A NEW AMERICAN APARTHEID Racialized, religious minorities in the post-9/11 era

This article examines whether the convergence of an individual's religious and national identities promotes authoritarian attitudes towards crime and deviance. Drawing on theories of social control and group conformity, as well as Christian nationalism's influence on intolerance toward out‐groups, I argue that the inability to distinguish between religious and national identities increases desire for group homogeneity and therefore increases willingness to utilize formalized measures of social control. Analysis of 2007 Baylor Religion Survey data demonstrates that adherence to Christian nationalism predicts three indicators of authoritarian views toward controlling crime and deviance: support for capital punishment, stricter punishment for federal crime, and for society to “crackdown on troublemakers.” These effects are robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive battery of 20 socioeconomic, political, and religious controls, and are consistent with previous research on Christian nationalism showing it is not religious commitment or traditionalism per se that leads to intolerant attitudes, but rather the conflation of one's religious identity with other social identities, in this case national. These findings indicate that, beyond sociopolitical and religious influences, the belief that the United States is, and should be, a “Christian nation” increases desires for group conformity and strict control for both criminals and “troublemakers.”

IntroductionIn recent years, the literature on Christian nationalism has grown exponentially. Studies have found that individuals who score high on a widely used Christian nationalism scale are likelier to advocate for traditional gender roles, endorse anti-immigrant policies, support policies limiting voting rights, oppose gun control and interracial marriage, express anti-vaccine attitudes, hold anti-globalist sentiments, and vote for Donald Trump. The literature on Christian nationalism is not without its critics, however. Some, for example, have questioned whether the scale used by many studies adequately identifies Christian nationalists and suggested alternative methods for doing so. Much of the literature also implicitly or explicitly equates Christian nationalism with white Christian nationalism, ignoring the fact that 25 to 30 percent of respondents who express Christian nationalist sentiments identify as Black, Hispanic, Asian, or another race or ethnicity. Finally, most of it has focused on the consequences of Christian nationalism. Very little has explored the predictors of Christian nationalism. The latter is the focus of this paper.MethodsDrawing on multivariate logistic regression, it examines potential factors driving Christian nationalist attitudes.ResultsIt finds that age, whether someone identifies as a conservative or a Republican, biblical literalism, and frequent worship attendance are positively associated with Christian nationalism, while being affiliated with religious traditions other than evangelicalism (or having no affiliation at all) is negatively associated with it. Notably, race and ethnicity have no effect, suggesting that other factors may be at work.DiscussionAs such, the paper briefly considers four potential factors not readily captured by statistical analyses of cross-sectional data. It concludes by noting that if Christian nationalism is potentially undemocratic and dangerous, then concerned individuals need to focus as much time and energy on its predictors as its consequences.

Christian nationalism, the fusion of religious and national identities, has emerged as an important factor shaping public opinion on a range of issues. However, debates in the existing literature on the motivations behind support for Christian nationalism remain unresolved: Is Christian nationalism a response to secularization and/or a cover for discomfort with racial diversity and equality? Is Christian nationalism rooted in fear of social change, disgust about social change, or something else? We use an experiment embedded in a national survey of adults to isolate the effects of knowledge of both religious and racial demographic change among White Christians. Our analysis suggests that exposure to religious demographic change shifts support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians, but exposure to racial demographic change has limited impact. This effect is mediated by emotion—religious demographic change increases fear and disgust, which then influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians. Although our treatment suggesting exposure to racial demographic change had null effects, we note that racial attitudes do independently influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians.

