A General Who Will Fight: The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant by Harry S. Laver (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: A General Who Will Fight: The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant by Harry S. Laver Brooks D. Simpson (bio) A General Who Will Fight: The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant. By Harry S. Laver. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Pp. 195. Cloth, $32.50.) Over the last three decades there has been a renaissance of interest in Ulysses S. Grant's generalship. Most of the resulting scholarship has taken a largely positive view of his performance: in a few cases these studies have offered insights not already captured in the work of J. F. C. Fuller, Bruce Catton, or T. Harry Williams. It is reasonable to ask whether more recent studies are simply rehashing and summarizing what is already out there, or whether they make a new and insightful contribution to understanding the secret to Grant's success. Harry S. Laver braves this challenge in his concise examination of Grant's Civil War career. He argues that the key to Grant's leadership is to be found in the concept of "analytical determination." The concept builds on Carl von Clausewitz's concept of "a great force of will": Laver declares that the great captain "will have the determination to exercise self-control and control of his command, overcome the voices of self-doubt that rise in moments of crisis, and then make the necessary adjustments to accomplish the mission." One should not confuse this with being stubborn. "By continually evaluating the environment, making the appropriate adjustments, and maintaining a cool head, analytical determination produces a decision both well conceived and deliberately made" (7). These observations should come as no surprise to students of Grant's generalship. Scholars have remarked upon his uncommon common sense, [End Page 134] his ability to assess situations quickly and respond to circumstances, and his coolness under pressure. Simply giving those characteristics a new label does not advance the argument much. The problem, indeed, may well lie elsewhere. As William T. Sherman once observed, "To me he is a mystery, and I believe he is a mystery to himself." The puzzle concerns character and temperament more than intellect. It may well reside in one's tendency to dismiss simpler and straightforward explanations as somehow unsatisfying. That we sometimes find Grant a mystery may tell us more about us than about Grant. Moreover, Laver avoids altogether the obvious question: if Grant possessed "analytical determination" as a general, where did it go during the next twenty years? Where was it evident when it came to business or politics? After all, if Grant was an extraordinary leader, how can one bring together his experiences as general and as president? Laver prefers to confine himself to Grant the general. While it may be unfair to ask an author to reflect on a subject he chose not to examine, Laver's failure to explore Grant's later careers limits the usefulness of an insight that most historians and biographers have already observed and described. "Analytical determination" is at best a term summarizing observations that cry for elaboration: at times it serves as shorthand substituting for more insightful analysis. Laver offers a rather familiar account of Grant's early life, pre-Civil War military career, and rise to high command. The signposts are familiar: his first encounter with the foe at Florida, Missouri; the quick change of fortune at Belmont; the taking of Fort Donelson; the response to surprise at Shiloh; and so on, with each episode offering a lesson in command that Grant usually absorbed. Laver has little to say about Grant's growing political awareness or his skill at civil-military relationships, although each made essential contributions to his success as a commander. Instead, as the narrative flows forward to Vicksburg and Chattanooga, one will find much that is familiar, and much more that is uncritical. Those scholars who stick up for John McClernand, William S. Rosecrans, or George H. Thomas will find much to complain about. More problematic is Laver's treatment of Grant's assumption of overall command in 1864. He passes over Grant's original plan of campaign submitted in January 1864 without understanding what it revealed about Grant's thinking; he asserts that...