A New Game Started? China’s ‘Overseas Strategic Pivots’ in the Indian Ocean Region

The Asian region has become the epicenter of global economic and geopolitical change. In this regard, the Pakistan Economic Corridor, ‘String of Pearls’ and the Maritime Silk Road in relation to the China Myanmar Economic Corridor are inclusive examples in this region. China has been trying to surround India in the Indian Ocean for a long time. In recent years, Chinese efforts have seen considerable upsurge. For this, it is working on a scheme called ‘String of Pearls’. To make the Indian Ocean a hub of trans-regional connectivity through several alternative routes. Despite China’s effectual interests in the Indian Ocean, its naval presence will particularly have a significant impact on the security of India and other major powers. However, as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Beijing’s strategic culture is more focused on self defense. Because the purpose of the ‘String of Pearls’ is to establish a Silk Road near the Indian Ocean region. There has been competition between India and China to find other such routes in the Indian Ocean region that could have a significant impact. The purpose of this article is to discuss China’s objectives, its approach to the Indian Ocean and its impact on India’s security measures to prevent it. Keywords: String of Pearls, Indian Ocean Region, India, China, Chinese.

In terms of geographical location and natural endowments, Indian Ocean and the coastal areas naturally have the gene to become a stage for the game of world powers and a key region for the competition of interests; the Indian Ocean Region today is experiencing not only the gradual change of international architecture but also the reconstruction of maritime order in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly important in its strategic position but it is still not the “center stage” or “strategic center” in global politics and economics; in recent years, China’s ambition towards the Indian Ocean has been growing, but that ambition is still a subordinate direction of its geo-strategy (maritime strategy). We shall have rational understanding about the geographical environment in the Indian Ocean Region and the geographical risks in China’s the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indian Ocean; the principal geographical risk for China in the Indian Ocean Region is not the security of Indian Ocean sea routes but two others: first, regionalization of structural contradictions between big powers; second, complicated and fragile geopolitical ecology in relevant Indian Ocean areas. From the perspective of geostrategic adjustments by big powers, the rise of the “Indo-Pacific” concept indicates the competition between big powers in the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly complicated. The US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, in particular, makes the Indian Ocean a major geo-direction in containing China, while the India’s “Maritime Doctrine” also strengthens vigilance against China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, the geopolitical competition between big powers including the US and India are major challenges and geographical risks for China in this region. From the perspective of regional geopolitical ecology, issues like cultural conflicts, resource disputes, poverty, turbulence, territorial disputes and terrorism in the shatter belt make geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Rim complex and fragile, and geographical risks and security in this region have significant spillover effect; local turmoil and political risks with instability in relevant regions have become another main geographical risk for China. Adverse impacts of the two on China’s maintaining and expanding its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region go far beyond the security of Indian Ocean sea routes and unconventional security threats like the Indian Ocean pirates and regional terrorismKeywordsIndian OceanGeo-environmentGeographical risksIndo-Pacific strategyChina’s Indian Ocean strategy

Concomitant with China’s rise as a major economic powerhouse over the last few decades has been its greater presence around the globe. More so is in the area of the maritime domain where China is currently competing with both global and regional powers for greater access such that is has successfully created what is known as the Chinese 'string of pearls’. While Beijing has constantly argued that its activities are peaceful and aimed at securing its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and ensuring its trade, commerce and energy security, however, not all the global and regional players are convinced. Over the last two decades, China has been pushing for greater access and presence into the Indian Ocean region such that it has created much uneasiness and anxiety in New Delhi and Washington. The aim of this article is therefore to analyse Chinese activities and strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean region. While the Chinese policy of creating its string of pearls is not solely confined to the Indian Ocean region alone, this article will, however, focus on the said ocean for at least three reasons. Firstly, the Indian Ocean is important for it serves as the bridge between Asia and the world, and secondly, it has witnessed heightened Chinese activity over the last decade such that it is indeed one of China’s major focal point on the global stage. Last, but not least, it has also become, to some extent, a pawn in the rivalries between major global and regional players, namely the United States, China and India. Apart from that, this article will also consider Chinese activities in the states of the Indian Ocean region, namely Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius. This is followed by a discussion on the Chinese official position and rationale in creating its string of pearls in the Indian Ocean region. Further afield, the article will analyse the reaction from India as well as its growing uneasiness and anxiety towards Chinese activities in what it has long considered its own backyard. Last, but not least, this paper will also deliberate on the United States' perception and reaction to Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean region.

