A Model of Adaptive Mobilization: Implications of the CCP’s Diaoyan Politics

Since Xi Jinping entered his third term, various memorials dedicated to the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) and the Communist Revolution throughout China have been regressing from their normal roles and functions. The Xiangshan Revolutionary Memorial Hall near Beijing, as of late 2019, is one such example. An analysis of the various documents, artifacts, and their layout, the museum's founding principles, exhibition content, and intentions revealed several distinct characteristics. First, the Xiangshan Revolutionary Memorial Hall lacks any blueprint for future development, philosophy, or national vision beyond the Communist Party's rule. Second, while Mao Zedong is portrayed as a great revolutionary leader who defeated the “comprador capitalist clique” and ended the “feudal” era, Xi Jinping is presented as a leader who, along with the CCP, must realize the “Chinese Dream”, demonstrating his legitimacy and historical legitimacy. Third, the negative aspects of modern Chinese history and the Chinese Communist Revolution are absent, and only the positive aspects of the CCP are highlighted. In an effort to emphasize the historical inevitability and legitimacy of the planned CCP rule, the uniqueness of the victory of the CCP Revolution, and the necessity of Xi Jinping’s greatness and leadership, too many data and facts are distorted, altered, omitted, or concealed. Fourth, the CCP employs a traditional unification strategy and tactic: anti-Kuomintang, anti-Chiang Kai-shek, anti-Japan, and anti-Americanism are used as political propaganda tools and means to unite and confront the United States by fostering patriotism and nationalism among the Chinese people. The Xiangshan Revolutionary Memorial Hall confirms that the history taught and propagated by the CCP is uniform, excluding or blocking diverse historical interpretations while enforcing the uniqueness and uniformity of historical facts. In other words, the seeds of Xi Jinping’s personality cult are sprouting. This violates the CCP’s principle of “prohibiting personality cults.” How persuasive will such an exhibition filled with distortions and exaggerations, emphasizing the inevitability of the advent of a communist society, the legitimacy of Chinese rule, and the exaltation of Xi Jinping’s greatness be to the people dissatisfied with the CCP’s one-party dictatorship and Xi Jinping’s dictatorship? If the Chinese people repeatedly see this kind of one-sided propaganda and publicity about Xi Jinping, they will ultimately develop hostility toward the Kuomintang, anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiments, and a one-sided belief in China’s greatness. As I have argued many times before, it is regrettable that Xi Jinping’s China is running in a direction that runs counter to the flow of history. It will be interesting to see how the exhibition at the Xiangshan Revolutionary Memorial Hall will change once Xi Jinping steps down from power.

The choice of the goals in political reform and the design of policy options are made with different purposes and considerations in mind. The policy selection process is filled with political interactions and games between the parties. However, the legitimacy, influence and authority possessed by all parties cannot be equal. The dominant party often can take advantage of superior political resources to lead the direction of political reform, to decide on the choice of reform policies, and translate their policy preferences and realistic political needs into substantive policies and actions. In China’s current constitution system, the Chinese Communist Party is the only legitimate ruling party and is therefore in a position of leadership in the political life of the country. The party’s political line and guiding ideology play a leading role in the political development of the country. In the on-the-ground operation of the political system, the Party’s central leadership is in fact the dominant head of the political reform process from beginning to end. In order to safeguard the long-term peace and stability of the country and the steady implementation of reform policy, the central leadership has explored and chosen a top-down progressive step by step political reform, under the conditions of many uncertainties in the reform.

Haunted by Chaos: China's Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping

The object of the research is the change in the image of the Reform and Opening-up Era in the historiography of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Xi Jinping. The goal is to trace the transformation of the historical positioning of the reform period in the context of Xi Jinping's announcement of a "New Era" in the history of the PRC and to identify aspects of continuity and break points between the two stages of the country's history. The most representative texts were selected as sources: speeches of party leaders on the occasion of the round anniversary of the start of the Policy of reforms and openness in 1998, 2008 and 2018 and the 2021 "Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century". The research method is qualitative content analysis. The novelty of the work lies in the consideration of issues that have not yet received proper coverage either in domestic or foreign science. The studies currently available on the topic of the change in the CCP’s approaches to its own historiography after the adoption of the “historic resolution” in 2021 are mainly publicistic in nature. The author comes to the conclusion that the proclamation of a "New Era" means the end of the period of reforms and openness, which the PRC entered in 1978 following the results of the 3rd plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee. The related changes in party politics are indicated.

