Abstract
I propose a modified version of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition (IIA). The new version preserves the most attractive feature of traditional IIA, viz., that it rules out vote-splitting in elections (in which two or more popular candidates split the vote, allowing a relatively unpopular candidate to win). Moreover, it permits election outcomes to reflect voters' preference intensities, unlike the traditional condition.
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