With the implementation of trade protectionism by western countries dominated by the US and EU, particularly the redefinition of trade rules by the Trump administration based on the “America First” policy, over the past two years, China’s foreign trade and investment will expand into the Indian Ocean region at a faster pace, and China will become an increasingly important economic and security stakeholder in the region. Moreover, the US is shifting its strategic focus from anti-terrorism to checking “strategic rivals”, hoping the countries within the Indian Ocean region like India and Australia will assume more security responsibilities. That causes new changes to the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and the strategic competition among powers in the Indian Ocean region is increasingly intensified. Meanwhile, instead of being eased, the instability of the security situation across the Indian Ocean shows a sign of further deterioration. In the future, the US will still be the biggest variable that affects the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and India, as a power within the region, will become a main variable that affects the international environment in the region. Amid the changing international environment across the Indian Ocean region, China will have fast growing demand for security in the region, which will prompt China to include the Indian Ocean into its strategic vision to meet its rising economic interests and security demand in the region and ease the pressure from the strategic competition among powers. According to this report, although China is not a country in the Indian Ocean, it’s a country close to the Indian Ocean. That is to say, China is the power outside but closest to the Indian Ocean. As the economic relations between China and the countries along the Indian Ocean coast has become increasingly closer in recent years, both traditional and non-traditional security challenges are growing in the region; in particular, given the strategic importance of the Eastern Indian Ocean, which is adjacent to South China Sea, to China’s peripheral environment, actively creating the political, economic and security environment favorable to China in the Indian Ocean region will be a choice for China’s foreign strategy in the next decade or even a longer period of time. In the Indian Ocean region, China has been, is, and will always be a builder that promotes economic prosperity, a participant that develops international rules and a contributor that safeguards common security. The main objective of China’s Indian Ocean strategy is to safeguard its freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and ensure its security of maritime transport, and to have the capability to expand its economic interest in the Indian Ocean region. This requires China to have corresponding military defense and projection capabilities, and to play a constructive role that matches its own capabilities in the field of security governance in the Indian Ocean.KeywordsIndian Ocean strategyInternational EnvironmentStrategic GameBelt and Road Initiative

The Sino-Indian competition is not a recent development when it comes to global and regional affairs. In recent years, the crisis between China and India has manifested serious geostrategic risks to the stability and safety of the South Asian region and maritime domain. This paper precisely analyses the Sino Indian maritime competition in the Indian Ocean where both the Asian powers are regarded as one of the most significant naval capabilities for their geostrategic vision. An overview of China’s and India’s strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is what this study aims to convey in the first section. The section analyzes the geo political and geo-economic importance of Indian Ocean for both China and India. The latter section sheds light on China’s growing concern for the IOR stemmed from its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) security and explains the expanding activities of China in the region. The Indian security community views China’s continued modernization of its military, increased power projection in the Indian Ocean, and political and economic ties with the IOR states as measures to counterbalance India’s dominance in the region. The next section outlines how China’s increasing sway in the IOR is becoming a major worry for New Delhi. In an effort to project power and protect its strategic interests both inside and outside the IOR, India has worked to modernize and bolster its armed forces over the past ten years, particularly the navy. India is currently envisioning a more grandiose and newer role for itself in the IOR by procuring infrastructure in a number of IOR countries. India has been trying to thwart China’s attempts to establish IOR dominance. This, combined with India’s essential naval build-up and overwhelming spatial advantage, would significantly challenge China’s goal of enhancing its leverage in the IOR through its “String of Pearls.” Thus, all these counter activities of the two Asian powers against each other have gradually been fueling the maritime competition in the IOR a more intense one. BIMRAD Journal VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, DEC 2024; PP-63-84