The End of China’s Reform Era Carl Minzner (bio) keywords China, Xi Jinping, Governance, Political Reform [End Page 83] executive summary This essay examines recent developments suggesting that China’s post-1978 reform era has ended and assesses the economic, ideological, and political implications. main argument The late 1970s saw Chinese leaders steer their country out of the chaos and stagnation of the Maoist era, launching the policies of “reform and opening up.” In subsequent decades, domestic Chinese politics were marked by three core factors: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) ideological openness, and (3) relative political stability as the result of partially institutionalized norms, such as those governing the retirement and succession of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. However, all of these factors are ending. Foreign media coverage has focused on recent elite political developments, such as the CCP’s proclamation of a “new era” under Xi Jinping and the removal of constitutional term limits on his role as president. But these developments are the culmination of much deeper shifts dating back to the early 2000s—with even older roots. Recent events merely illustrate how these trends have steadily deepened over the last two years. policy implications • In the short term, policymakers should expect China to evolve in the direction of a harsher and more personalized authoritarian system. • In the medium to long term, China will likely experience a revival of the sources of domestic political instability that marked the pre-1978 era—elite political turmoil, escalating social conflict, and rising ethno-nationalist sentiment directed at minorities and foreigners alike. • Beijing’s interest in increasing its economic and diplomatic influence overseas will continue unabated, with Chinese-language media and ethnic Chinese communities outside China as the first targets. Foreign firms and entities operating within China should also expect an increasingly unfavorable ideological and political climate. • Democratic countries should respond to Chinese pressure by reaffirming their liberal democratic values rather than giving into the nativist sentiment currently sweeping many Western nations. [End Page 84] In the late 1970s, China’s rulers steered the country out of the political turmoil and economic stagnation of the Maoist era, launching the policies of “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang). During the decades-long reform era that followed, domestic politics were marked by three core factors: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) ideological openness, and (3) relative political stability as the result of partially institutionalized norms, such as those governing the retirement and succession of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. All of these conditions are ending. Foreign media coverage of China has focused on recent elite political developments, such as the CCP’s proclamation in fall 2017 that the nation has entered a “new era” (xin shidai) under Xi Jinping, the removal of constitutional term limits on his role as president in spring 2018, and other indications that China is steadily evolving in the direction of an extended period of one-man rule. But these developments are merely the culmination of a much deeper set of changes that extend back to the early 2000s, with roots that go back even further. Political, economic, and ideological developments over the past two years merely illustrate how these trends are steadily deepening. This essay examines these trends. Drawing from my recent book, the first section sketches out how the core political, economic, and ideological characteristics that had marked the reform era have eroded.1 The second section explores developments since 2016. The third section outlines the implications of these trends. the end of china’s reform era Economics Rapid growth has been the beating heart of China’s renaissance. First-time visitors inevitably remark on the efficient high-speed rail network, the unending proliferation of Starbucks coffeehouses, and the ever-expanding number of newly opened shopping centers (and online apps) offering the latest in consumer products. All are the products of China’s astounding reform-era economic boom. Starting in 1978, the nation averaged 10% GDP growth annually for three decades, one of the highest rates in world history. The results have been spectacular. In the late 1970s, China was poorer than Afghanistan, India, and Zaire. By 2016, not only [End Page 85] had the...

