A note on relevance
This paper presents new data challenging the standard model of linguistic relevance, which defines relevance as informativeness to the Question Under Discussion, showing that sentences can be perceived as relevant despite lacking QUD informativeness, with implications for theoretical approaches to relevance.
Abstract In this paper, I present novel data that challenge the dominant approach to modelling linguistic relevance, according to which a sentence is relevant if and only if it is informative to the Question Under Discussion (QUD). In particular, I show that a sentence can fail to be informative to the QUD and, despite this, still be perceived as relevant. In the final section, I outline the theoretical implications of this finding.
- Research Article
17
- 10.1209/0295-5075/4/7/003
- Oct 1, 1987
- EPL (Europhysics Letters)
SU(3) breaking mechanisms for pseudoscalar-meson charge radii are discussed and confronted with the data. These mechanisms are compatible with Sirlin's theorem, but differ in more specific predictions. The present data tend to support constituent-quark model ideas for SU(3) breaking rather than traditional vector meson dominance or recent chiral perturbation theory approaches.
- Research Article
10
- 10.1007/bf03395558
- Jul 1, 2006
- The Psychological Record
A generalized weak dominance approach is used to test the documented preference reversal (PR) phenomenon. This approach simply models risky choice behavior in PR as a choice between the best possible outcomes or a choice between the worst possible outcomes by equating smaller paired outcome difference between bets. The preference reversals are therefore seen as a consequence of the fact that gamble parameters are designed to encourage individuals to differentiate the difference between the worst possible outcomes of the two bets (i.e., to avoid the worse possible outcome of $ bet) rather than to differentiate the difference between the best possible outcomes of the two bets (i.e., to seek the better outcome of $ bet on which people tend to put a higher price). A "matching" task as well as a "pricing" task was designed to examine whether the knowledge of the value difference of the paired possible outcomes will permit prediction of preferential choice. The overall test results favor the equate-to-differentiate explanation. The present data suggest that the anomaly may be not in individuals' inconsistent preferences but rather in our inadequate knowledge of what it is that is being preferred when a question about preference is posed.