberal democracies today.

Ethnoreligious hate speech is the precursor to political violence in Nigeria’s fourth republic. While it is true that one of the greatest benefits of democratic societies is freedom of speech, still no one should be allowed under the disguise of exercising the right to free speech to offend, humiliate and demean another human being. In Nigeria, hate speech has been elevated to the status of political campaign strategy and it accounts for the escalation of political violence in Nigeria’s fourth republic. Therefore, this study explored the impact of ethno-religious hate speech on political violence in Nigeria’s fourth public. A descriptive method was adopted and data was collected via a survey of 600 electorates in South-South zone of Nigeria. The study found that there is a positive and significant relationship between Ethno-religious hate speech and political violence in Nigeria’s fourth republic. This paper recommends among others that political campaign in Nigeria should focus on the implementation of the critical national issues such as economic, political, social, cultural, educational, and healthcare services rather than attack on political opponents or mobilization of ethnic, religious, and regional sentiments.

Bangladesh has a history of political unrest and supremacy of the ruling party. Recently, representatives of the local government were suspended for being accused in cases of political violence. The ruling party is defining the suspensions as a legal process; on the contrary, the opposition political parties are claiming it as political hostility and a way of controlling local governments. There are shortages of research on contemporary political challenges and its consequences. Thus, this study considered local government representative suspensions as a case to exemplify the political hostility and local government crisis in Bangladesh. This study also demonstrated some theoretical points to frame the conceptual thoughts, likewise explained the status and some historical illustration of governmental intrusion over local government. Besides, this study applied the qualitative method to discover the research queries. Consequently, the analysis outlined substantial political supremacy and hostility in Bangladesh and its adverse impact on local governance.

Aggressive rhetoric was part and parcel of the rising Tea Party and the related anti-Obama conspiracy theories. The argument here is that Donald J. Trump, as the leading public promoter of Birther rumors, first-time presidential candidate, and U.S. president, played a starring role in bringing hate speech, violent threats, and political violence into the political mainstream. As a result, political violence increased significantly and several violent far-right extremist groups, domestic terrorist entities, were newly founded after Trump announced his presidential campaign in mid-2015. As ex-president and once again presidential candidate, Trump glorified the criminally convicted participants in the violent breach of the U.S. Capitol on 6 January 2021 and honored violent far-right fringe groups that were active in the late 20th century while threatening revenge against his political enemies. To assess, whether Trump, as 47th U.S. president, would be able to have his political foes investigated and jailed upon his return to the highest office, we looked for answers in the Heritage Foundation's “Project 2025,” the most detailed blueprint for the dismantling of the “deep state” and the best-laid plan for a takeover by Trump and vetted conservative “Make America Great Again” loyalists in January 2025.1 Although the sole focus here is on the rhetoric of far-right extremism and violence in the past 15 years, there were no similarly extreme far-left hate speech patterns and violent extremism related to the Democratic Party during the same time.

The federal elections were held in Brazil in 2018. The ballot resulted in a victory for the far-right candidate, Jair Messias Bolsonaro. The question that arose after the victory of the far-right was: How could this have happened? One of the instruments that undoubtedly contributed to this unexpected victory was a peculiar aspect of his political campaign: memetic communication. Through the use of memes in the social media (above all WhatsApp), Bolsonaro’s project transformed these violent discourses against political opponents, feminism, racialised persons and poverty into a series of discourses legitimised through humour and irony. It was a simplification through the memes affecting the static system of cognitive and metaphorical frameworks. During the pre-election period in 2018, we carried out digital ethnographic research in the WhatsApp groups of supporters of Bolsonaro’s project (“Bolsonarism”). In this period, we collected a sample of 132 memes belonging to WhatsApp groups composed of up to 256 members, who did not know each other and were geographically dispersed. The analysis we carried out demonstrates the trivialisation and legitimisation of violence against political opponents and other social groups. Much of this legitimisation was camouflaged under the mask of supposed humour and irony, which in reality was insulting, prejudicial and dehumanising.