It All Hinges on China: Environmental Governance in the Twenty-First Century

566 SEER, 84, 3, JULY 2006 Frolov has, nevertheless,unearthed importantnew informationconcerning the wartime actions of Soviet partisansin Finnish territory.To this day, the wanton cruelties of the partisans against the civilian population, including the destruction of whole villages and their inhabitants, remain a source of bitterness. The Soviet Union never admitted any wrongdoing, and presentday Russia has adopted the same unflinching line. Occasional demands for clarificationor war crimes charges against the survivingmembers of partisan groups known to have taken part in atrocitieshave met with official silence. Frolov convincingly documents some of the atrocities,but evidentlyfeels that he has to balance this disclosure by appealing to Soviet reports of cruelties committed by the Finns against Soviet prisonersof war (p. 132). This is beside the point. While there is no arguing againstthe fact that Finnishtroops were also guiltyof cruel, unjustand calloustreatmentof theircaptives,the methodical depravities of the partisans against civilians make this kind of tu quoquecomparison superfluous.Thus, Frolov's ultimate conclusion that both 'sides did not always follow [the principles ofl the Geneva agreement, but instead occasionally treated captives cruelly and even killed them' (p. I38), seems carefulto the point of timidity. Frolov'stext is translatedfrom a Russian original,and footnotes to Russian sourcesand literatureare given, as a rule, in Cyrillic.However, the translation often betrayslinguisticusagesalien to Finnish.It is the dutyof the translatorto check the terminologyand, if necessary,suggestalternativesmore in line with the targetlanguage. Perhapsthe most unhappy choice of termsin this sense is the use of the Soviet 'Great PatrioticWar' throughoutthe text. Frolov can be partly excused by the palpable difficultiesthe consistent naming of the wars fought between Finland and the Soviet Union poses. However, particularly in a work intended for foreign readership,this kind of lip-serviceto Stalinist linguisticsis irritating.Professionalhistorianswould do well in trying to find less politicallyladen terminologyto tell their stories. These criticismsaside, Frolov's work makes an important and interesting introductionto a topic thought by many to be too difficultand unapproachable . Here Frolov has shown that the material does indeed exist and that many questions can be answeredby diligent archivalwork. National Archives ofFinland OULASILVENNOINEN Helsinki Heinzig,Dieter. TheSovietUnionand Communist China,I945-I950: 7he Arduous RoadtotheAlliance. An East Gate Book. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY and London,2004. xix + 53ipp. Appendices.Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?70?50? IN the wake of the Sino-Soviet dispute of I960, it became commonplace in Westernscholarshipto assumethat relationsbetween the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union had always been fraught, as the Chinese struggled to achieve independence from Moscow. Since the repudiation of Maoism in the People's Republic of China and the fall of the Soviet Union, REVIEWS 567 crucialsource-materialon relationsbetween the two partieshas become available , the effect of which has generally been to demonstrate that the Soviet contributionto the Chinese revolutionwas much greaterthan Maoist mythology maintained.The proliferationof new material,however, has not produced much consensus as to the general characterof relationsbetween Moscow and Yenan. Some continue to insist that their leitmotif was the determinationof the CCP to define its own political line, whereas others, notably Michael Sheng, BattlingWestern Imperialism: Mao, StalinandtheUnitedStates(Princeton, NJ, I998), argue that policies were largely in accord with those laid down by Moscow. In this impressive study of the forging of the Sino-Soviet alliance between 1945 and I949, Dieter Heinzig steersa middle course,arguing that after I938 the CCP listened to Moscow attentively but not necessarily completely; yet he insists that the road to the friendshiptreaty of February I950 was 'arduous',beset with tensions rooted in fundamental differencesof strategicand political interest.His massivelyresearchedstudy draws on Russian materialsfrom the PresidentialArchive, the ForeignMinistryarchiveand the archiveof the formerCPSU, as well as on new workby PRC scholarswho have had access to archives.The studybegins with the makingof the treatyof August I945 between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang (KMT) government , which led to the involvement of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, and ends with the friendshiptreatyof I950. In between, Heinzig examines in detail Stalin's'duplicitousdiplomacy'with the KMT, on the one hand, and the CCP, on the other, between I945 and I948; Stalin's reluctance to recognize Mao as more than a 'partisanleader';his effortsto achieve a more equal relationshipwith the...

