Abstract
This study, using data for 1981 through 1983, examines the efficiency and accuracy with which the fiscal agents for the three federal agencies estimated equilibrium competitive yields on their new debt issues. The findings indicate that the fiscal agents for two of the three agencies are adept at estimating equilibrium yields for new debt issues, even in the absence of an auction process or direct negotiation with potential investors or underwriters. The findings in the study also show that the average pricing error tends to favor the agencies rather than the buyer of the new issues.
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