A New Concept of Airport Security Screening

Airport operations and security screening: An examination of social justice

Today, passengers at every major Western airport are subjected to heightened levels of security screening that not only are inconvenient, but also raise important questions about the treatment of members of specific groups that are seen as presenting special security risks. Our study examines the importance of ethnic identity in explaining perceptions of legitimacy in airport screening among a random sample of Jewish and Arab passengers in Israel. The main hypothesis of our study is that ethnicity will play a major role in predicting passengers’ attitudes toward the airport security process. In fact, our survey shows that Israeli Arab passengers are, on average, significantly more negative regarding the legitimacy of security checks than Israeli Jewish passengers are. However, using a multivariate model, we find that ethnicity (Arab versus Jew) disappears as a significant predictor of legitimacy when we included factors of procedural justice and controlled for specific characteristics of the security process. The results of our research indicate that differences in legitimacy perceptions are by and large the result of the processes used in airport screening and not a direct result of ethnic identity. In concluding, we argue that profiling strategies aimed at preventing terrorism, which often include embarrassing public procedures, may actually jeopardize passengers’ trust in airport security. Such security is dependent on the cooperation of citizens, and heightened security procedures focused on particular groups may compromise legitimacy evaluations and thus the cooperation of the public.

Decision support systems such as explosives detection systems for cabin baggage (EDSCB) at airport security checkpoints help screeners detect bombs by highlighting areas in X-ray images that might contain explosives. However, these systems are not perfect and can produce false alarms (i.e. alarm when no target is present) and miscues (i.e. a non-target is cued but the actual target is located elsewhere in the image). This study investigated the consequences of such automation errors in 112 professional airport security screeners who were supported by a simulated EDSCB with realistic X-ray images of cabin baggage. They had to detect bombs, guns, and knives under one of three experimental conditions: miscue prone, false alarm prone, or multiple failures (false alarms and miscues). Results showed that screeners missed more knives when the EDSCB provided miscues. We conclude that on-screen alarm resolution of EDSCB alarms in primary screening has the disadvantage that miscues can result in missing prohibited articles at airport security checkpoints. To avoid this problem, automated decision or clear instructions to screeners should be considered. Practitioner Statement Airport security screeners inspect X-ray images of cabin baggage through visual search and decision making with the help of explosives detection system for cabin baggage screening (EDSCB). The present experiment addresses whether EDSCB miscues affect operator performance and whether miscues are a problem when conducting EDSCB on-screen alarm resolution.

Effect of total shoulder replacements on airport security screening in the post-9/11 era

Context matters: The structure of task goals affects accuracy in multiple-target visual search

The sensitivity of airport security screening measures has increased substantially during the past decade, but few reports have examined how this affects patients who have undergone hip arthroplasty. The purpose of this study was to determine the experiences of patients who had hip prostheses and who passed through airport security screenings. A consecutive series of 250 patients who presented to the office of a high-volume surgeon were asked whether they had had a hip prosthesis for at least one year and, if so, whether they had flown on a commercial airline within the past year. Patients who responded affirmatively to both questions were asked to complete a written survey that included questions about which joint(s) had been replaced, the number of encounters with airport security, the frequency and location of metal detector activation, any additional screening procedures that were utilized, whether security officials requested documentation regarding the prosthesis, the degree of inconvenience, and other relevant information. Of the 143 patients with hip replacements who traveled by air, 120 (84%) reported triggering the alarm and required wanding with a handheld detector. Twenty-five of these patients reported subsequently having to undergo further inspection, including additional wanding, being patted down, and in two cases having to undress in a private room to show the incision. Ninety-nine (69%) of the 143 patients reported that the prosthetic joint caused an inconvenience while traveling. This study provides interesting and critical information that allows physicians to understand the real-world implications of implanted orthopaedic devices for patients who are traveling where there has been heightened security since September 11, 2001. Patients should be counseled that they should expect delays and be prepared for such inconveniences, but that these are often only momentary. This information could relieve some anxiety and concerns that patients may have prior to traveling.

This study reports the findings of a field survey asking more than 500 passengers at a large East Coast international airport about their experiences while going through airport security. Although existing research shows that metal detectors and baggage screening can be effective in reducing the likelihood of violence at airports and on planes, the fairness of such procedures has yet to be fully examined. While all passengers must be screened, there can also be discretion in airport security regarding whether passengers receive additional screening and how they perceive they are being treated. Findings indicate differences between racial groups and treatment, with nonwhites more likely to receive additional screening, have more items confiscated, feel embarrassed, and less likely to be provided an explanation for searches. Policy recommendations are suggested.

Cobalt Chrome Spinal Constructs Trigger Airport Security Screening in 24% of Pediatric Patients

Airport security screening processes are essential to ensure the safety of both passengers and the aviation industry. Security at airports has improved noticeably in recent years through the utilisation of state-of-the-art technologies and highly trained security officers. However, maintaining a high level of security can be costly to operate and implement. It may also lead to delays for passengers and airlines. This paper proposes a novel queue formation method based on a queueing theory model augmented with a particle swarm optimisation method known as QQT-PSO to improve the average waiting time in airport security areas. Extensive experiments were conducted using real-world datasets collected from Sydney airport. Compared to the existing system, our method significantly reduces the average waiting time and operating cost by 11.89% compared to the one-queue formation.

