Abstract

AbstractIncomplete understanding of fiducial theory has led to (i) spurious paradoxes, (ii) mistaken beliefs of equivalence with other theories of inference, and (iii) wrongly conceived limitations on the validity of fiducial probability. In the present paper these misapprehensions are analysed and rebutted, and also illustrated with elementary yet crucial examples.

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