A FUNÇÃO SOCIAL DO DIREITO AUTORAL E O ACESSO AO CONHECIMENTO

The most notable, or at least the most noted, form of property evolution has been the transfer of exclusive rights from collectives to individuals and vice versa, such as the farm collectivization in Soviet Union and the establishment of the People’s Communes in Mao’s China and their reversals. Such radical moments, however, constitute only a small part of history. For the most part, property rights evolve quietly and incrementally, which is hard to explain if we take exclusive rights as the core of property, or, to put it more generally, if we are focusing solely on the question of who owns the things. To describe the evolution of property rights in China, we employ the concept of relational property. It is a concept that is heavily influenced by Joseph William Singer’s “social relations model” and Ian Macneil’s “relational contract” and, in particular, their emphasis on the determinative role of social relations in the construction of property and contract rights. The bundle of sticks metaphor is at the heart of relational property because it recognizes that property rights can be, and often are, disaggregated as they adapt to changing social, economic, and technological demands. As we show in the context of the reform of Chinese rural land, the combination of the metaphor of separable interests — the sticks in the bundle — and the dependence of property interests on social relationships can explain the evolution of property rights more accurately than a perspective that stresses a single central meaning of property.

The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West

In her path-breaking work, Elinor Ostrom provides theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that individuals often overcome the problem of collective action and arrange privately for the provision and allocation of public goods, including informal property rights. Ostrom has also found that local experimentation and self-governance often produce more effective results than rulemaking by the state. In his Coase Theorem, Ronald Coase arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion. Ostrom and Coase both recognize that high transaction costs can block private rule making. The new literature on institutions, however, has jettisoned the model of a benevolent welfare maximizing state: The state does not as a rule assign the license to create property rights to those who are most likely to provide efficient solutions. Still, private individuals often find various opportunities to supply their own informal rules and governance systems. In this paper, I examine recent evolution of property rights in Iceland’s national health records. My findings a) support the hypothesis that the demand for exclusive and well-defined property rights depends directly on the value of the assets in question; b) show that de facto rights, which are the effective economic property rights, can deviate from the corresponding de jure rights; c) demonstrate the relevance of the Coase-Ostrom insight concerning the role of private ordering; and d) provide evidence that competition between mental models can have a major role in the evolution of property rights.

In her path-breaking work, Elinor Ostrom provides theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that individuals often overcome the problem of collective action and arrange privately for the provision and allocation of public goods, including informal property rights. Ostrom has also found that local experimentation and self-governance often produce more effective results than rulemaking by the state. In his Coase Theorem, Ronald Coase arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion. Ostrom and Coase both recognize that high transaction costs can block private rule making. The new literature on institutions, however, has jettisoned the model of a benevolent welfare maximizing state: The state does not as a rule assign the license to create property rights to those who are most likely to provide efficient solutions. Still, private individuals often find various opportunities to supply their own informal rules and governance systems. In this paper, I examine recent evolution of property rights in Iceland’s national health records. My findings a) support the hypothesis that the demand for exclusive and well-defined property rights depends directly on the value of the assets in question; b) show that de facto rights, which are the effective economic property rights, can deviate from the corresponding de jure rights; c) demonstrate the relevance of the Coase-Ostrom insight concerning the role of private ordering; and d) provide evidence that competition between mental models can have a major role in the evolution of property rights.