The religious minorities have been part of Modern Iraq since it was founded in 1921 and they can be distinguished from the majority by their customs, traditions, beliefs and histories. Moreover, historically, Iraq (and Iraqi Kurdistan) has been the cradle of most of the religious minorities in the region. Iraqi religious minorities such as Jews, Christian, Yazidis, Sabean-Mandaean, and Kākāʾi are considered the oldest communities of Iraq history. They are considered to be, in some ways, the indigenous groups of Iraq. Republican Iraq underwent a period of immense socio-political change which impacted significantly on religious minorities in particular. Over time they, and the newer religious minorities like the Bahaʾi, began to face severe discrimination, which led to their being considered inferior to the majority. This, in turn, led to occasional extreme persecution and forced displacement campaigns often undertaken by the successive Iraqi governments and subsequently by the (Muslim) majority. This study focuses on social, political and historical factors pertaining to the lives of Iraqi religious minorities, and attempts to uncover the sequence of events that led to the current phenomenon of religious minorities fleeing their home countries in order to preserve their traditions. This study is based on an analytical and descriptive method and should be considered a historical research of events in the light of available archival documents, legal sources and press articles. This dissertation is divided into ten chapters. In first and second chapters the methodological and theoretical framework applied is discussed, as well as an overview of the concept of “minority” as well as definitions of religious minorities in Iraq. Chapter three and four deal with the contextualization of the historical and socio-political frameworks that inform the background of this dissertation which relates religious minorities with their backgrounds in the period of Monarchical Iraq (1920-1958). Chapter five discusses the religious minorities during the first republic of Iraq 1958-1963. This era is significant in that it was a time of unprecedented change, one which formed the interim between the Monarchical Era and the era of the nationalists. Furthermore, the first republic is significant because it constitutes a kind of ‘golden age’ for all Iraqi minorities. Chapters six, seven and eight are the main focus of this dissertation. They are primarily concerned with the second republican era, which is the period of the two ʿĀrifs (1963-1968). This particular era was one of conflict which saw the emergence of subsidiary identities. Chapter six examines the rise of sectarianism and confessionalism in Iraq. Chapter seven engages with the scattered religious minorities (SRM), under the republican eras after 1963 up to the present time. This chapter introduces the situation of three scattered religious minorities throughout Iraq: the Jews, Bahaʾi, and Sabean-Mandaeans. In chapter eight, the focus shifts to the geographically-concentrated religious minorities (GCRM). This chapter deals with three religious minorities: the Kākāʾi, Christians and Yazidis, all of whom dwell in the so-called Disputed Territories, a region which is disputed by the two parties involved in the conflict in Iraq: The Central Government of Iraq (CGI) and the Kurdish Movement. Chapter nine and ten discuss the prospective dimensions of political developments in Iraq in relation to religious minorities after 1968. In chapter nine, the impact of change in the legislation pertaining to the rights of religious minorities is examined, as well as judicial rights in the Iraqi courts, with a focus on the Law of Civil Status No.65/1972 in particular. The final chapter traces socio-political developments within the religious minorities, beginning with the last Farhūd of the Jews. This period saw re-forging the case of the Iraqi Christians, the renewed controversy over Yazidi Identity among disparate Kurdish political and religious movements, and ongoing demographic change brought about by forced Islamisation in Yazidi areas. The Sabean-Mandaean minority also experienced a period of transition; their status weakened, their welfare deteriorating from that of an organized minority to one whose existence and religious identity were threatened. In the case of the Kākāʾis, this period shows their situation is in the transmission from domestic conflict to distinctive religious identity. whereas pressure on the Bahai (whose religion had been previously banned) was relaxed somewhat, allowing them a cautions sense of new-found freedom. In the conclusion, the hypotheses of this thesis are revisited to investigate what implications the research findings may have beyond the immediate historical and socio-political context of Iraqi religious minorities. Religious minorities have endured much persecution in Monarchical Iraq and thus, it is from Monarchical Iraq that this research begins before proceeding to explore the case of the minorities in Republican Iraq. The policies of discrimination in Iraq assumed many forms such as enactments and laws or governmental or administrative acts that led to division and discrimination. Although these policies of discrimination affected all segments of Iraqi society, it was particularly detrimental to religious minorities that were already suffering at the hands of the majorities. They faced an unequalled degree of religious stigmatization and discrimination. This has created a form of shared collective memory which consists of a prevailing sense of alienation, social inequality and detrimental stereotypes that is shared by all non-Muslim minorities in Iraq. It is noteworthy that, although there was discrimination of religious minorities in Iraq, the nature of such discrimination was highly dependent on the political situation. This is because various Iraqi governments viewed the religious minorities differently and also dealt with them as such. Importantly, as this study illustrates, the religious minorities were not only affected by political currents but also by social and religious currents within Iraq. No radical change occurred in the thought and inclinations of the dominating powers, nor did such change occur within national movements which were in the position to influence both the ruling system and the state institutions. Besides, religious and sectarian belonging became a means upon which these powers relied to consolidate their power. No current or influential political party in Iraq to date has succeeded in establishing a nation state, nor has it succeeded in integrating the Iraqi communities to achieve equality in a manner which maintains the ethnic, religious and cultural variety within the country. Rather, policies of sectarianism have kept the religious minorities away from actual political participation in state institutions and in government. Such marginalization and political dysfunction could have been avoided if representation had been assured by virtue of population (i.e. the quota system) and not by political affiliation. However, as the historical eras show, the deep-rooted nature of such divisions and the lack of mutual trust between the different communities have led to the current long-endured conflict, which in turn has virtually fragmented all communities within Iraq. Against this historical backdrop of division and inequality, the sectarian and confessional issue quickly emerged in post Baʿthist Iraq. Indeed, all the unprecedented developments currently taking place in Iraq are tentativeness the result of the actions or the inaction of past regimes in Iraq. The various religious minorities in Iraq suffered systematic acts of oppression and extermination in different periods as follows. The ongoing oppression of the Jews ended with their exile from Iraq after two bouts of violent dispossession and killing referred to as the First Farhūd (1941-1952) and the Second Farhūd (1968-1973). Similarly, Christians were subjected to ongoing oppression and persecution. This began with a massacre which took place in 1933 and it continued until a second persecution after the coup of 1963. Their situation was not to improve in all of this time, 2003 when they were harshly targeted and eliminated from Iraq. The Yazidi also suffered, between 1935 and 1946 in particular and again after 1963. Their regions were divided between the province of Kurdistan and the central government of Iraq from 1991-2003. They were systematically targeted by Islamic groups, the most recent example of which is ISIS’ invasion of Sinjar and the Plain of Nineveh and the act of genocide which they carried out against the Yazidi. Other minorities such as the Sabean-Mandaean, Bahaʾi, Kākāʾi and others have suffered a similar fate and are currently fleeing Iraq.