Introduction In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a pair of initiatives that aims to restructure the economy and geopolitics of Eurasia. The Silk Road Economic Belt announced by Xi Jinping in September 2013 during a tour of Central Asian neighbours is a programme to build land transportation corridors that connect China to Europe and all other major Eurasian subregions, including Indochina, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. Then in October 2013, Xi visited Indonesia and announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is a port development initiative to broaden Chinese trade channels targetting the maritime regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. Xi Jinping's two Silk Road programmes are a package called the “One Belt — One Road” [ yidai-yilu ] initiative. Both Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang spent great effort in the year 2014 launching concrete measures to advance the silk roads agenda of Eurasian connectivity and regional cooperation. They hope to build a comprehensive trans- Eurasian network of economic corridors that could sustain China's economic growth and strengthen China's political leverage for decades to come. The consequence would be to draw the countries of Eurasia into China's economic orbit to form what Xi Jinping calls a “community of shared destiny”. Members’ fortunes would rise as China's own rise continued. A culturally and politically diverse but economically integrated division of labour harmoniously organized by China's trade and financial interests is what China promises. If this vision is fully realized, China's silk roads vision will help realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the “China Dream” of a wealthy society grounded on Chinese values. It should be noted that this yidai — yilu agenda is a work in progress rather than a fully drawn up master plan. That is, as previous Chinese leaders have done, Xi Jinping is providing a grand strategic vision or agenda for China. The Chinese Communist Party and government must work to realize this agenda to the best of their ability. So, for the rest of Xi Jinping's years in power — expected to last until 2022 — we will hear about the two Silk Roads at every meeting that Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang attends in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

Between cultural confidence and ideological insecurity: China’s soft power strategy for the cultural industries

The Ultimate Social Network: China's Expansionary, Internationally Oriented United Front Strategies 1923-2020

Ever since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, the government has tightened social, political, and economic controls in China and placed a renewed emphasis on CCP ideology. To what extent are Xi’s measures a continuance of policies established by his predecessors Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–2012)? Do they reflect a new direction for CCP media management? What is the agenda behind these changes and what do they tell us about the CCP’s hold on power? This article analyzes trends in media control during the Jiang and Hu eras and then examines to what extent Xi’s initiatives are a new direction.

In 1898, with the foundation of the Metropolitan University of the Qing Dynasty (Jingshi da xuetang) in Beijing, the modern higher education system was established in China. After the Qing Dynasty, China has been ruled by two political parties before and after 1949: Kuomintang (KMT) dated from 1911 to 1949 and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)1 dated from 1949 to present. The history of Nanjing University (NJU) can be traced back to Sanjiang Normal School founded by the Qing government in 1902. The NJU witnessed the development of modern higher education in China. The Nanjing city used to be the capital of the KMT regime and National Central University (NCU) was under the control of the KMT. Nevertheless, today Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu province and NJU is under the control of the CCP. As commonly known, the KMT and the CCP followed different political systems. The political status of the city and the university has changed a lot. It is worthwhile to do a research on the party controls of the KMT over NCU and the CCP over NJU within a changeable century to find which political system benefit the university more. This thesis introduces and compares the party controls of the KMT over NCU and the CCP over NJU in chapter two (party controls over personnel) and chapter three (party controls over the whole university). Afterwards, chapter four discusses the continuum of the political controls from the Qing Dynasty, to the KMT and then to the CCP and chapter five gives a summary as the conclusion. It is commonly known that China has a long civilized history for more than five thousand years. Within this long period of time, China formed a traditional Chinese authoritarianism with a typical Confucian orientation and three related structural aspects, hierarchical system, paternalism and bureaucratic pattern. This traditional Chinese authoritarianism was widely accepted and adopted by all dynasties and political regimes in China. All the modern universities (including NCU and NJU) and political parties (including the KMT and the CCP) in China are influenced by this type of authoritarianism while they are at the same time influenced by the Soviet Union (mainly in party constructions of the KMT and the CCP) and western values (mainly in university affairs including university settings and university administrations) in the late days. So the traditional Chinese authoritarianism, Soviet Union influence and western values are the three most