Township Village Enterprises (TVEs) have essentially contributed to China's economic development and institutional transformation over the last twenty years. One of the explanations for the mechanism of TVEs' growth is the co-operative culture theory which claims that Chinese - compared with other nationalities - could better resolve free riding problems and work more efficiently under collective TVEs. In this paper, based on official documents, statistical data and results from important surveys, we analyze the historic development of property rights in TVEs. We have proved that the evolution of TVEs' property rights depended on the interaction between peasants and policy makers. In this interaction process peasants showed strong pursuit of private ownership and policy makers reacted with delay towards owner interests. Owing to the delay of political adjustments, peasants had to adopt various ownership forms for their enterprises - joint households, collective and shareholding cooperative - in order to struggle against a discriminating environment for private ownership. This institutional evolution is not a proof for the co-operative culture theory, but instead for the conventional theory of property rights because the long struggle of the peasants finally led to one clearly defined form of ownership private property rights. We have tested our hypothesis in view of the following process: In the collective economy under the commune system, policy-makers changed the size of owner units of TVEs from big (commune) to small (production brigade or production group) and back in accordance with the importance of TVEs to the national economy. In the individual economy after the reform of land use rights, the property rights of TVEs were forced to change step by step to private property rights under the pressure of farm households striving for private ownership. The peasants instrumentalized the various vaguely defined property rights in order to avoid political risks. Due to the principal agent problem, the collective-owned TVEs went down despite political and financial support. The financial viability of private TVEs however grew in spite of their competition with collective-owned TVEs and severe political and financial discrimination. With the evolution of property rights in TVEs, at present private enterprises dominate the non farm sector in China's rural areas. These structural changes require adjustments of China's financial policy: Formerly, formal financial institutions directed their support mainly towards collective enterprises, whereas private TVEs depended on informal capital sources. In order to meet private TVEs' financial demands, the rural financial market which officially is still dominated by formal financial institutions should be replaced with a financial market consisting of legally recognized multiform-intermediaries.

A Human Rights-Based Approach to Poverty Reduction: The Role of the Right of Access to Medicine as an Element of the Right of Access to Health Care

The physical, economic, and sociocultural displacement of local peoples from protected areas generates intense discussion among scholars and policy makers. To foster greater precision and clarity in these discussions, we used a conceptual framework from the political economy literature to examine different forms of human displacement from protected areas. Using marine protected areas (MPAs) to ground our analysis, we characterized the 5 types of property rights that are reallocated (lost, secured, and gained) through the establishment of protected areas. All forms of MPA "displacement" involve reallocation of property rights, but the specific types and bundles of rights lost, secured, and gained dramatically shape the magnitude, extent, and equity of MPA impacts--positive and negative--on governance, economic well-being, health, education, social capital, and culture. The impacts of reallocating rights to MPA resources vary within and among social groups, inducing changes in society, in patterns of resource use, and in the environment. To create more environmentally sustainable and socially just conservation practice, a critical next step in conservation social science research is to document and explain variation in the social impacts of protected areas.

This article endeavors to conduct a comprehensive legal juxtaposition of moral and economic rights within the contexts of Indonesia and France. Intellectual property rights, specifically copyright, constitute the focal point of analysis, safeguarding various forms of creative expression encompassing literary, artistic, and scientific works. Within the realm of copyright, a fundamental distinction exists between economic rights, which are subject to arbitrary transfer, and moral rights, which inherently vest with the creator or artist and resist divestiture. Employing conceptual and normative approaches, supplemented by data procured from library resources, this research adopts qualitative data analysis techniques, encompassing both traditional and online research methodologies.The findings of this investigation illuminate dissimilarities in the legal frameworks governing intellectual property rights protection between Indonesia and France. France accentuates the significance of cultural and moral rights, prioritizing the intrinsic connection between the creator and their creation. In contrast, Indonesia places greater emphasis on economic considerations and the protection of economic interests. These disparities manifest in the divergent regulatory structures governing industrial design and copyright in each jurisdiction. Notwithstanding these distinctions, the article contends that achieving harmonization and fostering a nuanced understanding of these regulations is imperative to facilitate cross-border collaborations within the global economy and creative industries. Such harmonization is pivotal for advancing the collective interests of nations and creators alike.

Property rights are important institutions that influence economic performance and reflect the historical, cultural, and political realities of particular societies. Drawing on a variety of concepts from legal and economic studies, a framework for explaining the origin and evolution of property rights is developed and applied to the specific case of changing ground water rights in Nebraska. The Nebraska case is an interesting example of reliance on local control in regulating water use. Despite the importance of local initiatives in ground water management, this case also illustrates the need for external support from the judicial and legislative systems. The evolution of ground water property rights in Nebraska, as in other parts of the United States, has been conditioned by historical circumstances and changing values and attitudes as well as by economic and political forces.