The long‐standing and pervasive patterns of political violence in Turkey, which were only abated by the military coup of September 1980, are examined in terms of their historical and sociopolitical antecedents. The paper concludes that political violence in Turkey is the result on the one hand of the specific forms of Kemalist modernization to which the country was subjected from 1920 to 1945. Kemalism led to modern political and legal institutions, but left much of Turkey's cultural and economic life subject to traditional values. In addition, Kemalism bequeathed a legacy of political parties that saw the national good identified solely with each political organization's success, which in turn subjectively legitimized violence against political opponents as acceptable in the struggle for the national welfare. After 1945 the legacy of Kemalism was joined by severe developmental problems in the area of economics and social welfare, a resurgence of hyper‐nationalism over the Cyprus issue, and an anti‐modernist backlash through a revival of Islamic traditions. The results were conflicts in a society already strained by the symptoms of second stage modernization that could not be compromised within the parameters of the Turkish political system.

From the 2016 US presidential election and into 2019, we demonstrate that a visceral feeling of oneness (that is, psychological fusion) with a political leader can fuel partisans' willingness to actively participate in political violence. In studies 1 and 2, fusion with Donald Trump predicted Republicans' willingness to violently persecute Muslims (over and above other established predictors). In study 3, relative deprivation increased fusion with Trump and, subsequently, willingness to violently challenge election results. In study 4, fusion with Trump increased after his election and predicted immigrant persecution over time. Further revealing its independent effects, this fusion with Trump predicted a willingness to persecute Iranians (independent of identification with him, study 5); a willingness to persecute immigrants (study 6); and a willingness to personally protect the US border from an immigrant caravan (study 7), even over and above fusion with the group of Trump's followers. These findings echo past political movements and suggest critical future research.

Political violence is a worldwide problem that has been on the rise over the past decade. The international dimension of domestic repression and dissent is a particularly relevant factor yet surprisingly understudied. In particular, governments that heavily depend on foreign aid may crack down on political opponents when donors are distracted by major domestic events. In reaction, the opposition may have incentives to reduce agitations to incite such crackdowns. We study this interaction in a simple strategic model and empirically test the predictions using fine-grained data for Africa. The theory surmises that oppositions will reduce agitations when shocks are anticipated (elections). In contrast, when unanticipated shocks (natural disasters) hit, and when agitations are already underway, the theory surmises that the opposition will substitute visible forms of unrest (riots) for more covert operations on soft targets (civilian-targeted violence). This pattern is precisely reflected in the data. International inattention hurts political oppositions through the outof-equilibrium threat of increased repression, and observed political crackdowns may only represent the 'tip of the iceberg'. Enhancing international scrutiny would help safeguard public demonstrations of dissent and reduce violence against civilians.

Negative Campaigning (Election Campaigning Communication)

The elusive populist phenomenon has been the focus of numerous studies in recent years, with the reliance of populism on divisive and aggressive rhetoric being acknowledged. The paper aims to apply these findings to the Athenian forensic rhetoric and identify manifestations of populist rhetoric in the antagonistic arena of Athenian courts. By reference to the most ‘political’ of public trials, namely the indictments against inexpedient laws and illegal decrees, it is argued that the rhetorical strategies employed by the Athenian litigants who sought to persuade mass audiences in a zero-sum process, have much in common with modern populist discourse. Aiming to secure the good will of the dicasts, speakers competed over their level of adherence to the shared traditional values and norms of Athenian society, making the audience the nodal point of their rhetoric. Artfully interpellating the audience into a fictitiously pure and homogeneous group, litigants sought to establish concord with the dicasts while alienating the opponent. The division between the pure demos and the corrupt establishment, allowed the speakers to use a divisive and aggressive rhetoric, through which the adversary was presented as an outsider, representative of the out-group of corrupt political elite who undermined the political and moral principles upon which the Athenian identity was based.