An anonymous Bluetooth tracking system was deployed at the new Indianapolis International Airport in Indiana from May 8 to June 2, 2009, to measure the time for passengers (a) to move from the nonsterile side of the airport (presecurity), (b) to clear the security screening checkpoint, and (c) to enter the walkway to Concourse B on the sterile side. The maximum passenger transit time between these checkpoints was observed on Monday mornings at approximately 0600, when it could take passengers up to 20 min to transit the security queue and screening and to walk to Concourse B. Depending on the day of the week, this approach was demonstrated to sample between 5% and 6.8% of passengers. This modest sample size provides a more robust measurement of screening times than the current system of manually distributing time-stamped cards as passengers enter the queue and collecting them where passengers pass through the magnetometer. Furthermore, because the final passenger reference point used in this study is on the sterile concourse, it captures the time associated with passengers repackaging their belongings and redonning their shoes. The data from this pilot study suggest the feasibility of using an automated system to provide quantitative information to managers for more effective allocation of scarce resources, as well as providing the traveling public with necessary information about the amount of time they should allocate for transiting the security screening process. The paper concludes by suggesting that additional pilot studies should be performed at several airports with alternative checkpoint configurations to develop a consensus on best practices for locating sensors to measure passage times at airport security screening.

The 9/11-inspired airport security screening system has been the center of controversy ever since it was created in 2001. Although the federalized system is held in high esteem by the traveling public, two tests of the system by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and 2004 to 2005 found significant shortcomings, despite large changes made to the security screening process as a result of the first test. The article identifies other criticisms of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) from both an operational and philosophical perspective, and from functions the TSA does do right. Finally, the article identifies why airport security privatization has not progressed and how potential changes to the TSA structure could make it a better functioning entity, including the author’s proposal to transfer TSA oversight responsibility to the U.S. Coast Guard.

This research investigates security screeners' knowledge and the effect that differences in knowledge have on the performance of problem-solving activities. We argue that the development of problem-solving knowledge enables security screeners to perform effective problem-solving activity, which assists search and decision-making processes. Airport security screening research has investigated the many variables that affect security screeners' search and decision making during simulated threat-detection tasks. Although search and decision making are essential aspects of security screening, few studies have investigated the problem-solving knowledge and activities that support security screening task performance. Sixteen more-experienced and 24 less-experienced security screeners were observed as they performed x-ray screening in the field at an Australian international airport's departure security checkpoint. Participants wore eye-tracking glasses and delivered concurrent verbal protocol. When interacting with other security screeners, more-experienced screeners demonstrated situational knowledge more than less-experienced screeners, whereas less-experienced screeners experienced more insufficient knowledge. Lag-sequential analysis using combined data from both screener groups showed that situational knowledge facilitated effective problem-solving activity to support search and decision making. Insufficient knowledge led screeners to seek assistance and defer decision making. This study expands current understandings of airport security screening. It demonstrates that security screeners develop knowledge that is specific to problem solving. This knowledge assists effective problem-solving activity to support search and decision making, and to mitigate uncertainty during the x-ray screening task. Findings can inform future security screening processes, screener training, and technology support tools. Furthermore, findings are potentially transferable to other domains.

X-ray screening of passenger bags is an essential task at airport security checkpoints. In this study we investigated how well airport security screeners can detect guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other threat objects in X-ray images of passenger bags before and after 3 and 6 months of recurrent (about 20 min per week) computer-based training (CBT). Two experiments conducted at different airports gave very similar results. Training with X-ray Tutor (XRT), an individually adaptive CBT, resulted in large performance increases, especially for detecting IEDs. While performance for detecting IEDs was initially substantially lower than for guns, IEDs could be detected as well as guns after several months of training. A large transfer effect was observed as well: Training with XRT helped screeners recognize new threat objects that were similar in shape as the trained objects. Threat recognition was dependent on the rotation of the objects. If depicted from an unusual viewpoint, prohibited items were more difficult to recognize. The results were compared to two conventional (not adaptive) CBT systems. For one system no training and transfer effects were observed whereas small training and transfer effects were found for the other conventional CBT system.

Credibility Assessment, truth verification or lie detection – many terms point to the perpetual endeavour of developing procedures that are supposed to ensure the authenticity of others. This is especially true when the place of action is a vulnerable infrastructural site and the target action is to avert threats. Airports are large architectural filtering systems, in which people and goods are channelled through technological and human screening procedures. But airports also serve as a prominent place for imaginaries of automated control technologies. Although at least in Germany, such technologies are still subject to laboratory work and field trials, they share the notion of searching for harmful intentions with current filtering systems. Embedded in the nexus of STS scholarship, critical security and surveillance studies, the article sheds light on the differences and commonalities of human-centred suspicion practices at the airport and its envisioned automated equivalents in the laboratory. Based on insights of focused ethnographic research at German airports and in-depth interviews with researchers, the article presents three empirical case vignettes, highlighting the rationales of human border control, airport security screeners and researchers. Focusing on the role of tacit knowledge for identifying indicators for harmful intentions, the human-centred rationale of baselining is put into relation to the so-called ground truthing in computational contexts. The field insights suggest that, despite their differences, each mode of thinking and doing relies on conceptualising a so-called phenomenon of harmful intentions as a non-verbal physical display, that manifests itself as an epistemological object as well as a single truth.

X-Ray screening of passenger bags is an essental component of airport security. Large investments into technology have been made in recent years. However, the most expensive equipment is of limited value, if the humans who operate it are not selected and trained appropriately. Scientific studies have shown that human performance in x-ray image interpretation depends critically on individual abilites and visual knowledge acquired through experience on the job and training. The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of adaptive computer-based training for increasing the detection of guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other prohibited items. 97 airport security screeners of a European airport participated in this study. At the beginning of the project, all airport security screeners conducted the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT). Thereupon they received adapfive computer-based training (CBT) for about 4 months. Then they conducted the X-Ray CAT the second time in the middle of the project This was followed by about 4 months of CBT and a third test with X-Ray CAT at the end of the project. The goal was that each screener conducts at least one 20 minute training session per week. Substantial increases of detection performance were found as a result of training, which depended on the threat category (guns, IEDs, knives and other prohibited items). The largest training effects were found for IEDs.