Abstract
In a smart grid system, the utility server collects data from various smart grid devices. These data play an important role in the energy distribution and balancing between the energy providers and energy consumers. However, these data are prone to tampering attacks by an attacker, while traversing from the smart grid devices to the utility servers, which may result in energy disruption or imbalance. Thus, an authentication is mandatory to efficiently authenticate the devices and the utility servers and avoid tampering attacks. To this end, a group authentication algorithm is proposed for preserving demand–response security in a smart grid. The proposed mechanism also provides a fine-grained access control feature where the utility server can only access a limited number of smart grid devices. The initial authentication between the utility server and smart grid device in a group involves a single public key operation, while the subsequent authentications with the same device or other devices in the same group do not need a public key operation. This reduces the overall computation and communication overheads and takes less time to successfully establish a secret session key, which is used to exchange sensitive information over an unsecured wireless channel. The resilience of the proposed algorithm is tested against various attacks using formal and informal security analysis.
Highlights
Electricity is one of the major stakeholders in the development of the global economy
As described above, the forgery attack is not possible during the certificate generation phase and authentication and session key establishment phase. This is because the attacker does not know the private parameter assigned to the utility server (US) and smart grid devices (SGDs), which play an important role in authenticating and verifying the messages exchange during the certificate generation and authentication process
OMNeT++ because all operations of smart grids depend on the actions and decisions of the controllers, while the scheduler synchronises the operation of both simulators
Summary
Electricity is one of the major stakeholders in the development of the global economy. The second level of information flow is between the smart meter and utility provider and data centres using mediumand long-range communication technologies, such as public telephony networks, the internet and mobile networks [2] This bidirectional communication plays an important role in balancing the demand and response by controlling power generation based on its utilisation. In 2015, Tsai et al [9] presented a key distribution protocol that strongly preserves anonymity in the smart grid scenario, but Odelu et al [10] recently showed that Tsai’s protocol suffers from the ephemeral secret key leakage attack He et al [11] and Mohammadali et al [12] presented a cost efficient key establishment protocols that have better communication and computational overheads compared with the previous approaches. These issues motivated us to develop an authentication and key establishment mechanism that can cope with the existing challenges
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