Abstract
The process of urbanization in China has been accompanied by the conflict of land expropriation, which is not conducive to social stability. Different from the previous angles and methods of studying the conflict of agricultural land expropriation, this study puts forward a new behavioral perspective on the basis of game theory, and constructs an evolutionary game model of the conflict of agricultural land expropriation in China from the perspective of multi-dimensional preference. It also discusses the impact of different preference combinations on the conflict input, net income and utility of various stakeholders in agricultural land expropriation. The results show that under the influence of complete self-interest preference, the degree of protection of farmers’ land rights and interests affects the probability of conflicts in compensation for agricultural land expropriation. However, under the influence of multi-dimensional preference combination, agricultural land expropriation can be carried out smoothly only when the reciprocal altruism preference of local government and farmers is strong and the loss aversion preference is weak. These insights have implications for the sustainable development of land, including government involvement and farmers participation, particularly in the context of developing countries.
Highlights
Land resources are the most basic support of national urbanization, and the rapid process of urbanization and the transformation of social structure are the root causes of the conflict of land expropriation and demolition [1]
Reciprocal altruism comes from the research of Rabin (1993) [55], who believes that people are unkind to others when they increase their own interests, and that they are willing to sacrifice their own interests to increase others’ interests, which is friendly to others
From the perspective of behavior preference theory, combined with game theory, this study considers the impact of multi-dimensional preference on the strategic behavior of relevant stakeholders in the conflict of agricultural land expropriation
Summary
Land resources are the most basic support of national urbanization, and the rapid process of urbanization and the transformation of social structure are the root causes of the conflict of land expropriation and demolition [1]. China’s socialist system and top-down administrative system are quite different from other capitalist countries, and land expropriation adopts a two-track land ownership system The particularity of these systems makes the local government play a leading role in the process of land expropriation [2], while the residents are in a weak position [3]. In view of the important role of the conflict of land expropriation in the sustainable and stable development of China’s rural areas, the purpose of this study is to determine how different behavioral preferences and different combinations of preferences of stakeholders affect decision-making and to determine how to promote cooperation among stakeholders in the process of agricultural land expropriation [19,20]. The authors hope that these findings can provide some reference for the policy direction in the conflict management of land expropriation
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