Critical Whiteness scholar George Yancy argues that the condition of whiteness is not natural, but rather, a social construct that can be de-constructed, and from which Whites (through great effort) can “un-suture” themselves. This un-suturing can only be achieved through deep interrogation of, and resistance to, the personal and social benefits of whiteness. While a growing amount of scholarship is focused on the problem of White Christian Nationalism, this dissertation argues that the problem of whiteness persists even among justice-seeking White Christians who engage in the work of organizing for racial justice, but often continue to center whiteness even as they understand it to be the core problem they are seeking to dismantle. A central claim is that while it may be impossible for White people to ever become wholly un-sutured from the condition of whiteness, the essential labor for Whites in reclaiming the human condition is a lifelong commitment to this practice of un-suturing from whiteness; and for White Christians, this must also include the work of un-suturing Christianity from whiteness, as it has been portrayed through the dominant U.S. national religious identity. The project proposes that one potentially transformational way White Christians can engage in this un-suturing process is through multi-race and multi-faith organizing efforts for racial justice, which can lead to deep interrogations of whiteness and solidarity-building processes with people of various racial, economic, and religious identities. Examining the lived experiences of community organizers in Texas who are working toward incarceration and immigration reform and/or abolition, this study employs qualitative ethnography and Critical Whiteness Studies as frameworks for building a theo-ethical, praxis-centered analysis primarily based in womanist, Latin American feminist, and Indigenous scholarship. The purpose is twofold: to better understand how White Christians engage in and are impacted by organizing in multi-race and multi-faith movements for racial justice (do these movements have the potential to “un-suture” White Christians/Christianity from whiteness?); and to better understand how the presence of White Christians impacts the work of such organizations and movements (what are the benefits, as well as the costs, of allowing White Christians into power-building spaces/movements for BIPOC communities?).