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Shen Dingli, ‘Don't Shun the Idea of Setting up Overseas Military Bases’, January 28, 2010, at http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm. 2 Edward Wong, ‘Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power’, New York Times, April 23, 2010. 3 Youssef Bodansky, ‘The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US’, Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, DC, September 30, 1995, pp. 6–13. 4 Manu Pubby, ‘China's New N-Submarine Base Sets off Alarm Bells’, Indian Express, May 3, 2008. 5 The term ‘string of pearls’ was first used in a report entitled ‘Energy Futures in Asia’, commissioned by the US Department of Defence's Office of Net Assessment from defence contractor Booz-Allen-Hamilton. For details, see David Walgreen, ‘China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy’, Comparative Strategy, 25(2), 2006, pp. 55–73. Also see Jae-Hyung Lee, ‘China's Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24(3), 2007, pp. 553–554. 6 For a detailed explanation of the security ramifications of the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ strategy, see Gurpreet Khurana, ‘China's “String of Pearls” in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications’, Strategic Analysis, 32(1), 2008, pp. 1–22. 7 Ziad Haider, ‘Oil Fuels Beijing's New Power Game’, Yale Global Online, at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/oil-fuels-beijings-new-power-game. 8 On India's role in shaping Sino-Pakistan ties, see Harsh V. Pant, ‘The Pakistani Thorn in China-India–US Relations’, The Washington Quarterly, 25(1), 2012, pp. 83–95. 9 Saibal Dasgupta, ‘China Mulls Setting up Military Base in Pakistan’, Times of India, January 28, 2010. 10 The rapidly changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific is discussed in Harsh V. Pant, China's Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition, Sussex Academic Press, Portland, OR, 2011, pp. 11–28. 11 Geoffrey Till concludes from this that the Chinese government appears ‘to have a very clear vision of the future importance of the sea and a sense of the strategic leadership needed to develop maritime interest’. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Frank Cass, London, 2004, p. 102. 12 For a detailed examination of the contemporary state of Sino-Indian relations, see Harsh V. Pant, The China Syndrome: Grappling with an Uneasy Relationship, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2010. 13 Manu Pubby, ‘Indian Submarine, Chinese Warship Test Each Other in Pirate Waters’, Indian Express, February 5, 2009. 14 Ben Bland and Girija Shivakumar, ‘China Confronts Indian Navy Vessel’, Financial Times, August 31, 2011.