I went to the University of Toronto in the fall of 1983 to pursue a Master's Degree in what was then called Political Economy. I chose Toronto largely because C.B. Macpherson taught there. Or so I thought. In those pre-internet days, news traveled slowly, and while the brochure I had received in the mail clearly listed him as a member of the faculty, I discovered when I arrived that he had in fact retired.As it happens, his physical absence hardly seemed to matter, as his ideas—along with those of Allan Bloom, who was also no longer there—permeated the air. It was easy to think about and find discussions of not just Possessive Individualism, but also of his many essays on democratic theory. When, after a four year absence in the mid-80s, I returned for doctoral work, I found no small amount of faculty support for a dissertation on Macpherson's democratic vision.I mention this history because it is of a time that now seems quite remote. Good old-fashion Marxist inspired leftism has almost a quaint air about it, as the names of those whose works we debated endlessly—Miliband, Poulantzas, Althusser, Marcuse (a friend of Macpherson's), Fromm—now create more nostalgia than they do internecine graduate student fighting. So too does the name Macpherson, and, I would argue, we need, in marking the 50th anniversary of Possessive Individualism, to acknowledge that fact. The book is fifty years old, but it was really only alive for about half of that time. Part of the explanation for its decline is no doubt found in the critiques—by Dunn, Skinner and others—of Macpherson's interpretations of Hobbes, Locke et al.1 Of at least equal significance, however, are the forces that have undermined enthusiasm for much of the socialist left. Put simply: Macpherson was too forceful a critic of capitalism for his work to remain unscathed by that system's perceived triumph over communism.Or so I shall argue. When I say “too forceful” I do not mean to imply that Macpherson's critique of capitalism was where he went wrong. Actually, I intend to make precisely the opposite point. To be more specific, my argument here is that while the central ethical commitment of the theory of possessive individualism was anti-capitalist in nature—and for that reason a difficult sell in today's political climate—a close inspection of the manner in which Macpherson employed that commitment reveals a critical perspective that renders his work every bit as vital now as it was thirty, forty or fifty years ago.2Macpherson explained in the opening pages of Possessive Individualism that the book's central concept is a form of individualism arising in the seventeenth-century in which the individual is “seen as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”3 This image was, Macpherson argued, brought to life in the writings of liberal thinkers who took their cues about the nature of individuals from the nascent capitalist relations around them.4 In imbuing their theories with this image, they managed, as have their successors—and in Macpherson's hands, there is no shortage of possessive individualists—to in turn justify those relations, for capitalism as an ideal made sense only as long as humans were conceived in the possessive individualist mode (which, as he later commented, was “a fairly realistic conclusion at the time”5).The logic of these justifications made them unassailable to anyone unwilling to question the basic “postulates of human nature,” as Macpherson was fond of calling them. And for those who did question them—J.S. Mill and T.H. Green through to twentieth century liberals such as A. D. Lindsay and Ernest Barker—the results were various forms of contradiction “involving the thinkers' concealing from themselves the fundamental nature of the problem.”6 As the possessive individualism postulates could not be jettisoned “while market relations prevail,”7 critics of the possessive model simply tacked on to them an “egalitarian complement.”8 This “concept of man as at least potentially a doer, an exerter and developer and enjoyer of his human capacities”9 resulted in “an uneasy compromise between the two views of man's essence, and, correspondingly, an unsure mixture of … two maximizing claims made for the liberal-democratic society.”10 Thus while the theory of possessive individualism was initially an attempt to bring to light the pervasiveness in liberal theory of market assumptions about humans, it became, as Macpherson continued in subsequent works to explore its normative implications,11 an attempt to expose much broader and further reaching contradictions within what had become liberal-democratic theory. As he put it, “Because Western democratic theory contains these inconsistent postulates, its condition is internally precarious.”12So far there is little to indicate why this theory might have come to be neglected in the last twenty years. Even if Macpherson's critics were correct that early liberal thinkers were not drawing from nascent market relations in their postulates about human nature, none, to my knowledge, has suggested that these postulates are absent in their theories. (Rousseau, after all, had argued something very similar when he pointed out that all state of nature theorists, “speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression, desires, and pride, have transferred to the state of nature the ideas they acquired in society.”13) Nor has there been criticism of the claim that such postulates do indeed work to justify market relations (irrespective of whether that justification was the intention of any particular thinker). In fact, it is difficult to see how one could reject that claim. So what is the problem here? Why is the theory of possessive individualism not still in currency?The answer, I think, has far less to do with Macpherson's analysis of liberal-democratic theories than it does with the normative position that motivated it. He was, after all, targeting those theories not simply because he, like Rousseau, saw them as anthropologically or ontologically incorrect. Rather, he targeted them because of what they did, namely justify particular inequalities endemic to market relations.14 Hobbes, Locke, and others whose theories were imbued with possessive individualist assumptions did not interest him as subjects of intellectual history; they interested him for the part they played—wittingly or not—in the justification of unjust property relations. His general thinking was that the maintenance [of any particular system of property] requires at least the acquiescence of the bulk of the people, and the positive support of any leading classes. Such support requires a belief that the institution serves some purpose or fills some need. That belief requires, in turn, that there be a theory which both explains and justifies the institution in terms of the purpose served or the need filled.15 This, then, was the role of possessive individualist theories.So what unjust set of property relations—what institution—did possessive individualism explain and justify? In discussing possessive individualism's emphasis on humans as having unlimited desires, Macpherson followed a causal chain to the source of the problem: … the acceptance, by the most active part of society, of the belief that unlimited desire is natural and rational leads to the establishment of the right of unlimited appropriation, which leads to the concentration of ownership of the material means of labour, which leads to the continual transfer of powers.16 This continual transfer occurs because men, as “proprietors of their own person or capacities,” are able to “sell the use of their energy and skill on the market, in exchange for the product or the use of others' energy and skill.”17 The source of the injustice was, then, the wage relationship, a relationship made possible by “the individual right to unlimited, or virtually unlimited, accumulations of property.”18Possessive Individualism (the book) did not dwell long on these concrete conditions, as Macpherson's focus was on