A Game Incentive Scheme Integrating Punishment in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Abstract

In vehicular ad hoc networks, uncooperative behaviors will impact the reliability of comfort applications, as well as drivers’ decisions, and even invoke serious traffic accidents. In this paper, we propose a novel game incentive scheme to stimulate cooperation among vehicle nodes, consider selfish nodes’ expectations to future payoff and their long-term desires for profit, and show analytically the three incentive-compatible conditions under which selfish nodes will be deterred from cheating by the subsequent punishments. We also discuss the impact on selfish nodes’ behavior, which is caused by their willingness for future collaboration, the parameter values of punishment mechanism and the variation of network load. Simulation results show that, the increase of network load and the deterioration of node’s future profit expectation will motivate nodes toward self-interested action, but our scheme can neutralize this tendency by the careful configuration of punishment parameters, and have favorable incentive effect.