Prior research found that Christian nationalism, a belief that integrates Christian identity with American national identity, was associated with more negative views toward marginalized groups, such as religious minorities. Relatively less known is the relationship between Christian nationalism and attitudes toward atheists. Specifically, even less is known about whether or not Christian nationalism that is above individuals at the macro, geographic level may influence individual views of atheists. Using nationally representative multilevel data, this study found that higher individual Christian nationalism was associated with more negative views toward atheists. No robust state‐level Christian nationalism influence was found for anti‐atheist attitude. However, Blacks, relative to Whites, were less likely to view atheists negatively in states where Christian nationalism was higher. Meanwhile, in states where Christian nationalism was higher, Black Protestants were less prejudiced against atheists compared to Evangelical Protestants.

Popular narratives suggest that the effects of Christian nationalism should be more heavily concentrated among white Americans. The academic literature on Christian nationalism largely reflects this take, often asserting that it is effectively white Christian nationalism. We question such pronouncements, as they have come without systematic analysis across the broad range of issue areas needed to justify subgroup segmentations. Utilizing national oversamples of Black and Latino Christians (alongside white Christians), we assess the relationship between standard measures of Christian nationalism and attitudes toward policies that vary in their degree of racialization. Our findings qualify typical narratives: consistent with a theory of Christian nationalism as sacralized in-group protection, we find effects that diverge by racial groups on racialized issues but otherwise converge. We close by discussing the implications of these findings and offering suggestions for future work linking race with Christian nationalism.

This chapter uses quantitative data to show how many white Christian nationalists there are, which religious traditions they belong to, and what they believe. WCN is most strongly represented among evangelical Protestants but attracts significant numbers of mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, and even some non-Christians. It also shows that white Americans who embrace Christian nationalism have very different views than non-whites who do so, and on a wide range of issues including America’s religious history, racial discrimination, and economic issues. This is why it is important to focus on white Christian nationalism, rather than just “Christian nationalism,” or “white Christianity.” Last, the chapter shows how WCN influences Americans’ interpretations and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their embrace of libertarian, free-market economics.

This study examines the relationship between Christian nationalism—a political theology and cultural framework that seeks to amalgamate the Christian faith and a country's political life and privilege Christianity in the public square over other faith traditions—and attacks against religious minorities in the United States. Some Christian nationalists believe that it is justifiable to undertake violent actions in order to realize the goals of Christian nationalism. We theorize that the political empowerment of Christian nationalist ideology in the form of politicians expressing Christian nationalist sentiments corresponds to physical attacks on religious minorities carried out by self‐professing Christians. We test this theory using a cross‐sectional, time‐series analysis of antiminority violence in the United States. The results provide robust support for our theory.

This chapter overviews the scholarly definitions of nationalism, nations, nation-states, and various forms of nationalism, including religious nationalism, secular nationalism, and religious nationalism, and differentiates between nationalism and patriotism. The chapter defines Christian nationalism, reviews the disputed data documenting how many American Christians adhere to Christian nationalist tenets, and discusses core narrative and theological themes in Christian nationalist beliefs. The most dominant belief among Christian nationalists is that America was historically Christian—that the founders established it as Christian—and that God is empowering them to make it Christian again. Also common are the beliefs that to be a good American is to be a good Christian and that Christians are suffering persecution. But Christian nationalists are also prone to sanitize American history, promote misinformation, engage in-group and out-group dynamics, and favor native-born, white Christians. Scholars have correlated agreement with Christian nationalist tenets with conspiratorial thinking, anti-science stances, racist and sexist attitudes, anti-immigration rhetoric, and pro-gun sentiments. Others have described Christian nationalism as a religious populism. Theologically, adherents believe they are specially blessed by God, and some believe they are called to dominate seven cultural mountains.

