Abstract
Security and efficiency are the two main challenges for designing a smart home system. In this paper, by incorporating Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) into the elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), a lightweight key agreement protocol for smart home systems is constructed. Firstly, one-way hash authentication is used to identify the sensor nodes instead of mutual authentication to reduce the authentication cost. Secondly, the CRT is introduced to enhance the security of the original ECDH key agreement. Security analysis showed that the proposed protocol can validate the data integrity and resist the replay attack, the man-in-middle attack, and other attacks. Performance analysis and experiments showed that the protocol achieves high security with low communication and computation costs, and can be implemented in smart home systems.
Highlights
The Internet of Things (IoT), ranging from wearable devices [1], smart homes [2], healthcare [3], smart cities [4], and smart agriculture [5], to industrial automation [6], has rapidly developed
To secure the communication between IoT devices and servers, many elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH)-based key agreement protocols have been proposed [12,13,14,15].Inspired by previous work, we aimed to improve the security of ECDH by incorporating Chinese remainder theorem (CRT), which is a lightweight parameters negotiation algorithm
We aimed to resolve several security issues existing in the authentication and key agreement for smart homes, while simultaneously meeting the lightweight and efficient requirements of the protocol
Summary
The Internet of Things (IoT), ranging from wearable devices [1], smart homes [2], healthcare [3], smart cities [4], and smart agriculture [5], to industrial automation [6], has rapidly developed. With the evolution of IoT technologies, smart home products have been becoming increasingly intelligent and easy to use. A general IoT architecture model consists of three layers: a sensing layer, a network layer, and an application layer. Since many IoT devices work in an unattended fashion with no or limited tamper resistance policies and methodologies, an attacker might take advantage of physical access to some devices, leading to significant damage [7]. The wireless communication between sensors might be intercepted and eavesdropped by malicious attackers
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