the possessive picture of humanity that emerges from Hobbes, et al. He did, however, in his discussion of Hobbes, outline the features of “possessive market society,” emphasizing that “if a single criterion of [this] society is wanted it is that man's labour is a commodity.”19 Indeed, this criterion makes this possessive “model of society” the only one (of three he described) that “meet(s) Hobbes's requirements:” Only in a society in which each man's capacity to labour is his own property, is alienable, and is a market commodity, could all individuals be in this continual competitive power relationship.20To sum up: the “possessive” in “possessive individualism” refers not to our relationship with commodities (as is commonly supposed),21 but rather to our relationship with our own labor. Specifically, it refers to the fact that we can have a relationship with it; that it is thought of not as “us” but rather as “ours.” (Try having a relationship with your leg.) This self-image—the product of possessive individualist theories—in turn allows us to accept the sale of labor to others, and it is this actual, concrete economic fact (the existence of the wage relationship) that lies at the core of Macpherson's critical analysis. It is also what makes that analysis problematic in the era that accepts the market in an increasingly uncritical fashion, for in attacking the commodification of labor, the theory of possessive individualism attacks the market at its core.In most of Macpherson's analysis of possessive individualism, Marx is not mentioned. In fact Marx's name only appears on two pages of Possessive Individualism. Yet, as he makes clear on one of those two pages, his debt is substantial: The conception of possessive market society is neither a novel nor an arbitrary construction. It is clearly similar to the concepts of bourgeois or capitalist society used by Marx, Weber, Sombart, and others, who have made the existence of a market in labour a criterion of capitalism.22 Indeed, while Macpherson did in subsequent writings say a bit more about the concrete economic relations he viewed as unjust, he never actually refined or added to Marx's analysis; he simply appropriated it as his own.23 Whatever debt he owed “Weber, Sombart, and others” was never again mentioned. Marx, however, remained a steady, if often unmentioned, voice in his later writings. Irrespective of whether he himself was at some level a Marxist—an issue I have always found uninteresting, if not silly24—he clearly felt, as he once quipped, that “the utility of Marxism as a means of understanding the world is increasing over time.”25I highlight Macpherson's embracing of Marx's social analysis in order to identify a crucial difference between the two. If Macpherson's social analysis was the same as Marx's, the conceptual framework in which it was delivered was emphatically not, and, as I shall suggest, it is precisely this perspectival difference that explains why the utility of Marxism as a means of understanding the world has not increased over time, and why the utility of possessive individualism need not follow the same path. To see this point, we need to contrast the language each thinker used in discussing what, precisely, was the problem raised by the wage relationship. We turn first to Marx.Marx's first sustained analysis of the wage relationship is found in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, where he describes the problem of that relationship as one of “alienation.” In the essay “Estranged Labor,” he identifies four particular types of alienation: from the laboring process, from the object of labor, from our “Species Being” and from each other. The first thing to note in this account is how at least half of it rests on some fairly ambiguous conceptual arguments. Whether we are alienated from our Species Being will, of course, depend on what that is; an issue that can hardly be resolved in the absence of some deep ontological claim. As far as being alienated from our fellow human beings, it is difficult to see how social separation—though regrettable morally—could, despite its effects on the individual, be constituted as a wrong in some political sense: if it is “wrong,” it is so only in a broad sense that would be difficult to defend uncontroversially (“life shouldn't be like that”). At a minimum it seems unlikely that we can point, say, to any right (to fraternity?) being violated.What, however, of alienation from the laboring process and the product of our labor? How is the essence of the problem described there? On the laboring process, Marx's language is particularly striking (and should draw comparisons to Macpherson's): … labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it … Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another …26 Here alienation results in a condition of, as Wood has put it, “a person who experiences life as empty, meaningless and absurd, or who fails to sustain a sense of self-worth.”27 Troublesome as well is what the laborer creates: The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the the this the is the of Whatever the product of his labor he is the this the less is he The alienation of the worker in his product means … that the life which he has on the object him as something and the condition seems it is difficult to how to what is problematic about it. it that we to remain to our ontological And what is to the the laborer how precisely is he in not being able to see himself in not that there no only that capacity to them as Marx did seems of ontological In some this us to the of Marx's To the problem with wage labor into one of where of the laborer are is to Marx's that of and is as it is to the very relations of we to into Indeed, that our conceptual understanding of and in his the product of those relations, Marx might have our to the wage as an injustice or a of first this claim seems similar to Macpherson's argument about the effects of possessive The however, is that Macpherson's claims about liberal theory were from a theory of He was largely on the issue of how theory was to its material do not into the general question of the of ideas or material he and Locke could be explained by the in which they but so too could Mill and If the theories were merely and of this the were that was not merely another in Marx much more Macpherson, on the his to from the of possessive then, is that Macpherson from the relations of to which he so His was one of as he put it, not a he makes clear in the opening pages of Possessive Individualism. If we are by some others might our Whether he was in some we can indeed see and critique the relations of from some the point. only is that Macpherson's critique is one that still has in an era to the of liberal no ontological Macpherson only that we relations of from in their he whether those relations might the very used to justify Possessive Individualism, Macpherson's critique of the market was that by the twentieth century it had both the and of that were the of political The problem was that theory to use the assumptions of possessive individualism because they are for our possessive market the market no contradiction to the indeed it the only of of which possessive individuals were such as Mill who possessive assumptions as were to in Macpherson continued to work on in liberal-democratic theory over the he his understanding of its contradictions the issue of The problem remained liberal-democratic to into the of capitalist society a of market postulates and which were not when first a century or more what made the was not simply that was but that one set of postulates (the possessive individualist to justify an economic system that the (the The market simply a society of and the of the postulates had liberal-democratic theory then, that while Marx's claim is that the capitalist market about a nature of humanity and human relations, Macpherson saw no need to the basic liberal-democratic that were into liberal theory in the century to make it To Marx's claim