Maritime security is a broad and vague area, though it could be defined as the security dealing with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain. Indian Ocean has become multifaceted and dynamic. Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the Indian Ocean Region transitions from an international backwater, a mere route for maritime trade, to a major global nexus of resource, human, economic and environmental issues. The Indian Ocean Region contains a large proportion of the world's failed and failing states, including 11 of the 20 states listed in Foreign Policy Journal 's 2009 article 'The Failed State Index'. 2 The non-traditional threats to security comprise threat of non-state actors. The trafficking of narcotics, weapons and people continues to be a great concern. The likelihood of terrorist attack has become a major concern. Although terrorist attacks on shipping remain relatively low, the threat of terrorism must be viewed as credible. Any major attack can easily disrupt global economy. Maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean continue to be dominated by piracy and armed robbery at sea, especially hijacking of merchant vessels. Therefore, maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region is an apt model of Buzan and Weaver's 'regional security complex', that is, a group of states united by common security problems of the region. 3Geographically, the Indian Ocean is the third-largest ocean in the world, covering 68.556 million sq. km or 20 per cent of the earth's water surface. 4 Broadly, it has been bounded by India in its north; Africa in its west; Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, Malaysiaand Australia in its east; and Antarctica in its south. The Indian Ocean also embraces many seas like Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Mannar and the Gulf of Oman. The major ports in the Indian Ocean are Chennai, Colombo, Durban, Jakarta, Kolkata, Melbourne, Mumbai and Richards Bay. 5 There are several choke points in the Indian Ocean such as the Mozambique Channel, the Bab-elMandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Lombok Strait. 6 According to Michel and Sticklor, 38 states have influence over the Indian Ocean Region. Some of the 38 states are Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. France and United Kingdom are also included because of their island territories. 7 These countries draw 40 per cent of the world's total coastlines. In 2010, the population of Indian Ocean Region comprises almost onethird, that is 35.70 per cent, of the world's total population while the average Human Development Index of this region is only 0.597 in comparison to the world average of 0.682. Looking at the brief history of the Indian Ocean, one can say that the Indian Ocean has been a significant route, making it accessible for traders from the worldwide. The western Indian Ocean was dominated by the Persians from the third century to the seventh century while the Arabs dominated the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean from seventh century to the fourteenth century. The Arabs occupied the coastline of East Africa, the north-western coastline of India and Southeast Asia. Rais is of the view that the neglect of the naval strategy by the Arabs led European traders to enter the Indian Ocean. 8The Portuguese came with the aim to monopolize over the Asian trade, especially in spices. The Portuguese occupied Colombo, Socotra, Goa and Melaka, but by the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch started occupying most of the Portuguese domains. The Dutch formed the United East India Company in 1602 to promote the eastern trade. It is said that Spain's occupation of Portugal in 1580 and religious intolerance and lack of commercial associations in Portugal led to weaken Portugal, while newly discovered Brazil diverted its focus from the Indian Ocean. Because of the lack of resources, the Dutch failed in effectively controlling the region. The war with England and alteration in Dutch colonial policies led Dutch to lose their domination to the British and the French in the seventeenth century. The English established the East India Company in 1601, while the French East India Company was established in 1604. The Indian Ocean has been called 'British Lake'. 9By the end of the Second World War, almost all the countries of Indian Ocean area got independence from the colonial domination. However, following the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, the Indian Ocean occupied centre stage in the foreign policies of the super power because of their strategic and economic interest in the region. Chomsky argued that the United States is interested in the region because of its oil reserves. However, the Cold War reached the Indian Ocean in the 1960s and 1970s. Both the United States and the USSR tried to install their naval bases and submarines in the Indian Ocean. The United Nations declared the Indian Ocean as the zone of peace in 1971. Bouchard and Crumplin argued that the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Israel-Palestine war of 1973, Gulf oil crisis in 1973 and 1979, the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s gave Indian Ocean a geostrategic importance. After the end of Cold War, the United States intervened in Iraq-Kuwait war in 1991. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 brought instability to the region. The war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1983 to 2009 also brought turmoil to the region. It is argued that India is a great power in the Indian Ocean Region while China is also gradually proving its presence in the region. 10Maritime rights of the nations are enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but these rights are sometimes in conflict with their strategic interests. The Indian Ocean Region has now turned into a multidimensional and dynamic region; however, it was neglected for a long time. Venkatshamy is of the view that Indian Ocean has an increasingly important role to play in the geopolitics in the coming times. Forty-eight out of 63 ports in Asia are located in the Indian Ocean Region. By 2013, it has become the pivot of trade and energy as the region has 61 per cent of total global container traffic besides 70 per cent of the petroleum products transportation. 11 The Malacca Strait is the major shipping route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, connecting Asia, Middle East and Europe. The 550-mile strait is a vital choke point in the Indian Ocean as more than 50,000 merchant ships travel by the waterways every year. 12 'If Straits get blocked, almost half of the world's fleet would need to reroute through the Sunda or Lombok Straits.' 13 The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region has made many extra-regionalstates to keep a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 14 It is said that most of the armed conflicts are located in the Indian Ocean Region. According to Venkatshamy, 45 per cent of the world's conflicts (such as Palestine and Israel, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) and 75 per cent of the world natural disasters occur in the Indian Ocean Region. 15The region is said to be very rich in the natural resources like gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminium and cadmium. It is estimated that the region contains almost 55 per cent of recognized oil reserves and around 40 per cent of gas reserves. According to Berlin, in 2011, 40 per cent of trade in oil transports passed through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 per cent through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Most of the energy exports from the five major world oil producers pass the narrow route of the Indian Ocean. 16 It is argued that the growing interest of the Gulf Cooperation countries in the Indian Ocean is because of the gradual increase in the consumption of energy by India and China. It is argued that countries like the United States, China, India and Japan are increasingly depending on energy supplied by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran, making Indian Ocean Region more and more important in the coming decades or rather century. 17Besides its economic importance, Indian Ocean Region also has military significance. The island of Diego Garcia has been a major airnaval base of the United States in the Indian Ocean. The United States has also installed some major naval task forces such as Combined Task Force 152 and Combined Task Force 150, while France has its naval bases installed in Djibouti, Reunion and Abu Dhabi. China has commercial ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. Port construction by the Chinese is also under way in Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is argued that Marao Atoll in Maldives is among potential Chinese military bases.

