A Gaming Approach to Crowd Behavior

Abstract

Social science analyses which try to incorporate human mental processes are fraught with problems. The very existence of as a distinct structure has been debated at length with no resolution (Hook, 1960). Could we agree on useful definitions, there would remain a host of epistemological issues since inferences about psychological conditions must necessarily be drawn from observed indicators. Nowhere has controversy about mental processes been more salient than in theories of crowd behavior. Turner and Killian note that the issues of mind and thread the literature, and the debates have been often marked by semantic confusion, obvious oversimplification, and sheer dogmatism (Turner and Killian, 1972:6). At one extreme is the early work by LeBon (1960) and Freud (1957) who viewed crowd participants as creatures of passion, acting on impulse, and unable to exercise the most elementary forms of cognition. In marked contrast is work by game theorists (Raiffa, 1970; Schelling, 1963) who apply prescriptive strategies for decisions under uncertainty and risk to explain certain group processes. Brown (1965) and Berk (1972b) have applied gaming approaches to actual crowds. Despite varying assessments of the psychological states of crowd members, the dominant view in social science emphasizes emotion, suggestion, and irrationality (Couch, 1968). Smelser defines all collective behavior in terms of generalized beliefs (Smelser, 1962:8) clearly implying crippled cognition. Turner (1964) emphasizes suggestibility which Turner and Killian (1972:80) characterize as a tendency to respond uncritically to suggestions that are consistent with the mood, imagery and conception of appropriate action that have developed and assumed normative character. Earlier, Blumer (1946) argued that crowds evolve through reaction . . . a type of interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces the stimulation that has come from another individual and in being reflected back to this individual reinforces the stimulation. He compared crowds to stampeding cattle claiming that all collective behavior participants react uncritically to each other and the environment. Shibutani (1966) and Klapp (1972) also employ Blumer's circular reaction, while Canetti (1966) simply takes the dominance of emotion as given. Unfortunately, this preoccupation with crowd irrationality has reinforced a type of social inequality Becker (1967) calls the hierarchy of credibility. He argues that societies habitually give credence to the views of people in superordinate positions while dismissing the views of subordinates. Becker's insights can be usefully extended if we recognize that credibility is not only a concomitant of high status, but one of its *1 wish to mention the crucial aid provided by Alan Berger in collecting the data. I also want to acknowledge the assistance of Howard S. Becker, John Walton, John I. Kitsuse, Deborah Lubeck, and Dianne LaFaver. Finally, the ASR referees, the people you love to hate, deserve mention for their thorough, insightful, and often blistering comments.