that the system would the of its of concentration of argued that the contradiction was between a market system and the of human life on its own Put simply: Marx Macpherson within be clear about why this last I no claims here about the ontological of Marxism or In I have always been to the of Marx's analysis of the very ideas that I suggested were ambiguous and on ontological I have always found about Macpherson, however, was his to those As a first of political Macpherson taught his that there was within the liberal a of human one that much of the of (and that was in fact the same as the but one that also the political that with Marx's theory of In Macpherson's critique of the wage relationship that need not accept the with which Marx had it. through a one that its possessive could a to the wage relationship, and it could do so the own of Macpherson's perspective is to in over the wage relationship to or a for is to at with all the more so in the twenty years. Even if Marx is correct as a right of man is not on the of man with man but rather on the of man from it would still be to question whether the capitalist market is really the most means to its own conception of and to its own understanding of to a critique of property in the claim that “the of any man which are … are only those which all others to have equal is to out that property at a minimum be on basic liberal Macpherson's that from possessive postulates could not to this him to at a position both and than Macpherson its liberal position need not be to depend on an of capitalist it has been so The fact that liberal in capitalist market is not in a reason why the central ethical of of the individual to his or human always be to such Macpherson's hands, then, the of capitalism could on liberal terms that the of both and human As long as was viewed from the “an of the right to all to human could the of the market then, does the wage contradictions for In what is a human by a process in which no part in what is when it is how it is or why it is The issue is not the of the means of as it for in the of and The is with to the that has on the in the Macpherson was particularly about the effects on two crucial to the liberal those of and those of I shall close by how the wage each We can with in its most something to claim that it in having a to capacity in and the of the to which one belongs and in to need in the which the this understanding of the between the wage relationship and democratic it also to a of in which the two might have little or no on one is the that the as he or belongs to the process, should have a in and the of that The same also to for being of however, for could In what sense does the laborer to the there is the issue of whether a is inconsistent with an to the fact that the of democratic rests on how we might about the nature of the process, for the of the democratic has normative only if we accept the claim that the process should be for that relations do not with democratic is more of an than a normative In we need first to the to which the process is similar to or from the society that others, had in Macpherson's such are for between democratic and are if not In an essay twenty years Possessive Individualism, Macpherson argued If we think of as not merely a set of … but as a set of or to which these are but it is to that any economic which can be to be also essential means to the democratic are to the and support of the The that was not merely a political concept but a broader social one (a of as described remained at the of Macpherson's thought his So too did the claim that was not just about a to capacity in and the of the to which one but also that it a of an equal society in which can be as he later it, in which there was an to use and develop and each person Indeed, it is this broader conception of that explains Macpherson's on political If the is to be then democratic as as an of that the over which one needs would the of the of particular be those that to the of and namely those our laboring In discussing for the democratic in in the Macpherson what was at in are as not as or are in it not to a wage or a of the but to make their work more to them. If were merely another in the for more to home … it would do nothing … to from their image of themselves as and is not about of it is about the of Whether or not, the to Macpherson's (and central claim that how we is of vital to the in which we of who we from being a ontological the here only on the that labor in fact, a part of us (and that it is only in light of an turn in century liberal thought that we have come to think that perspective it is the wage relationship that and an ontological at a an one whose requires a democratic ideal in calling for a human the of what the capitalist market has there can be no doubt that democratic is with the that are for has every for the of its own to democratic unlimited property right with the wage to a democratic Macpherson saw as the not to the market, but only to in its was the to to “the laborer has a to capacity in and the of the to which he Whether that is received depend not on the existence of the wage but on its any the democratic ideal would themselves depend a democratic process, one that as much on in as it did on any As Macpherson put “the of a in Western liberal-democratic with their … of the possessive individualist model of wage relationship was not simply a democratic for the of to the means of labor that it one of the basic justifications of the … institution of individual property, that human needs be that In his writings on property, Macpherson with the concept in its one that from any particular mode of At this property in “a and not merely a because it that the not be by of the of his market society had the wage was to this between labor and its As its very was, as Green put it, should be by society in the power of and the means of a had been Macpherson to to of property that the market and its theories had of the for property as a human right … on whether we property in the or in the more and more natural sense of an individual right both to some property and to some right of to the natural and the of a If we to it in the the property right democratic human If we it in the broader it does not a democratic concept of human indeed it bring us to something like the concept of individual property in and he was more As as a property in is from an right which is at the same time an i.e., the right to or property in labour, the is property as a right by all to them to their human essence is to In forms of property are with the ideal of the institution and forms are In the market not only of fundamental they also the very which they were I have no to Macpherson at the of As I have most of these are with Marx's Macpherson, Marx to property, not to it there can be no and no society where some form of property does not is a he did so by at its most form of is not the of property but the of bourgeois and he did so on the same as Macpherson no man of the power to the of all that it does is to him of the power to the labour of others by means of such problem of Marx has less to do with the of his than it does with its to be And of the market are as vital now as they were in for that matter, more of and, for those who do have a of labor all for those who to that the is a The question is who to more to the to they of the market, if we are to them at all, that market property not us where we to … as why that and then they why an set of property is to be most they after such a set of be able to close the argument as a liberal-democratic theory which the concept of property still be in any sense a liberal That of course, on what put into If that it mean all the market … then clearly a political theory around the concept of property could not be called if to be essentially an of the right to all to human … then a political theory around the conception of property is as liberal theory less of property would not but would the essential liberal-democratic