What is strategic culture? How does strategic culture help us to understand the international dynamics in the Indian Ocean? How could we make sense of the ‘string of pearls’ phenomenon in the Indian Ocean? These questions set the terrains of this chapter. I will first engage with a scholarly debate on strategic culture. Based on the debate, I will develop an alternative approach in conceiving strategic culture as ‘the Powers’ (Wong in Discerning the powers in Post-Colonial Africa and Asia: A treatise on Christian statecraft. Springer Science + Business Media, Heidelberg & Singapore, 2016a: Chap. 1). Through examining Kautilya’s ancient Hindu statecraft as a lens to unpack contemporary Indian strategic culture, case studies from the South Asian small powers of Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh will illustrate how the ‘string of pearls’ was formed. The argument will go into this direction: on one hand, the ‘string of pearls’ is formed consequential of India’s strained relations with her small power-neighbours. On the other hand, as both the South Asian small powers and China find each other useful to counter the hegemonic thrust of India, the ‘string of pearls’ was formed in the Indian Ocean region.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) turned out to be the most engaging region for global activities in recent years. The Indian Ocean consists of the most important trade routes of the world. The Indian Ocean provides a way to move through various regions of the world. World's huge economic players always keep an eye on the IOR for its strategic importance. The Indian Ocean is a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and it also provides a way to the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. It is the main shipping channel for the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The Indian Ocean region is spread over 28 states, three continents and covers 17.5% of the global land area. The IOR is home to almost 36% of the population of the world. The region is proven to have a rich petroleum resources and other metals. Indian Ocean is also a rich source of fish and its export. Major Sea routes of the world pass through the Indian Ocean that connects the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become a home for economic developments, disputes, conflicts, and competition for regional influence by regional and extra-regional powers. The Trade flow from IOR across the globe has its importance for the global economy as well as regional countries. The growing presence of regional power (China) is a major concern for India and other regional countries and that has compelled them to reshape their maritime strategies. This article aims to state the importance of IOR in Indian reference and Chinese presence in IOR and its strategies.

An evaluation of tsunami hazard using Bayesian approach in the Indian Ocean

Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean has the potential to profoundly affect the stability and security of the region. This essay examines Indian and Chinese views on the status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean and argues that fundamental differences in perceptions could exacerbate an already highly competitive security dynamic in the maritime domain. Delhi tends to have a somewhat proprietary attitude toward the region, questioning the legitimacy of any extraregional naval presence, particularly China. But Indian strategists also see China as having strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize claims to great-power status or special prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).This essay first summarizes China's growing strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean. It then considers aspirations to take a leading role in the IOR and Indian perspectives on China's presence in the region. Next, the essay discusses Chinese perspectives on India and its role in the Indian Ocean and considers the potential consequences for China of the failure to take sensitivities into account. In short, I argue that China's failure to try to co-opt India as a partner or address some of its concerns is a mistake. Beijing will find it difficult to create a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indian Ocean in opposition to India.China's Imperatives in the Indian OceanChina's primary strategic imperative in the IOR is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs are highly vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate actors, especially at the narrow chokepoints through which most trade must pass. Chinese strategists are concerned that an adversary may use these vulnerabilities as a bargaining chip in the context of a wider dispute. China also has other developing interests in the IOR, including a growing population of Chinese nationals and greater investment in the region. These issues are likely to become increasingly important in the country's strategic thinking.An additional factor is that China's military expansion program will significantly enhance its ability to project military power into the IOR in the long term. Its capabilities already exceed by a considerable and growing margin. China's naval presence has grown in connection with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's antipiracy deployments in the western Indian Ocean, which Beijing is now making more permanent, including by developing logistical support facilities in Djibouti. China's One Belt, One Road initiative will also involve the development of a swathe of maritime infrastructure across the IOR.India's Aspirations in the Indian OceanIndia considers itself as the leading Indian Ocean state and as destined to be the natural leader of the region. It thus takes a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the IOR and perceives the presence of extraregional naval powers, particularly China, as essentially illegitimate.India has long harbored ambitions to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Though few Indian officials might care to publicly admit it, many in Delhi see the Indian Ocean as more or less India's ocean. 1 As Donald Berlin has commented, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region-the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. 2India's views on the Indian Ocean are partly defensive: the country's colonial experience is used to justify the exclusion of extraregional powers from the Indian Ocean, an approach that is sometimes labeled India's Monroe Doctrine. The idea involves an assertion, at least unofficially, that the military presence of outside powers in neighborhood is essentially illegitimate and that neighboring countries should rely exclusively on India as the predominant regional manager and security provider. …