Recent political events have galvanized interest in the promulgation of misinformation—particularly false rumors about political opponents. An array of studies provide reasons to think that harboring false political beliefs is a disproportionately conservative phenomenon, since citizens with affinity for the political right endorse more false information than people with affinity for the left. However, as we discuss below, past research is limited in its ability to distinguish supply-side explanations for this result (false information is spread more effectively by elites on the right) from demand-side explanations (citizens who sympathize with the right are more likely to believe false information upon receipt). We conduct an experiment on a representative sample of Americans designed specifically to reveal asymmetries in citizens’ proclivity to endorse false damaging information about political opponents. In a contrast with previous results, we find no evidence that citizens on the political right are especially likely to endorse false political information.

This research investigated associations between diverse aspects of ideological worldviews and opposition to principles of liberal democracy in a heterogeneous sample of UK adults (N = 824). In line with the hypotheses, both system-justifying worldviews (e.g., authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) and system-challenging worldviews (e.g., need for chaos and prejudice against the rich and powerful) were robustly associated with antidemocratic attitudes, adjusting for other predictors and demographic variables-and these associations were mediated by perceived illegitimacy of the democratic system. Several system-orthogonal aspects of worldviews, including a simplistic epistemology (e.g., lack of actively open-minded thinking) and misperceptions of antidemocratic attitudes among political opponents, also robustly predicted antidemocratic attitudes, while political prejudice, societal discontent, and perceived superiority or the self and ingroup showed less robust effects. At a more specific level, the strongest predictors of support for democratic elections, censorship, political violence, and denying groups their rights were actively open-minded thinking, authoritarianism, need for chaos, and social dominance orientation, respectively. Taken together, the findings contribute to a more unified and nuanced understanding of the psychological underpinnings of antidemocratic attitudes.

BackgroundThe ruling parties in Bangladesh have systematically used violence against political opponents and criminals. It is essential to 1) determine the magnitude and burden of organised crime and political violence (OPV) and human rights violations in the affected community, and to 2) identify the risk factors and key indicators for developing effective health intervention and prevention measures.MethodsThe population-based study consisted of two parts: a household survey and OPV screening at mobile clinics (presented in Part II). A cross-sectional, multistage cluster household survey was conducted in the Meherpur district in February-March 2008; 22 clusters with a sample size of 1,101 households (population of 4,870) were selected.ResultsAround 83% of households reported being exposed to at least two categories of OPV or human rights violations: 29% reported that the family members had been arrested or detained; 31% reported torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Crude mortality rate was 17.9/1,000 and under 5 mortality rate was 75/1,000. The annual injury rate was 36%, lifetime experience of violence-related injury was 50%, and pain experience within 2 weeks was reported by 57%. Over 80% of the population over 35 years old complained of pain. High prevalence of injury, lifetime experience of OPV-related injury and pain complaints are related to the level of exposure to OPV and human rights violations. A financial burden was imposed on families with an injured person. A geographical variation was revealed regarding reports of torture and lifetime experience of violence-related injury. A combination of individual, relational, community and societal factors, including variables such as political party affiliation, conflict with other families, household income and residential area, affected the risk of victimisation in the household. The odds ratio for reporting extrajudicial execution of a family member was 9.22 for Awami League supporters, 9.15 for Bangladesh Nationalist Party supporters; and 3.97 for Jamaat-e-Islami Party supporters compared with families with no political involvement.ConclusionThe level of violence and human rights violations is high. The affected population suffers from violence-related injuries and traumas, which could be a factor contributing to poverty. Victimisation is not random.

Political polarization in America has intensified beyond mere disagreement to what scholars characterize as sectarianism—a condition where partisan identity fundamentally shapes moral judgments. A key marker of sectarianism is asymmetric moral standards for violence, where aggression against political opponents is considered more justified than identical violence targeting one’s own group. Using a survey experiment featuring a realistic political rally scenario, we find compelling evidence in support of such sectarianism: partisan bias in the US extends to evaluations of political violence. By manipulating the partisan affiliations of perpetrators and targets, as well as provocation severity, we find that both Democrats and Republicans exhibit substantial and symmetrical partisan bias. This double standard is particularly pronounced among strong partisans, who are nearly three times more likely to justify violence against the opposition than violence targeting their own party. These results extend sectarianism theory beyond policy preferences to physical violence, suggesting that partisan identity now functions as a powerful perceptual filter that can legitimize political aggression when directed at opponents.