The Relationship between Religion and the Public Square: Freedom of Religion in the Public Space

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) of the Council of Europe counts more than 20 years of existence in the European human rights landscape. Normatively, the protection of minority religious identity is embedded in three main articles of the convention: first, under Articles 7 and 8, which outline a general right to freedom of religion, but also under Article 6, which considers religious minority rights for “new” minorities as related to tolerance. The analysis that follows here will unfold in three stages: the first stage will engage with the crucial issue of the scope of protection of the FCNM and how this relates to the protection of religious minority rights contained in the convention in today’s European societies. The second stage will focus on the main relevant articles of the FCNM that concern religious freedom. Starting with Articles 7 and 8 of the FCNM that focus on the religious rights of minorities stricto sensu, the discussion will then extend to Articles 5 and 6 of the FCNM due to their relevance to the exercise of religious rights by minorities in their cultural and diversity management dimensions. This extension is necessary to illustrate the current implications of religious identity for minority–majority relations. Methodologically, the study relies heavily on a detailed survey of the four completed cycles of monitoring, mapping the typology of issues pertaining to religious minorities as encountered by the Advisory Committee to the FCNM (ACFC) in the monitored states. The final stage of the analysis will provide some concluding thoughts on the general contribution of the ACFC towards standard setting on religious freedom in the European context.

In the nineteenth-century colonial Dutch East Indies, a legal distinction existed between different population groups. This article examines the implications of this so-called ‘legal dualism’ by focusing on a specific group: the ‘native Christians’. These Indonesians converted to Christianity, who some politicians believed had become to a certain extent ‘European’, may have been a small group, but they challenged legal pigeonholing and the underlying colonial hierarchy. This group of subjects forced colonial legislators to rethink the essence of the colonial system and make choices in the process. Should native Christians be categorized as ‘natives’ based on their ethnicity, or as ‘Europeans’ due to their religious affiliation? The debate over their legal status sheds light on the dynamic processes of inclusion and exclusion in colonial governance. By analyzing the political and legal discussions and reports that defined the status of this group from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, this study demonstrates that the criteria for equality were varied, yet consistently rooted in a broader ‘criterion of civilization’.

What explains popular support for political violence in the contemporary United States, particularly the anti-institutional mob that attacked the U.S. Capitol in January 2021? Recent scholarship gives reason to suspect that a constellation of beliefs known as “Christian nationalism” may be associated with support for such violence. We build on this work, arguing that religious ideologies like Christian nationalism should be associated with support for violence, conditional on several individual characteristics that can be inflamed by elite cues. We turn to three such factors long-studied by scholars of political violence: perceived victimhood, reinforcing racial and religious identities, and support for conspiratorial information sources. Each can be exacerbated by elite cues, thus translating individual beliefs in Christian nationalism into support for political violence. We test this approach with original survey data collected in the wake of the Capitol attacks. We find that all the identified factors are positively related to each other and support for the Capitol riot; moreover, the relationship between Christian nationalism and support for political violence is sharply conditioned by white identity, perceived victimhood, and support for the QAnon movement. These results suggest that religion’s role in contemporary right-wing violence is embedded with non-religious factors that deserve further scholarly attention in making sense of support for political violence.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09758-y.

Increasing atheism, or the view that there is no God, is a major trend affecting the Western religious landscape. Scholarly interest in atheists has grown together with their number, but unanswered questions abound. In this study, we present survey data (N = 758) collected from deconverted and lifelong atheists in four countries (Australia, Finland, Germany, and Norway), and investigate the relationships between deconversion, religious identity, spiritual identity, and interreligious attitudes. We show that retaining a low level of religious or spiritual identity is more typical for deconverts than life-long atheists. Furthermore, we demonstrate that higher religious or spiritual identity among deconverts is associated with more positive attitudes toward different religious groups (national religious majority, religious minorities in general, and Muslims specifically).