Language is a sensitive matter for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a fact made clear by the well-documented mechanisms of party-state censorship and propaganda, which aim to repel criticism and set the agenda in the CCP’s favor. Less widely acknowledged, however, is the extent to which even terms of praise and devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China. Two recent catchphrases in particular that speak anew to deeper anxieties about the image of the CCP and its top leader, Xi Jinping. These are “low-level red” and “high-level black,” odd phrases in English that invite some elucidation. The terms, which first emerged on the internet, refer in both cases to covert or unintentional acts of criticism. “Low-level red,” or dijihong (低級紅), refers in official parlance to language or conduct that is intended to praise the Party or government, but which ultimately has the opposite effect because it is patently false, cheap, or ill-considered. “High-level black,” or gaojihei (高级黑), refers on the other hand to more deliberate and skilful acts of disguised sabotage, in which language is deployed in obscurely humorous ways, or cloaked in academic respectability, in order to criticise or ridicule. 對中國共產黨來說，語言是一個敏感的問題， 這在中國的審查和宣傳機制中得到了充分的證實。審查的目的是為了排斥批評，營造有利於中國共產黨的輿情。然而，鮮為人知的是，在中國，即使是讚美和奉承的詞彙也會受到審查。尤其是最近的兩個流行語 —— 低級紅和高級黑，再次體現了人們對中共及其最高領導人習近平形象的深層憂慮。這兩個詞最早出現在互聯網，均為隱蔽或無意的批評。 低級紅指的是那些旨在讚美黨或政府的語言或行為，但最終卻因明顯的虛假、低級或考慮不周而產生相反的效果。而高級黑則指更有心機、更有技巧的變相貶低。它以隱晦幽默的方式運用語言，或披上學術的外衣，以達到批評或嘲笑的目的。

This article revisits Chiang Kai‐shek's Kuomintang (KMT) party‐state during the Nanjing Decade (1927–37) of the Republic of China (ROC) and assesses how the actions and ideological propensities of the Nationalist regime affected prewar China's external relations with the United States. While both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were constituted as Leninist parties in the 1920s, due to the Soviet Union's military and economic aid for Sun Yat‐sen's republican revolution, they had very different political objectives and socioeconomic perspectives on China's state/nation‐building. Consequently, the KMT's and CCP's respective attitudes towards the United States also differed. Though Leninism is an antithesis to Western liberal democracy, it is not inevitable for a Leninist dictatorship to engage in confrontations with Washington, as the central leadership's inclinations and actions would determine how China approaches America. Chiang's Confucian Leninism opened up the friendly ties with the United States in 1928, which eventually consolidated into a strong U.S.‐ROC alliance during WWII and beyond, despite the KMT's autocracy. The essay will contrast briefly with the post‐1949 People's Republic of China (PRC), as the CCP experienced from Mao Zedong's radical Leninism, Deng Xiaoping/Jiang Zemin/Hu Jintao's consultative Leninism, to Xi Jinping's expansionist Leninism today. The evolving CCP positions have also affected the extent of cooperation and hostility between Beijing and Washington and illustrated how the changing attributes of the Chinese Leninist regime are crucial in determining U.S.‐PRC strategic trajectories.

Since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation has emerged as the country´s ultimate imperative.This goal stands in stark contrast to the Century of National Humiliation, when China was turned into a semi-colonial entity by way of force and compelled to cede its sovereignty andsign unequal treaties. In this article I will explain how Xi Jinping´s concept of Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation has shifted China’s Foreign Policy approach from a low-profile orientation to a more assertive and ambitious one. Additionally, I will illustrate the role which nationalism plays in the strengthening of the party-state’s political legitimacy and how it is related to the emergence of the Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Furthermore I will argue Xi has embraced a two-pronged foreign policy approach. On the one hand, China is portrayed asa benign major power which advocates win-win international cooperation, the creation of a Community of Shared Future and a New Model of International Relations. Nevertheless,at the same time it vows to strongly defend China’s core interests, CCP’s political legitimacy and reshape international order along the lines of Chinese political values and imperatives. Furthermore, I will illustrate how Xi has centralized power and reformed the foreign policy decision-making apparatus.