Beginning with the set of Hohfeldian elements, it is possible to design any number of molecular combinations that may come closer to approximating what we mean by a moral right than any of those elements in isolation. In the last chapter, we looked at the particular molecule favored by Choice Theory of legal rights, and considered the question whether that molecule was also distinctive of moral rights. Another common suggestion about moral rights (and moral, rather than legal, rights will be the focus of this chapter) is that a person X’s moral right to φ is a precise bundle of Hohfeldian elements consisting of a moral claim-right against interference by Y with X’s φing, a moral claim-right against interference by Y with X’s not φing, coupled with X’s moral permissions both to φ and not to φ – that is, with the absence of a moral duty either to φ or not to φ. This is to be taken as a proposed stipulation of what is to be understood by talk of a moral right. The force of such rights will be brought out (in part) by unpacking what is meant by interference. The scope of the right will be brought out by specifying the range of persons and entities Y who are duty-bound not to interfere. And the substance of the right will be the action, φing, that the right-holder has a moral option to do or omit. Further, we can pose the question of the alienability or prescriptability of a moral right as a question about what powers and liabilities exist with respect to the core bundle.

What are property rights? The term "property rights" carries two distinct meanings in the economic literature. One, primarily developed by Alchian (1965, 1987) and Cheung (1969), is essentially the ability to enjoy a piece of property. The other, much more prevalent and much older, is essentially what the state assigns to a person. I designate the first "economic (property) rights" and the second "legal (property) rights." Economic rights are the end (that is, what people ultimately seek), whereas legal rights are the means to achieve the end. In this book I am concerned primarily with economic rights. Legal rights play a primarily supporting role – a very prominent one, however, for they are easier to observe than economic rights.