This article explores the objectives of China's engagement in the Maldives and how the current administration of the country is responding to it. The article also looks at how the Maldives has been used by major powers in the past. On the basis of these analyses, it envisages the path that Maldivian foreign policy is likely to follow in the future and its likely impact on the security environment in the Indian Ocean region. The article argues that China is trying to make inroads into the Maldives to fulfil its strategic objectives, but it has not been very successful because of the regime of President Nasheed, which is friendly towards India. However, as Chinese economic engagement in the Maldives increases, it might affect the close relationship between India and the Maldives. The article also highlights that the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean cannot be described as a ‘string of pearls’ to encircle India, but has more to do with furthering its strategic interests and global military ambitions.

Securing the Maritime Silk Road in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Nilanthi Samaranayake (bio) For roughly fifteen years, China's commercial and military activities in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean have caused increasing concern about its intentions in the region. China specialists have examined the country's energy interests and naval planning along its sea lines of communication.1 The proliferation of commercial infrastructure projects now branded under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has heightened these concerns about China's presence in the Indian Ocean region. Prominent infrastructure efforts include port development in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, while lower-profile efforts include tunnel and bridge construction in Bangladesh and Maldives. These developments have raised questions about how China is attempting to secure the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)—the waterway "road" component of BRI—in South Asia and across the Indian Ocean region more broadly. Because Pakistan will be examined by another essay in this roundtable and the China-Pakistan relationship is long-standing and predates BRI activities, this essay focuses on what China's activities look like elsewhere in maritime South Asia and out to critical Indian Ocean chokepoints. Despite notable changes in the country's presence in the Indian Ocean over the last decade, to what extent is China securing its commercial interests using naval and maritime forces? If it indeed aims to do this in a comprehensive way, then the results are modest at present. The first section of this essay examines the evidence that China is working to secure its interests in the region. The next section describes challenges to China's efforts to do so and the galvanizing effects of its activities thus far. The essay will conclude by emphasizing the importance of monitoring potential indicators of a substantive shift in the Indian Ocean and South Asian order, [End Page 21] despite the limited scope of China's activities to secure the MSR to date, and by considering the implications for U.S. interests in the region. Is China Securing the MSR? The clearest examples of China acting to secure the MSR are the counterpiracy and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the establishment of a base in the far fringes of the Indian Ocean at the chokepoint in Djibouti. Since 2008, Beijing has sent a PLA Navy task force to the Gulf of Aden. Originating out of UN resolutions to combat piracy,2 China's military vessels have transited the Indian Ocean for the past decade, providing escort activity that aims to secure the safe passage of shipping, including for Chinese commercial vessels. China has used this mission to justify the deployment of submarines. These were clearly not in support of counterpiracy but instead appeared to be aimed at gaining operational experience far from home for this platform.3 As Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt observes, at any given time the PLA Navy has four to five surface ships and two support ships transiting the Indian Ocean, plus occasionally a submarine.4 India's chief of naval staff Admiral Sunil Lanba estimates a similar number (six to eight ships).5 Second, China conducted NEOs in response to domestic instability in Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. In total, roughly 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Libya using Chinese civilian and military aircraft and ships,6 and nearly 1,000 Chinese and foreign nationals were evacuated from Yemen.7 Through such operations, China secured an important MSR asset—its citizens working in these countries. [End Page 22] Third, China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Although China had stated for decades that it had no intention of developing overseas bases, its counterpiracy operations as well as NEOs pointed to the potential benefits of having logistical support in place.8 The base leverages Djibouti's location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint, where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. China's presence at this far corner of the Indian Ocean shows the expanse of its operational reach across the region. Challenges to China Securing the MSR Through conducting counterpiracy operations and NEOs and establishing a base...

