Abstract
Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in contrast is not sufficient for discrimination as there are cases of safety that are clearly instances of discrimination failure. The developed account of discrimination between objects will be extended to discrimination between kinds and between types.
Highlights
We regularly employ discrimination when distinguishing between particular objects or persons, such as Anna from Hannah, between kinds or types, such as Ferraris from Lamborghinis, and between properties, such as cardinal red from carmine
Goldman defines perceptual knowledge in terms of discrimination whereas this paper primarily focuses on discrimination
Any appropriate account of discrimination requires conditions for discriminating between two particular alternatives whereas Goldman develops a theory of perceptual knowledge and focuses on discriminating the target proposition p from any relevant alternative q
Summary
We regularly employ discrimination when distinguishing between particular objects or persons, such as Anna from Hannah, between kinds or types, such as Ferraris from Lamborghinis, and between properties, such as cardinal red from carmine. Goldman defines perceptual knowledge in terms of discrimination whereas this paper primarily focuses on discrimination In this respect, Goldman’s approach is different in focus than the one presented here. Any appropriate account of discrimination requires conditions for discriminating between two particular alternatives whereas Goldman develops a theory of perceptual knowledge and focuses on discriminating the target proposition p from any relevant alternative q. S can have favoring epistemic support that the animal in the pen is a zebra and not a painted mule and that she is a normal person and not a brain in a vat, without having discriminating epistemic support In his account, Pritchard relies on pre-theoretical intuitions about discrimination without providing a full theory. Four, I extend this modal theory to reflective discrimination, discrimination via background knowledge, and discrimination of kinds and types
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