The right to the city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it. We need to be sure we can live with our own creations. But the right to remake ourselves by creating a qualitatively different kind of urban sociality is one of the most precious of all human rights. We have been made and re‐made without knowing exactly why, how, and to what end. How then, can we better exercise this right to the city? But whose rights and whose city? Could we not construct a socially just city? But what is social justice? Is justice simply whatever the ruling class wants it to be? We live in a society in which the inalienable rights to private property and the profit rate trump any other conception of inalienable rights. Our society is dominated by the accumulation of capital through market exchange. To live under capitalism is to accept or submit to that bundle of rights necessary for endless capital accumulation. Free markets are not necessarily fair. Worse still, markets require scarcity to function. The inalienable rights of private property and the profit rate lead to worlds of inequality, alienation and injustice. The endless accumulation of capital and the conception of rights embedded threin must be opposed and a different right to the city must be asserted politically. Derivative rights (like the right to be treated with dignity) should become fundamental and fundamental rights (of private property and the profit rate) should become derivative. But new rights can also be defined: like the right to the city which is not merely a right of access to what the property speculators and state planners define, but an active right to make the city different, to shape it more in accord with our heart's desire, and to re‐make ourselves thereby in a different image.

Indonesia has some varieties of ethnic groups that are rich in diversity of intellectual property, there are so many products produced by society. The society creations especially created by the community are assorted, one of them is Paoman Batik. Thre are two kinds of Paoman Batik, those are contemporary and traditional, which is distinguished by its motives, processes, creators. The Paoman Traditional Batik is well-known to the public than contemporary. This research has supported the creators or copyright holders to get higher benefits, both the benefits of moral and economic rights. The main problem is, first, is the current intellectual property rights regime able to provide the foundation for the protection of Paoman Traditional Batik? Second, is the UNESCO's determination that stated if batik is a world heritage, non-object from Indonesia, can be used as the foundation to charge the economic rights of Paoman Traditional Batik? Third, is it possible for Traditional Batik, including Paoman Traditional Batik, to be carried out through other regimes, in addition to the intellectual property regime? Fourth, how is the effect of Paoman Traditional Batik Registered at the Directorate General of Intellectual Property of Indonesia on the Progress of Indramayu society?
 The research method used is descriptive specification, by using juridical empirical approach, which focus on secondary research consisting of legal materials, both primary, secondary and tertiary. However it is supported by primary data generated from field research through in-depth interview and survey techniques. The analysis used is descriptive analysis.
 The results of the study show that intellectual property rights that is copyright cannot be made as the foundation of protection against the creation of society that have traditional and communal motives, including the Paoman Tradsional Batik. The establishment of Batik by UNESCO as a non-object world heritage from Indonesia has increased the moral rights of Indonesia, but it also cannot be established as the foundation for restoring economic rights when there is a misappropriation. Another alternative to intellectual property is through the Sui Generis regime, which specifically addresses the protection of community rights, including intellectual property rights.