This research paper focuses on the strategic culture of China in the 21st century and establishes a link with the Chinese 'String of Pearls' strategy. The article explores the relevant literature and develops an empirical premise that China’s contemporary strategic culture is still defensive, in line with it past practices. However, after the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s strategic culture is more focused on its defence preparedness as 'String of Pearls' is aimed at establishing the maritime Silk Road along the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The paper also briefly discusses China’s importance on developing partnerships and economic relations with different regions like Asia, the Middle East, Europe and America to show its peaceful rise and defensive strategic culture.

Prospects for China's Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean Hu Bo (bio) There is much exaggerated speculation about China's military strategy in the Indian Ocean, including the so-called string of pearls, and military intentions for the Belt and Road Initiative. Before analyzing China's Indian Ocean strategy over the next ten to fifteen years, it is first useful to focus on some general development trends of sea power rather than speculation about China's intentions. The Dominance of Sea Denial Today, we are living in a period of sea-denial dominance. Because maritime hegemony is so expensive to gain and sustain in the 21st century, no powers, including the United States and China, can have the capacity and bear the cost. Compared with sea control, sea denial is a much more realistic and cheaper goal. Definitions of sea control and sea denial vary according to different perspectives, and the two concepts are usually intertwined. Nonetheless, from a strategic perspective, we may define sea control as assuring one's own use of the sea and denying its use to the rivals in wartime. Sea denial, by contrast, can be defined as preventing adversaries from using the sea. Sea control means the desire to gain maritime dominance, whereas sea denial entails a balance of power. The 2020 version of the U.S. Navy's Naval Doctrine Publication 1 defines sea denial as an "offensive, cost-imposing approach that can be applied when it is impossible or unnecessary to establish sea control."1 Achieving sea control has always been more difficult than sea denial because the former is highly dependent on a country's capacity to project air and naval power, while the latter does not require massive power projection and intense joint operations. Moreover, today's task of sea control includes joint operations in all domains—land, sea, air, space, [End Page 18] and cyber—and the vulnerability of any domain may mean that the strategy fails. What makes sea denial different now from the past is the rapid improvement in sensor, guidance, and communication technology in recent decades and new ways of implementing strategies that such technology creates.2 Therefore, states are increasingly able to threaten an opponent's ships at long range from relatively safer and cheaper land-based aircraft and missile batteries—a range of capabilities termed anti-access/area-denial by U.S. military planners.3 Thus, with heightened interdependence of great powers and multiple paths of military technology, maritime predominance is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and perhaps will even be impossible in the future. However, for great powers, it is progressively simpler to ensure the other side's fleet cannot sail unhindered if needed. In this regard, most waters of the world are in the contested "no man's sea."4 Usually, great powers enjoy an advantage in their near seas and must accept others' advantages elsewhere. The United States may be the only exception based on its status as a superpower and its alliance system. However, even the United States is finding it harder to maintain its edge, especially in the western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arctic. China's Interests in the Indian Ocean China is a power with a relatively unfavorable marine geography, and it has no formal military ally around the Indian Ocean. No matter how China rises, it would be difficult for the country to wield dominant sea power in the Indian Ocean region as long as the United States and India make no major strategic mistakes nor suffer a sharp decline in national power. In the Indian Ocean, China is confronted with a similar anti-access dilemma and the disadvantage of distance that the United States faces in East Asian waters. Therefore, China can only operate in the ocean as a relatively weak sea power, or perhaps by using a "fleet in being" strategy, which means maintaining an effective but inferior military presence so as to deter and [End Page 19] check the stronger sea power from obtaining absolute command of the sea and violating its own vital interests.5 At present and for the foreseeable future, China's most important interest in the Indian Ocean is to...