Indonesia has some varieties of ethnic groups that are rich in diversity of intellectual property, there are so many products produced by society. The society creations especially created by the community are assorted, one of them is Paoman Batik. Thre are two kinds of Paoman Batik, those are contemporary and traditional, which is distinguished by its motives, processes, creators. The Paoman Traditional Batik is well-known to the public than contemporary. This research has supported the creators or copyright holders to get higher benefits, both the benefits of moral and economic rights. The main problem is, first, is the current intellectual property rights regime able to provide the foundation for the protection of Paoman Traditional Batik? Second, is the UNESCO's determination that stated if batik is a world heritage, non-object from Indonesia, can be used as the foundation to charge the economic rights of Paoman Traditional Batik? Third, is it possible for Traditional Batik, including Paoman Traditional Batik, to be carried out through other regimes, in addition to the intellectual property regime? Fourth, how is the effect of Paoman Traditional Batik Registered at the Directorate General of Intellectual Property of Indonesia on the Progress of Indramayu society?
 The research method used is descriptive specification, by using juridical empirical approach, which focus on secondary research consisting of legal materials, both primary, secondary and tertiary. However it is supported by primary data generated from field research through in-depth interview and survey techniques. The analysis used is descriptive analysis.
 The results of the study show that intellectual property rights that is copyright cannot be made as the foundation of protection against the creation of society that have traditional and communal motives, including the Paoman Tradsional Batik. The establishment of Batik by UNESCO as a non-object world heritage from Indonesia has increased the moral rights of Indonesia, but it also cannot be established as the foundation for restoring economic rights when there is a misappropriation. Another alternative to intellectual property is through the Sui Generis regime, which specifically addresses the protection of community rights, including intellectual property rights.